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LECTURE 10
OBEDIENCE ENTIRE
The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to
the law of God.
But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever
called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though
apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reasonably
excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths
of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that
are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They
maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there
is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all
Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not
one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts
as virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to
His law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that
obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of
heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic,
or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to obey the law; and
maintain that men may be, and are pious, and eminently so, who do
not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be
generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must
assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral
law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any
law. In this discussion. I shall:
moral law; and,
2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this
law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as
virtue or true religion.
There can be no rule of duty but the moral law.
Upon this proposition I remark:
(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the
law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of
God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the
course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and
relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and
relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if
this is right, nothing else can be right If this course is obligatory upon
us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly
be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and
relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right.
If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.
(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should He
do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in His
arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can He alter it, or introduce any
other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else
right than to love Him with all the heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of
faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is
not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from
its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and
love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been
said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can
be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his
nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this.
Nor call any being render anything more than this obligatory Indeed,
there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law.
There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,
and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us
to the consideration of the second proposition, namely:
That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral
law.
That, every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,
will appear, if we consider:
(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:
(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:
(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the
law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.
"Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law" (Romans 13:10). "Though I
speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity
(love), I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And
though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and
all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove
mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow
all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be
burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing" (1 Cor.
13:1-3). Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible not only as
constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every
form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence.
Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of
selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to
obedience to it.
Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and
the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ.
Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we
come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is
love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or
the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of Him and of us.
Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings.
Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence
viewed in particular relations.
Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands.
That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,
virtue.
A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to
God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's
account, is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of
full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow
brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations, that God really
accepts from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what
His law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they
render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less
at every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as
can well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct
inquiries:
(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to
disobey, the moral law at the same time?
(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present
and full obedience to the moral law?
The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding
lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral
law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,
and partly disobey, at the same time. We will now attend to the
second question, namely:
Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and
full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can He accept
anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full
obedience, or all that the law requires?
The term justification is used in two senses:
(a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:
(b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has
sinned, as if he had not sinned.
It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted,
and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short
of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do
not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at
every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they are
justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and
personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts,
and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present
commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts them
righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully
pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by
coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under
the circumstances the law of God requires. While voluntarily
withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the
sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the
sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds.
This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many
hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the
following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.
moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be
accepted and justified?
This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully
withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how
great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all
our hearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted,
how much less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our
neighbor, will be accepted?
Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our
neighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our
neighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not
what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,
then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be
accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be
in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our
neighbor a little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our
neighbors, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God
must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme
love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial
obedience; yet the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or
is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree
of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much
greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In
what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure,
our love, so as to know whether we love God a little more than any
other being? But how much are we to love our neighbor, in order to
our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves,
how much less, and still be justified? These are certainly questions of
vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should
they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not
only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The
advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if
they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that
their theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such
vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be
accepted, it is a momentous question, how partial, or how complete
must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of
agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here.
But again,
2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do
not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which
we are forgiven?
The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this
world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always
withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very
act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God
and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services, fully
forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and
pertinacious rebellion? Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!
Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this
must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full
obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents
God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled with
weapons against His throne.
3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,
by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be
honored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear,
and honor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself
to the intelligence of the universe? Will pardon and justification save
the sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his
heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can
heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such
a method of justification?
4. But again: Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of?
Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a
question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has
God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some
course of conduct which is suitable to Him? Has He not given us
intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the
propriety of His public acts? Does He not invite and require scrutiny?
Why has He required an atonement for sin, and why has He required
repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate
has a right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which
any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same
thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a
rebel's being pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his
rebellion? To pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered
in, were to sanction by a public act that which is lacking in his
repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to
render full obedience.
5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the
sin of withholding a part of our hearts from Him?
God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire Him to
forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness.
While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we cannot
profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And
shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess
repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease
from sin, is a gross insult to God.
6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while
unrepented of? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is
represented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully
forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this
always stands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of
divine inspiration.
7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin? Where is
such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every
degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose
heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be
condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely,
if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most
unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the whole law, and yet
offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10). What is this but
asserting, that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be
unavailing, since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that
partial obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable
obedience at all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense
that the law is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is
sheer antinomianism. What! A sinner justified while indulging in
rebellion against God!
But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must
intend fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his
purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of
perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is
intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that
moral character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then,
perfection of intention be an indispensable condition of justification,
what is this, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a
condition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny.
What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is
intended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a
sinner cannot be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes and
intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he seriously
intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends
to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love,
good willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to
intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is absurd.
What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of
justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an
intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended,
to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Unless he
intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the
law; that he intends to live without sin. The supposition is, that he is
now sinning; that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily withholding from
God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and intends this, and yet
the supposition is, that at the same time he chooses, wills, intends,
fully to obey the law. What is this but the ridiculous assertion, that he
at the same time intends full obedience to the law, and intends not
fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God
and man their dues.
But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in
him? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless
the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while
there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he
be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense,
while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the
law, unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is
any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both
be pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the
time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which
the law is not uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one
that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to
do them" (Gal. 3:10). The fact is, there never has been, and there
never can be, any such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved,
if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20),
that is, He much more condemns us. "But if our heart condemn us
not, then have we confidence towards God" (1 John 3:21). God
cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in His arbitrary will. It is as
unalterable and unrepealable as His own nature. God can never
repeal nor alter it. He can for Christ's sake dispense with the
execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full present
obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other
possible conditions. To affirm that He can, is to affirm that God can
alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral
government.
8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial
repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to
present full obedience to the law of God?
To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose
a new end, to begin a new life, to turn from self seeking to seeking the
highest good of being, to turn from selfishness to disinterested
benevolence, from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience.
Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a
thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists
in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former
lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot coexist, at the same
time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite
ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of
partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to
overlook the very nature of repentance. What! A man both turn away
from, and hold on to sin at the same time! Serve God and mammon at
one and the same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed
both by reason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the
sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God
pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry:
9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin?
What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires
benevolence, good willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing,
but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the
commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing,
willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it must be intelligent
and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin
is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin.
Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, of
course, implies the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is
the choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the
rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness,
naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal
opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of
the other in the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and
there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.
10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?
Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that
present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking
both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish
willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These
two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly coexist.
Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of
God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is
nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that
he is penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he
disobeys. This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man
can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time. This
idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that repentance consists in
sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility. But repentance
consists in a change of ultimate intention a change in the choice of
an end a turning from selfishness to supreme disinterested
benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly
penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time; inasmuch as
penitence and impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.
So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the
government of God, but present full obedience to His law.
If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a
great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present
sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life.
If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning
of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin
ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that
error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious
sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in this world;
that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour
or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for heaven!
How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated
upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may
be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of
more or less sin! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the
universalism that ever cursed the world.
We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in
his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes
under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be
lost.
LECTURE 11
OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW
We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in
the single word, love, that this word is synonymous with benevolence;
that benevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of
God and of the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this
choice is an ultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good will
to being in general is obedience to the moral law. Now the question
before us is, what is not implied in this goodwill, or in this benevolent
ultimate intention?
Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and
the only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and
what is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of
fundamental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not,
implied in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state,
or of the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these inquiries
are settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were the notions
of the Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that they thought
Him possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as He claimed to
be. I will state then, what is not implied in entire obedience to the
moral law, as I understand it. The law, as epitomized by Christ, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and
with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself"
(Deut. 6:5), I understand to lay down the whole duty of man to God,
and to his fellow creatures. Now, the questions are, what is not, and
what is, implied in perfect obedience to this law?
What is not implied in perfect obedience to this law.
the soul or body, for this the law does not require; and it would not be
obligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent with
natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the entire
consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not imply any
change in them, but simply the right use of them.
2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of
character, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is
nothing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional
traits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly directed
in their exercise.
3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional
appetites or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that
the constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves
sinful, and that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies
their entire annihilation. I have been not a little surprised to find, that
some persons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing
the doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to this
assumption, in order to set aside the doctrine of entire sanctification in
this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law anywhere,
expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or require the
annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the constitution itself?
Does it require the annihilation of the appetite for food, or is it satisfied
merely with regulating its indulgence? In short, does the law of God
any where require any thing more than the consecration of all the
powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body and mind to the service
of God?
4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural
affection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that
certain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to
have had a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean,
that, from the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to
injustice or ill treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge
ourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to
the law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury
and injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have
it, and so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself,
does not imply, that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the
injury or injustice, but that you should love him and do him good,
notwithstanding his injurious treatment.
5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind.
Moral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical law.
God's laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral law
cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will
destroy the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental
excitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and
circumstances of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ
or faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its
capacity. This would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ
of the body. Whatever may be true of the mind, when separated from
the body, it is certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a
constant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly
excited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the
brain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without
producing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the
law of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental
excitement, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ
does not appear to have been in a state of continual mental
excitement. When He and His disciples had been in a great
excitement for a time, they would turn aside, "and rest a while" (Mark
6:31).
Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that
the high degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in
revivals of religion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must
become deranged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a
high degree of excitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public
and individual attention, and draw off people from their pursuits, to
attend to the concerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high
degree of excitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to
be long continued, they have not well considered the matter. And here
is one grand mistake of the church. They have supposed that the
revival consists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in
conformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the
reasons for much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins
to grow more calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is
on the decline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there
may be vastly more real religion in the community. Excitement is often
important and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are
infinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the
absence of highly excited emotions.
Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or
intellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not need the
same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they are
not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth as
strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames of a
burning house? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping nursling,
when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful volitions, as might
be required to snatch it from the devouring flames? Now, suppose
that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her sleeping babe,
and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness would not
consist in the fact, that she exercised equally strong volitions, in both
cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal to the
accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons
may be entirely holy, and yet continually varying in the strength of their
affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their circumstances, the
state of their physical system, and the business in which they are
engaged.
All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and
disposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral
energy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature
and the circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from
the truth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of
emotion and mental action, on any and every subject alike.
6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the
direct object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible in
the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to think of
or love our neighbor as ourselves.
The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is
meant that the mind's supreme preference should be of God that
God should be the great object of its supreme regard. But this state of
mind is perfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary
business of life giving to that business that attention, and exercising
about it all those affections and emotions, which its nature and
importance demand.
If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the
promotion of His glory, if his eye be single, his affections and conduct,
so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy when
necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business, although,
for the time being, neither his thoughts nor affections are upon God;
just as a man, who is intensely devoted to his family, may be acting
consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the most
important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at all.
The moral heart is the mind's supreme preference. The natural heart
propels the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a
striking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy
consists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations, diffuses life
through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the supreme
governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is that which
gives life and character to man's moral actions. For example, suppose
that I am engaged in teaching mathematics; in this, my ultimate
intention is to glorify God in this particular calling. Now in
demonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for
hours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object.
While my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it
is impossible that I should have any thoughts about God, or should
exercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards Him.
Yet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my
supreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire
obedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.
It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or
intention of the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness,
and to call forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and
emotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which the
mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable degree
of thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean just that
intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature and
importance of the particular duty, to which, for the time being, I am
called, demand, in my honest estimation.
In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain together
with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that the requisite
amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the physical
constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable to put
forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might
otherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far
below the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God
requires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire
obedience implies a state of entire abstraction of mind from everything
but God, labors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as
inconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.
The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and
generally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what
they never did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a
mind has been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a
state of continual bondage and condemnation, because God was not,
at all times, the direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and
because the mind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and
excited to the utmost at every moment.
7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ
was not in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of His mind
was never broken up, but the surface or emotions of His mind were
often in a state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of
great calmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have His
history in the Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken.
For example: Christ had all the constitutional appetites and
susceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, He could not
have been "tempted in all points like as we are" (Heb. 4:15), nor could
He have been tempted in any point as we are, any further than He
possessed a constitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested
natural affection for His mother and for other friends. He also showed
that He had a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable
resentment when He was injured and persecuted. He was not always
in a state of great excitement. He appears to have had His seasons of
excitement and of calm of labor and rest of joy and sorrow, like
other good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to
the law, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as
if every kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to
God, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a
great degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In
short, His history would lead to the conclusion that His calmness and
excitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case.
And although He was sometimes so pointed and severe in His reproof,
as to be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet His emotions and
feelings were only those that were called for, and suited to the
occasion.
8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without
any indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only a
modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a
disposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the
government, is only another of the modifications of love. And such
dispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the
circumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that He was
angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. "God is angry
with the wicked every day" (Psalms 7:11). And holiness, or a state of
obedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies, the
existence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its
exercise.
9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no
sense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love.
Justice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is
another of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,
exercise all those dispositions that constitute the different
modifications of love, under every possible circumstance.
10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike,
irrespective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being
may have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more
importance to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of
love require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all beings
and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances, and
value.
11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such
an interpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to
yield obedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in
us the possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is
not a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation.
And a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite
knowledge. It is plain that the law of God cannot require any such
thing as this.
12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever.
It is maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every
man perfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him
from any mistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but
would merely say, the law does not expressly or impliedly require
infallibility of judgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use
we can of all the light we have.
13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have
possessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The
law might require us to love God or man, as well as we might have
been able to love them, had we always improved all our time in
obtaining all the knowledge we could, in regard to their nature,
character, and interests. If this were implied in the requisition of the
law, there is not a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can,
perfectly obey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can
never be so remedied, that we shall ever be able to make up in our
acquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true to
all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have
possessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not,
cannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God as well as we might
have loved Him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of
knowledge respecting Him. And if entire obedience is to be
understood as implying that we love God as much we should, had we
all the knowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a
saint on earth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.
14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have
rendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or
suppose, that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of
body or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it
simply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of
the law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the full
amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral
being, however great or small.
The most perfect development and improvement of our powers,
must depend upon the most perfect use of them. And every departure
from their perfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development,
and a curtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and
best manner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and
curtailing the powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so
much, incapable of performing the service they might otherwise have
rendered.
To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an
opposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed His feet with
her tears, when He said, "To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth
much" (Luke 7:47). But can it be that Christ intended to be understood
as teaching, that the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our
ultimate virtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that
the more sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If our
virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would not be
good economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can while
in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such principle as
this. He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was truly
sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the love
of gratitude than would be exercised by one who had a less affecting
sense of ill-desert.
15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that
might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We
cannot believe anything about God of which we have neither evidence
nor knowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual
perceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe
in Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no
knowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than
in a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and
greater faith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply
much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more
of God than man does. Let it be always understood, that entire
obedience to God never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is
naturally impossible for us to believe that of which we have no
knowledge. Entire obedience implies, in this respect, nothing more
than the heart's faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by
the intellect.
16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our
prayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience
implies the offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men.
To this I reply: then Christ did not obey, for He offered no such prayer.
The law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or
impliedly. We have no right to believe that all men will be converted in
answer to our prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise
to that effect. As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no
obligation to offer such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the
world imply, that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God's
law.
It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an
express or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas
was not converted in answer to Christ's prayer, does not prove that
Christ did not fully obey.
Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or
impliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in
other words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant of
the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect love
implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly speaking
can be duty of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot, therefore,
be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely ignorant, or
the application of which to any specific object we do not understand.
If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the soul
neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be
understood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the
neglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is
inconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such
neglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that of
which we have no knowledge. James says, "He that knoweth to do
good and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (James 4:17). "If ye were blind,"
says Christ, "ye should have no sin, but because ye say, We see,
therefore your sin remaineth" (John 9:41).
17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will
of course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely
conformed to the law.
It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ
was possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their
notions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed Him to be actuated
by any other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on
account of His opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the
ungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not
see, that when the church is, in a great measure, conformed to the
world, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim
the sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state, whether
in high or low places? And who does not see, that this would naturally
result in His being accused of possessing a wicked spirit? And who
does not know, that where a religious teacher finds himself under the
necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly be hunted,
almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his day, whose
authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?
18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. It
was not so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our
own past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and
vigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had
sinned less; or sorrow for those around us sorrow in view of human
sinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of joyful
love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.
19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society with
mingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as
some have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of
papists in retiring to monasteries, and convents in taking the veil,
and, as they say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state
of voluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent
with any degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love
to our neighbor.
20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing
is further from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom,
perhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that "he was so cheerful as
often to be accused of being gay." Cheerfulness is certainly the result
of holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this
world than it does in heaven.
In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian
holiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does
obedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply?
Instead of bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it.
On the one hand, they include things that the law of God never
required of man in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block
and a snare for the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage,
supposing that this is the way to keep them humble, to place the
standard entirely above their reach. Or, on the other hand, they really
abrogate the law, so as to make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter
away what is really implied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements,
but a sickly, whimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism,
which in its manifestations and results, appears to me to be anything
but that which the law of God requires.
21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do
our duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or ever,
terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at or intend
the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, or
for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end at which we are at
all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this. While we aim at this, we
do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing duty.
Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty,
or of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation
is a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral
agent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral
agency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to the
moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to the
thoughts as an object of attention.
Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of
benevolence is, at all times, the object of the mind's attention. We
may intend the glory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at
all times thinking of the moral character of this intention. But the
intention is not the less virtuous on this account. The mind
unconsciously, but necessarily, assumes the rightness of
benevolence, or of willing the good of being, just as it assumes other
first truths, without being distinctly conscious of the assumption. It is
not therefore, at all essential to obedience to the law of God, that we
should at all times have before our minds the virtuousness or moral
character of benevolence.
22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself
should be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind's attention.
The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in the form
of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which every moral
agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a rule of duty,
is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in the mind of
every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily takes along
with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to himself.
Nevertheless, this law or idea, is not always the object of the mind's
attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good will or love to
God and man, without at the time being conscious of thinking, that this
love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I am not mistaken, the
benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so spontaneously,
as not, for much of the time, even to think that this love to God is
required of him. But this state of mind is not the less virtuous on this
account. If the infinite value of God's well-being and of His infinite
goodness constrains me to love Him with all my heart, can any one
suppose that this is regarded by him as the less virtuous, because I
did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love Him, and that it
was my duty to do so?
The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the
good of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will
that end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the law
be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will that
end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not virtue; that
unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend obedience to moral
law, or to God, it is not virtue; I answer, that the objection involves an
absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the good of God and of
being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The reason of the
choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I will the good of
being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right reason.
It is impossible to will God's good as an end, out of regard to His
authority. This is to make His authority the end chosen, for the reason
of a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will anything
for the reason that God requires it, is to will God's requirement as an
ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any acceptable love,
primarily, because He commands it. God never expected to induce
His creatures to love Him, or to will His good, by commanding them to
do so.
23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should
practically treat all interests that are of equal value according to their
value. For example, the precept, "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt.
19:19), cannot mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and
the soul of every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does
it mean that I should take the same care and oversight of my own, and
of all the families of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of
property, or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This
were:
(1.) Impossible.
(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the
universe by each individual's giving his attention particularly to the
promotion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so
under his influence that he possesses particular advantages for
promoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its
relative value; but our efforts to promote particular interests should
depend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some
interests of great value we may be under no obligation to promote, for
the reason that we have no ability to promote them, while we may be
under obligation to promote interests of vastly less value, for the
reason, that we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting
those interests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but
always in a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other
interests, according to their relative value. Every man is bound to
promote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because they
belong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and
because they are particularly committed to him, as being directly within
his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the government
of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we proceed in
our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent
misapprehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of
circumlocution, when we wish to express the same idea; the true intent
and meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good
known to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic
value, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we are to aim at
securing the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our efforts
where, as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we can
accomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all
question, only by each one attending to the promotion of those
particular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.
LECTURE 12
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE
It has been shown that the sum and spirit of the whole law is properly
expressed in one word love. It has also been shown, that this love is
benevolence or good willing; that it consists in choosing the highest
good of God and of universal being, for its own intrinsic value, in a
spirit of entire consecration to this as the ultimate end of existence.
Although the whole law is fulfilled in one word love, yet there are
many things implied in the state of mind expressed by this term. It is,
therefore, indispensable to a right understanding of this subject, that
we inquire into the characteristics or attributes of this love. We must
keep steadily in mind certain truths of mental philosophy. I will,
therefore:
Call attention to certain facts in mental philosophy as they are
revealed in consciousness.
the faculty or susceptibility of feeling.
3. They also possess will, or the power of choosing or refusing in
every case of moral obligation.
These primary faculties are so correlated to each other, that the
intellect or the sensibility may control the will, or the will may, in a
certain sense, control them. That is, the mind is free to choose in
accordance with the demands of the intellect, which is the lawgiving
faculty, or with the desires and impulses of the sensibility, or to control
and direct them both. The will can directly control the attention of the
intellect, and consequently its perceptions, thoughts, etc. It can
indirectly control the states of the sensibility, or feeling faculty, by
controlling the perceptions and thoughts of the intellect. We also know
from consciousness, as was shown in a former lecture, that the
voluntary muscles of the body are directly controlled by the will, and
that the law which obliges the attention, the feelings, and the actions of
the body to obey the decisions of the will, is physical law, or the law of
necessity. The attention of the intellect and the outward actions are
controlled directly, and the feelings indirectly, by the decisions of the
will. The will can either command or obey. It can suffer itself to be
enslaved by the impulses of the sensibility, or it can assert its
sovereignty and control them. The will is not influenced by either the
intellect, or the sensibility, by the law of necessity or force; so that the
will can always resist either the demands of the intelligence, or the
impulses of the sensibility. But while they cannot lord it over the will,
through the agency of any law of force, the will has the aid of the law
of necessity or force by which to control them.
Again: We are conscious of affirming to ourselves our obligation to
obey the law of the intellect rather than the impulses of the sensibility;
that to act virtuously we must act rationally, or intelligently, and not
give ourselves up to the blind impulses of our feelings.
Now, inasmuch as the love required by the moral law consists in
choice, willing, intention, as before repeatedly shown; and inasmuch
as choice, willing, intending, controls the states of the intellect and the
outward actions directly, by a law of necessity, and by the same law
controls the feelings or states of the sensibility indirectly, it follows that
certain states of the intellect and of the sensibility, and also certain
outward actions, must be implied in the existence of the love which the
law of God requires. I say, implied in it, not as making a part of it, but
as necessarily resulting from it. The thoughts, opinions, judgments,
feelings, and outward actions must be molded and modified by the
state of the heart or will.
Here it is important to remark, that, in common language, the same
word is often used to express either an action or attitude of the will, or
a state of the sensibility, or both. This is true of all the terms that
represent what are called the Christian graces or virtues, or those
various modifications of virtue of which Christians are conscious, and
which appear in their life and temper. Of this truth we shall be
constantly reminded as we proceed in our investigations, for we shall
find illustrations of it at every step of our progress.
Before I proceed to point out the attributes of benevolence, it is
important to remark, that all the moral attributes of God and of all holy
beings, are only attributes of benevolence. Benevolence is a term that
comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. This term
expresses comprehensively God's whole moral character. This love,
as we have repeatedly seen, is benevolence. Benevolence is good
willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe, as
an end. But from this comprehensive statement, accurate though it
be, we are apt to receive very inadequate conceptions of what really
belongs to, as implied in, benevolence. To say that love is the fulfilling
of the whole law; that benevolence is the whole of true religion; that
the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor, is expressed in one
word, love these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as
to need with all minds much amplification and explanation. Many
things are implied in love or benevolence. By this is intended, that
benevolence needs to be viewed under various aspects and in various
relations, and its nature considered in the various relations in which it
is called to act. Benevolence is an ultimate intention, or the choice of
an ultimate end. But if we suppose that this is all that is implied in
benevolence, we shall egregiously err. Unless we inquire into the
nature of the end which benevolence chooses, and the means by
which it seeks to accomplish that end, we shall understand but little of
the import of the word benevolence. Benevolence has many attributes
or characteristics. These must all harmonize in the selection of its
end, and in its efforts to realize it. By this is intended that benevolence
is not a blind, but the most intelligent, choice. It is the choice of the
best possible end in obedience to the demand of the reason and of
God, and implies the choice of the best possible means to secure this
end. Both the end and the means are chosen in obedience to the law
of God, and of reason. An attribute is a permanent quality of a thing.
The attributes of benevolence are those permanent qualities which
belong to its very nature. Benevolence is not blind, but intelligent,
choice. It is the choice of the highest well-being of moral agents. It
seeks this end by means suited to the nature of moral agents. Hence
wisdom, justice, mercy, truth, holiness, and many other attributes, as
we shall see, are essential elements, or attributes, of benevolence. To
understand what true benevolence is, we must inquire into its
attributes. Not everything that is called love has at all the nature of
benevolence. Nor has all that is called benevolence any title to that
appellation. There are various kinds of love. Natural affection is
called love. Our preference of certain kinds of diet is called love.
Hence we say we love fruit, vegetables, meat, milk, etc. Benevolence is
also called love, and is the kind of love, beyond all question, required
by the law of God. But there is more than one state of mind that is
called benevolence. There is a constitutional or phrenological
benevolence, which is often mistaken for, and confounded with, the
benevolence which constitutes virtue. This so-called benevolence is in
truth only an imposing form of selfishness; nevertheless it is called
benevolence. Many of its manifestations are like those of true
benevolence. Care, therefore, should be taken, in giving religious
instruction, to distinguish accurately between them. Benevolence, let it
be remembered, is the obedience of the will to the law of reason and
of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not to gratify
self. Selfishness consists in the obedience of the will to the impulses
of the sensibility. It is a spirit of self-gratification. The will seeks to
gratify the desires and propensities, for the pleasure of the
gratification. Self-gratification is sought as an end, and as the
supreme end. It is preferred to the claims of God and the good of
being. Phrenological, or constitutional benevolence, is only obedience
to the impulse of the sensibility a yielding to a feeling of compassion.
It is only an effort to gratify a desire. It is, therefore, as really
selfishness, as is an effort to gratify any constitutional desire whatever.
It is impossible to get a just idea of what constitutes obedience to the
divine law, and what is implied in it, without considering attentively the
various attributes or aspects of benevolence, properly so called. Upon
this discussion we are about to enter. But before I commence the
enumeration and definition of these attributes, it is important further to
remark that the moral attributes of God, as revealed in His works,
providence, and word, throw much light upon the subject before us.
Also the many precepts of the Bible, and the developments of
benevolence therein revealed, will assist us much, as we proceed in
our inquiries upon this important subject. As the Bible expressly
affirms that love comprehends the whole character of God that it is
the whole that the law requires of man that the end of the
commandment is charity or love we may be assured that every form
of true virtue is only a modification of love or benevolence; that is, that
every state of mind required by the Bible, and recognized as virtue, is,
in its last analysis, resolvable into love or benevolence. In other
words, every virtue is only benevolence viewed under certain aspects,
or in certain relations. In other words still, it is only one of the
elements, peculiarities, characteristics, or attributes of benevolence.
This is true of God's moral attributes. They are, as has been said,
only attributes of benevolence. They are only the essential qualities
that belong to the very nature of benevolence, which are manifested
and brought into activity wherever benevolence is brought into certain
circumstances and relations. Benevolence is just, merciful, etc. Such
is its nature, that in appropriate circumstances these qualities, together
with many others, will manifest themselves in executive acts. This is
and must be true of every holy being.
I will now proceed to point out the attributes of that love which
constitutes obedience to the law of God.
As I proceed I will call attention to the states of the intellect and of
the sensibility, and also to the course of outward conduct implied in the
existence of this love in any mind implied in its existence as
necessarily resulting from it by the law of cause and effect. These
attributes are:
There is a state of the sensibility often expressed by the term love.
Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a
mere feeling or emotion. The term is often used to express the
emotion of fondness or attachment, as distinct from a voluntary state
of mind, or a choice of the will. This emotion or feeling, as we are all
aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a
phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind,
it has in itself no moral character. The law of God requires voluntary
love or goodwill, as has been repeatedly shown. This love consists in
choice, intention. It is choosing the highest well-being of God and the
universe of sentient beings as an end. Of course voluntariness must
be one of its characteristics. The word benevolence expresses this
idea.
If it consists in choice, if it be a phenomenon of the will, it must
control the thoughts and states of the sensibility, as well as the
outward action. This love, then, not only consists in a state of
consecration to God and the universe, but also implies deep emotions
of love to God and man. Though a phenomenon of the will, it implies
the existence of all those feelings of love and affection to God and
man, that necessarily result from the consecration of the heart or will
to their highest well-being. It also implies all that outward course of life
that necessarily flows from a state of will consecrated to this end. Let
it be borne in mind, that where these feelings do not arise in the
sensibility, and where this course of life is not, there the true love or
voluntary consecration to God and the universe required by the law, is
not. Those follow from this by a law of necessity. Those, that is,
feelings or emotions of love, and a correct outward life, may exist
without this voluntary love, as I shall have occasion to show in its
proper place; but this love cannot exist without those, as they follow
from it by a law of necessity. These emotions will vary in their
strength, as constitution and circumstances vary, but exist they must,
in some sensible degree, whenever the will is in a benevolent attitude.
2. Liberty is an attribute of this love. The mind is free and
spontaneous in its exercise. It makes this choice when it has the
power at every moment to choose self-gratification as an end. Of this
every moral agent is conscious. It is a free, and therefore a
responsible, choice.
3. Intelligence. That is, the mind makes choice of this end
intelligently. It not only knows what it chooses, and why it chooses,
but also that it chooses in accordance with the dictates of the intellect,
and the law of God; that the end is worthy of being chosen, and that
for this reason the intellect demands that it should be chosen, and
also, that for its own intrinsic value it is chosen.
Because voluntariness, liberty, and intelligence are natural attributes
of this love, therefore, the following are its moral attributes.
4. Virtue is an attribute of it. Virtue is a term that expresses the
moral character of benevolence; it is moral rightness. Moral rightness
is moral perfection, righteousness, or uprightness. The term marks or
designates its relation to moral law, and expresses its conformity to it.
In the exercise of this love or choice, the mind is conscious of
uprightness, or of being conformed to moral law or moral obligation. In
other words, it is conscious of being virtuous or holy, of being like God,
of loving what ought to be loved, and of consecration to the right end.
Because this choice is in accordance with the demands of the
intellect, therefore the mind, in its exercise, is conscious of the
approbation of that power of the intellect which we call conscience.
The conscience must approve this love, choice, or intention.
Again: Because the conscience approves of this choice, therefore,
there is and must be in the sensibility a feeling of happiness or
satisfaction, a feeling of complacency or delight in the love that is in
the heart or will. This love, then, always produces self-approbation in
the conscience, and a felt satisfaction in the sensibility; and these
feelings are often very acute and joyous, insomuch that the soul, in the
exercise of this love of the heart, is sometimes led to rejoice with joy
unspeakable and full of glory. This state of mind does not always and
necessarily amount to joy. Much depends in this respect on the
clearness of the intellectual views, upon the state of the sensibility, and
upon the manifestation of Divine approbation to the soul. But where
peace, or approbation of conscience, and consequently a peaceful
state of the sensibility are not, this love is not. They are connected
with it by a law of necessity, and must of course appear on the field of
consciousness where this love exists. These, then, are implied in the
love that constitutes obedience to the law of God. Conscious peace of
mind, and conscious joy in God must be where true love to God exists.
5. Disinterestedness is another attribute of this love. By
disinterestedness, it is not intended that the mind takes no interest in
the object loved, for it does take a supreme interest in it. But this term
expresses the mind's choice of an end for its own sake, and not
merely upon condition that the good belongs to self. This love is
disinterested in the sense that the highest well-being of God and the
universe is chosen, not upon condition of its relation to self, but for its
own intrinsic and infinite value. It is this attribute particularly that
distinguishes this love from selfish love. Selfish love makes the
relation of good to self the condition of choosing it. The good of God
and of the universe, if chosen at all, is only chosen as a means or
condition of promoting the highest good of self. But this love does not
make good to self its end; but good to God and being in general, is its
end.
As disinterestedness is an attribute of this love, it does not seek its
own, but the good of others. "Charity (love) seeketh not her own" (1
Cor. 13:5). It grasps in its comprehensive embrace the good of being
in general, and of course, of necessity, secures a corresponding
outward life and inward feeling. The intellect will be employed in
devising ways and means for the promotion of its end. The sensibility
will be tremblingly alive to the good of all and of each; will rejoice in the
good of others as in its own, and will grieve at the misery of others as
in its own. It "will rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with
them that weep" (Romans 12:5). There will not, cannot be envy at the
prosperity of others, but unfeigned joy, joy as real and often as
exquisite as in its own prosperity. Benevolence enjoys everybody's
good things, while selfishness is too envious at the good things of
others even to enjoy its own. There is a Divine economy in
benevolence. Each benevolent soul not only enjoys his own good
things, but also enjoys the good things of all others so far as he knows
their happiness. He drinks at the river of God's pleasure. He not only
rejoices in doing good to others, but also in beholding their enjoyment
of good things. He joys in God's joy, and in the joy of angels and of
saints. He also rejoices in the good things of all sentient existences.
He is happy in beholding the pleasure of the beasts of the field, the
fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea. He sympathizes with all joy
and all suffering known to him; nor is his sympathy with the sufferings
of others a feeling of unmingled pain. It is a real luxury to sympathize
in the woes of others. He would not be without this sympathy. It so
accords with his sense of propriety and fitness, that, mingled with the
painful emotion, there is a sweet feeling of self-approbation; so that a
benevolent sympathy with the woes of others is by no means
inconsistent with happiness, and with perfect happiness. God has this
sympathy. He often expresses and otherwise manifests it. There is,
indeed, a mysterious and an exquisite luxury in sharing the woes of
others. God and angels and all holy beings know what it is. Where
this result of love is not manifested, there love itself is not. Envy at the
prosperity, influence, or good of others, the absence of sensible joy in
view of the good enjoyed by others, and of sympathy with the
sufferings of others, prove conclusively that this love does not exist.
There is an expansiveness, an ampleness of embrace, a universality,
and a divine disinterestedness in this love, that necessarily manifests
itself in the liberal devising of liberal things for Zion, and in the copious
outpourings of the floods of sympathetic feeling, both in joys and
sorrows, when suitable occasions present themselves before the
mind.
6. Impartiality is another attribute of this love: By this term is not
intended, that the mind is indifferent to the character of him who is
happy or miserable; that it would be as well pleased to see the wicked
as the righteous eternally and perfectly blessed. But it is intended
that, other things being equal, it is the intrinsic value of their well-being
which is alone regarded by the mind. Other things being equal, it
matters not to whom the good belongs. It is no respecter of persons.
The good of being is its end, and it seeks to promote every interest
according to its relative value. Selfish love is partial. It seeks to
promote self-interest first, and secondarily those interests that sustain
such a relation to self as will at least indirectly promote the gratification
of self. Selfish love has its favorites, its prejudices, unreasonable and
ridiculous. Color, family, nation, and many other things of like nature,
modify it. But benevolence knows neither Jew nor Greek, neither
bond nor free, white nor black, Barbarian, Scythian, European,
Asiatic, African, nor American, but accounts all men as men, and, by
virtue of their common manhood, calls every man a brother, and seeks
the interests of all and of each. Impartiality, being an attribute of this
love, will of course manifest itself in the outward life, and in the temper
and spirit of its subject. This love can have no fellowship with those
absurd and ridiculous prejudices that are so often rife among nominal
Christians. Nor will it cherish them for a moment in the sensibility of
him who exercises it. Benevolence recognizes no privileged classes
on the one hand, nor proscribed classes on the other. It secures in the
sensibility an utter loathing of those discriminations, so odiously
manifested and boasted of, and which are founded exclusively in a
selfish state of the will. The fact that a man is a man, and not that he
is of our party, of our complexion, or of our town, state, or nation that
he is a creature of God, that he is capable of virtue and happiness,
these are the considerations that are seized upon by this divinely
impartial love. It is the intrinsic value of his interests, and not that they
are the interests of one connected with self, that the benevolent mind
regards.
But here it is important to repeat the remark, that the economy of
benevolence demands, that where two interests are, in themselves
considered, of equal value, in order to secure the greatest amount of
good, each one should bestow his efforts where they can be bestowed
to the greatest advantage. For example: every man sustains such
relations that he can accomplish more good by seeking to promote the
interest and happiness of certain persons rather than of others; his
family, his kindred, his companions, his immediate neighbors, and
those to whom, in the providence of God, he sustains such relations
as to give him access to them, and influence over them. It is not
unreasonable, it is not partial, but reasonable and impartial, to bestow
our efforts more directly upon them. Therefore, while benevolence
regards every interest according to its relative value, it reasonably puts
forth its efforts in the direction where there is a prospect of
accomplishing the most good. This, I say, is not partiality, but
impartiality; for, be it understood, it is not the particular persons to
whom good can be done, but the amount of good that can be
accomplished, that directs the efforts of benevolence. It is not
because my family is my own, nor because their well-being is, of
course, more valuable in itself than that of my neighbors' families, but
because my relations afford me higher facilities for doing them good, I
am under particular obligation to aim first at promoting their good.
Hence the apostle says: "If any man provide not for his own, especially
for those of his own household, he hath denied the faith, and is worse
than an infidel" (1 Tim. 5:8). Strictly speaking, benevolence esteems
every known good according to its intrinsic and relative value; but
practically treats every interest according to the perceived probability
of securing on the whole the highest amount of good. This is a truth of
great practical importance. It is developed in the experience and
observation of every day and hour. It is manifest in the conduct of God
and of Christ, of apostles and martyrs. It is everywhere assumed in
the precepts of the Bible, and everywhere manifested in the history of
benevolent effort. Let it be understood, then, that impartiality, as an
attribute of benevolence, does not imply that its effort to do good will
not be modified by relations and circumstances. But, on the contrary,
this attribute implies, that the efforts to secure the great end of
benevolence, to wit, the greatest amount of good to God and the
universe, will be modified by those relations and circumstances that
afford the highest advantages for doing good.
The impartiality of benevolence causes it always to lay supreme
stress upon God's interests, because His well-being is of infinite value,
and of course benevolence must be supreme to Him. Benevolence,
being impartial love, of course accounts God's interests and
well-being, as of infinitely greater value than the aggregate of all other
interests. Benevolence regards our neighbor's interests as our own,
simply because they are in their intrinsic value as our own.
Benevolence, therefore, is always supreme to God and equal to man.
7. Universality is another attribute of this love. Benevolence chooses
the highest good of being in general. It excludes none from its regard;
but on the contrary embosoms all in its ample embrace. But by this it
is not intended, that it practically seeks to promote the good of every
individual. It would if it could; but it seeks the highest practicable
amount of good. The interest of every individual is estimated
according to its intrinsic value, whatever the circumstances or
character of each may be. But character and relations may and must
modify the manifestations of benevolence, or its efforts in seeking to
promote this end. A wicked character, and governmental relations and
considerations, may forbid benevolence to seek the good of some.
Nay, they may demand that positive misery shall be inflicted on some,
as a warning to others to beware of their destructive ways. By
universality, as an attribute of benevolence, is intended, that good will
is truly exercised towards all sentient beings, whatever their character
and relations may be; and that, when the higher good of the greater
number does not forbid it, the happiness of all and of each will be
pursued with a degree of stress equal to their relative value, and the
prospect of securing each interest. Enemies as well as friends,
strangers and foreigners as well as relations and immediate
neighbors, will be enfolded in its sweet embrace. It is the state of mind
required by Christ in the truly divine precept, "I say unto you. Love
your enemies, pray for them that hate you, and do good unto them
that despitefully use and persecute you" (Matt. 5:44). This attribute of
benevolence is gloriously conspicuous in the character of God. His
love to sinners alone accounts for their being today out of perdition.
His aiming to secure the highest good of the greatest number, is
illustrated by the display of His glorious justice in the punishment of the
wicked. His universal care for all ranks and conditions of sentient
beings, manifested in His works and providence, beautifully and
gloriously illustrates the truth, that "His tender mercies are over all His
works" (Psalms 145:9).
It is easy to see that universality must be a modification or attribute
of true benevolence. It consists in good willing, that is, in choosing the
highest good of being as such, and for its own sake. Of course it
must, to be consistent with itself, seek the good of all and of each, so
far as the good of each is consistent with the greatest good upon the
whole. Benevolence not only wills and seeks the good of moral
beings, but also the good of every sentient existence, from the
minutest animalcule to the highest order of beings. It of course
produces a state of the sensibility tremblingly alive to all happiness
and to all pain. It is pained at the agony of an insect, and rejoices in
its joy. God does this, and all holy beings do this. Where this
sympathy with the joys and sorrows of universal being is not, there
benevolence is not. Observe, good is its end; where this is promoted
by the proper means, the feelings are gratified. Where evil is
witnessed, the benevolent spirit deeply and necessarily sympathizes.
LECTURE 13
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE
8. Efficiency is another attribute or characteristic of benevolence.
Benevolence consists in choice, intention. Now we know from
consciousness that choice or intention constitutes the mind's deepest
source or power of action. If I honestly intend a thing, I cannot but
make efforts to accomplish that which I intend, provided that I believe
the thing possible. If I choose an end, this choice must and will
energize to secure its end. When benevolence is the supreme choice,
preference, or intention of the soul, it is plainly impossible that it should
not produce efforts to secure its end. It must cease to exist, or
manifest itself in exertions to secure its end, as soon as, and
whenever the intelligence deems it wise to do so. If the will has
yielded to the intelligence in the choice of an end, it will certainly obey
the intelligence in pursuit of that end. Choice, intention, is the cause of
all the outward activity of moral agents. They have all chosen some
end, either their own gratification, or the highest good of being; and all
the busy bustle of this world's teeming population, is nothing else than
choice or intention seeking to compass its end.
Efficiency, therefore, is an attribute of benevolent intention. It must,
it will, it does energize in God, in angels, in saints on earth and in
heaven. It was this attribute of benevolence, that led God to give His
only begotten Son, and that led the Son to give Himself, "that
whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting
life" (John 3:16).
If love is efficient in producing outward action, and efficient in
producing inward feelings; it is efficient to wake up the intellect, and
set the world of thought in action to devise ways and means for
realizing its end. It wields all the infinite natural attributes of God. It is
the mainspring that moves all heaven. It is the mighty power that is
heaving the mass of mind, and rocking the world like a smothered
volcano. Look to the heavens above. It was benevolence that hung
them out. It is benevolence that sustains those mighty rolling orbs in
their courses. It was good will endeavoring to realize its end that at
first put forth creative power. The same power, for the same reason,
still energizes, and will continue to energize for the realization of its
end, so long as God is benevolent. And O! What a glorious thought,
that infinite benevolence is wielding, and will forever wield, infinite
natural attributes for the promotion of good! No mind but an infinite
one can begin to conceive of the amount of good that Jehovah will
secure. O blessed, glorious thought! But it is, it must be a reality, as
surely as God and the universe exist. It is no vain imagination; it is
one of the most certain, as well as the most glorious, truths in the
universe. Mountains of granite are but vapor in comparison with it.
But the truly benevolent on earth and in heaven will sympathize with
God. The power that energizes in Him, energizes in them. One
principle animates and moves them all, and that principle is love, good
will to universal being. Well may our souls cry out, Amen, go on,
God-speed the work; let this mighty power heave and wield universal
mind, until all the ills of earth shall be put away, and until all that can
be made holy are clothed in the garments of everlasting gladness.
Since benevolence is necessarily, from its very nature, active and
efficient in putting forth efforts to secure its end, and since its end is
the highest good of being, it follows that all who are truly religious will,
and must, from the very nature of true religion, be active in
endeavoring to promote the good of being. While effort is possible to
a Christian, it is as natural to him as his breath. He has within him the
very mainspring of activity, a heart set on the promotion of the highest
good of universal being. While he has life and activity at all, it will, and
it must, be directed to this end. Let this never be forgotten. An idle,
an inactive, inefficient Christian is a misnomer. Religion is an
essentially active principle, and when and while it exists, it must
exercise and manifest itself. It is not merely good desire, but it is good
willing. Men may have desires, and hope and live on them, without
making efforts to realize their desires. They may desire without action.
If their will is active, their life must be. If they really choose an ultimate
end, this choice must manifest itself. The sinner does and must
manifest his selfish choice, and so likewise must the saint manifest his
benevolence.
9. Complacency in holiness or moral excellence, is another attribute
of benevolence. This consists in benevolence contemplated in its
relations to holy beings. This term also expresses both a state of the
intelligence and of the sensibility. Moral agents are so constituted,
that they necessarily approve of moral worth or excellence; and when
even sinners behold right character, or moral goodness, they are
compelled to respect and approve it, by a law of their intelligence.
This they not infrequently regard as evidence of goodness in
themselves. But this is doubtless just as common in hell as it is on
earth. The vilest sinners on earth or in hell, have, by the unalterable
constitution of their nature, the necessity imposed upon them, of
paying intellectual homage to moral excellence. When a moral agent
is intensely contemplating moral excellence, and his intellectual
approbation is emphatically pronounced, the natural, and often the
necessary result, is a corresponding feeling of complacency or delight
in the sensibility. But this being altogether an involuntary state of
mind, has no moral character. Complacency, as a phenomenon of
will, consists in willing the highest actual blessedness of the holy being
in particular, as a good in itself, and upon condition of his moral
excellence.
This attribute of benevolence is the cause of a complacent state of
the sensibility. It is true, that feelings of complacency may exist, when
complacency of will does not exist. But complacency of feeling surely
will exist, when complacency of will exists. Complacency of will
implies complacency of conscience, or the approbation of the
intelligence. When there is a complacency of intelligence and of will,
there must follow, of course, complacency of the sensibility.
It is highly worthy of observation here, that this complacency of
feeling is that which is generally termed love to God and to the saints,
in the common language of Christians, and often in the popular
language of the Bible. It is a vivid and pleasant state of the sensibility,
and very noticeable by consciousness, of course. Indeed, it is
perhaps the general usage now to call this phenomenon of the
sensibility, love; and, for want of just discrimination, to speak of it as
constituting religion. Many seem to suppose that this feeling of delight
in, and fondness for, God, is the love required by the moral law. They
are conscious of not being voluntary in it, as well they may be. They
judge of their religious state, not by the end for which they live, that is,
by their choice or intention, but by their emotions. If they find
themselves strongly exercised with emotions of love to God, they look
upon themselves as in a state well-pleasing to God. But if their
feelings or emotions of love are not active; they of course judge
themselves to have little or no religion. It is remarkable to what extent
religion is regarded as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and as
consisting in mere feelings. So common is it, indeed, that almost
uniformly, when professed Christians speak of their religion, they
speak of their feelings, or the state of their sensibility, instead of
speaking of their conscious consecration to God, and the good of
being.
It is also somewhat common for them to speak of their views of
Christ, and of truth, in a manner that shows, that they regard the states
of the intellect as constituting a part, at least, of their religion. It is of
great importance that just views should prevail among Christians upon
this momentous subject. Virtue, or religion, as has been repeatedly
said, must be a phenomenon of the will. The attribute of benevolence
which we are considering, that is, complacency of will in God, is the
most common light in which the scriptures present it, and also the
most common form in which it lies revealed on the field of
consciousness. The scriptures often assign the goodness of God as a
reason for loving Him, and Christians are conscious of having much
regard to His goodness in their love to Him; I mean in their good will to
Him. They will good to Him, and ascribe all praise and glory to Him,
upon the condition that He deserves it. Of this they are conscious.
Now, as was shown in a former lecture, in their love or good will to
God, they do not regard His goodness as the fundamental reason for
willing good to Him. Although His goodness is that, which, at the time,
most strongly impresses their minds, yet it must be that the intrinsic
value of His well-being is assumed, and had in view by them, or they
would no sooner will good than evil to Him. In willing His good they
must assume its intrinsic value to Him, as the fundamental reason for
willing it; and His goodness as a secondary reason or condition; but
they are conscious of being much influenced in willing His good in
particular, by a regard to His goodness. Should you ask the Christian
why he loved God, or why he exercised good will to Him, he would
probably reply, it is because God is good. But, suppose he should be
further asked, why he willed good rather than evil to God; he would
say, because good is good or valuable to Him. Or, if he returned the
same answer as before, to wit, because God is good, he would give
this answer, only because he would think t impossible for any one not
to assume and to know, that good is willed instead of evil, because of
its intrinsic value. The fact is, the intrinsic value of well-being is
necessarily taken along with the mind, and always assumed by it, as a
first truth. When a virtuous being is perceived, this first truth being
spontaneously and necessarily assumed, the mind thinks only of the
secondary reason or condition, or the virtue of the being, in willing
good to him.
Before I dismiss this subject, I must advert again to the subject of
complacent love, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, and also as a
phenomenon of the intellect. If I mistake not, there are sad mistakes,
and gross and ruinous delusions, entertained by many upon this
subject. The intellect, of necessity, perfectly approves of the character
of God where it is apprehended. The intellect is so correlated to the
sensibility, that, where it perceives in a strong light the divine
excellence, or the excellence of the divine law, the sensibility is
affected by the perception of the intellect, as a thing of course and of
necessity; so that emotions of complacency and delight in the law, and
in the divine character, may and often do glow and burn in the
sensibility, while the will or heart is unaffected. The will remains in a
selfish choice, while the intellect and the sensibility are strongly
impressed with the perception of the Divine excellence. This state of
the intellect and the sensibility is, no doubt, often mistaken for true
religion. We have undoubted illustrations of this in the Bible, and
similar cases of it in common life. "Yet they seek Me daily, and delight
to know My ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and forsook not
the ordinance of their God: "they ask of Me the ordinances of justice,
they take delight in approaching to God" (Isaiah 58:2). "And, Lo, Thou
art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice,
and can play well on an instrument: for they hear Thy words, but they
do them not" (Ezek. 33:32).
Nothing is of greater importance, than forever to understand, that
religion is always and necessarily a phenomenon of the will; that it
always and necessarily produces outward action and inward feeling;
that, on account of the correlation of the intellect and sensibility,
almost any and every variety of feeling may exist in the mind, as
produced by the perceptions of the intellect, whatever the state of the
will may be; that unless we are conscious of goodwill, or of
consecration to God and the good of being-unless we are conscious of
living for this end, it avails us nothing, whatever our views and feelings
may be.
And also it behooves us to consider that, although these views and
feelings may exist while the heart is wrong, they will certainly exist
when the heart is right; that there may be feeling, and deep feeling,
when the heart is in a selfish attitude, yet, that there will and must be
deep emotion and strenuous action, when the heart is right. Let it be
remembered, that complacency, as a phenomenon of the will, is
always a striking characteristic of true love to God; that the mind is
affected and consciously influenced, in willing the actual and infinite
blessedness of God, by a regard to His goodness. The goodness of
God is not, as has been repeatedly shown, the fundamental reason for
the goodwill, but it is one reason or a condition, both of the possibility
of willing, and of the obligation to will His blessedness in particular. It
assigns to itself, and to others, His goodness as the reason for willing
His good, rather than the intrinsic value of good; because this last is so
universally, and so necessarily assumed, that it thinks not of
mentioning it, taking it always for granted, that this will and must be
understood.
10. Opposition to sin is another attribute or characteristic of true love
to God.
This attribute certainly is implied in the very essence and nature of
benevolence. Benevolence is good willing, or willing the highest good
of being as an end. Now there is nothing in the universe more
destructive of this good than sin. Benevolence cannot do otherwise
than be forever opposed to sin, as that abominable thing which it
necessarily hates. It is absurd and a contradiction to affirm, that
benevolence is not opposed to sin. God is love or benevolence. He
must, therefore, be the unalterable opponent of sin of all sin, in every
form and degree.
But there is a state, both of the intellect and of the sensibility, that is
often mistaken for the opposition of the will to sin. Opposition to all sin
is, and must be, a phenomenon of the will, and on that ground alone it
becomes virtue. But it often exists also as a phenomenon of the
intellect, and likewise of the sensibility. The intellect cannot
contemplate sin without disapprobation. This disapprobation is often
mistaken for opposition of heart, or of will. When the intellect strongly
disapproves of, and denounces sin, there is naturally and necessarily
a corresponding feeling of opposition to it in the sensibility, an emotion
of loathing, of hatred, of abhorrence. This is often mistaken for
opposition of the will, or heart. This is manifest from the fact, that
often the most notorious sinners manifest strong indignation in view of
oppression, injustice, falsehood, and many other forms of sin. This
phenomenon of the sensibility and of the intellect, as I said, is often
mistaken for a virtuous opposition to sin, which-it cannot be unless it
involve an act of the will.
But let it be remembered, that virtuous opposition to sin is a
characteristic of love to God and man or of benevolence. This
opposition to sin cannot possibly coexist with any degree of sin in the
heart. That is, this opposition cannot coexist with a sinful choice. The
will cannot at the same time, be opposed to sin and commit sin. This
is impossible, and the supposition involves a contradiction. Opposition
to sin as a phenomenon of the intellect, or of the sensibility, may exist;
in other words, the intellect may strongly disapprove of sin, and the
sensibility may feel strongly opposed to certain forms of it, while at the
same time, the will may cleave to self indulgence in other forms. This
fact, no doubt, accounts for the common mistake, that we can, at the
same time, exercise a virtuous opposition to sin, and still continue to
commit it.
Many are, no doubt, laboring under this fatal delusion. They are
conscious, not only of an intellectual disapprobation of sin in certain
forms, but also, at times, of strong feelings of opposition to it. And yet
they are also conscious of continuing to commit it. They, therefore
conclude, that they have a principle of holiness in them, and also a
principle of sin, that they are partly holy and partly sinful at the same
time. Their opposition of intellect and of feeling, they suppose to be a
holy opposition, when, no doubt, it is just as common in hell, and even
more so than it is on earth, for the reason that sin is more naked there
than it generally is here.
But now the inquiry may arise, how is it that both the intellect and the
sensibility are opposed to it, and yet that it is persevered in? What
reason can the mind have for a sinful choice, when urged to it neither
by the intellect nor the sensibility? The philosophy of this
phenomenon needs explanation. Let us attend to it.
I am a moral agent. My intellect necessarily disapproves of sin. My
sensibility is so correlated to my intellect, that it sympathizes with it, or
is affected by its perceptions and its judgments. I contemplate sin. I
necessarily disapprove of it, and condemn it. This affects my
sensibility. I loathe and abhor it. I nevertheless commit it. Now how is
this to be accounted for? The usual method is by ascribing it to a
depravity in the will itself, a lapsed or corrupted state of the faculty, so
that it perversely chooses sin for its own sake. Although disapproved
by the intellect, and loathed by the sensibility, yet such, it is said, is the
inherent depravity of the will, that it pertinaciously cleaves to sin
notwithstanding, and will continue to do so, until that faculty is renewed
by the Holy Spirit, and a holy bias or inclination is impressed upon the
will itself
But here is a gross mistake. In order to see the truth upon this
subject, it is of indispensable importance to inquire what sin is. It is
admitted on all hands, that selfishness is sin. Comparatively few seem
to understand that selfishness is the whole of sin, and that every form
of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every form of virtue
may be resolved into benevolence. It is not my purpose now to show
that selfishness is the whole of sin. It is sufficient for the present to
take the admission, that selfishness is sin. But what is selfishness? It
is the choice of self-gratification as an end. It is the preference of our
own gratification to the highest good of universal being.
Self-gratification is the supreme end of selfishness. This choice is
sinful. That is, the moral of this selfish choice is sin. Now, in no case,
is or can sin be chosen for its own sake, or as an end. Whenever
anything is chosen to gratify self, it is not chosen because the choice is
sinful, but notwithstanding it is sinful. It is not the sinfulness of the
choice upon which the choice fixes, as an end, or for its own sake, but
it is the gratification to be afforded by the thing chosen. For example,
theft is sinful. But the will, in an act of theft, does not aim at and
terminate on the sinfulness of theft, but upon the gain or gratification
expected from the stolen object. Drunkenness is sinful, but the
inebriate does not intend or choose the sinfulness for its own sake, or
as an end. He does not choose strong drink because the choice is
sinful, but notwithstanding it is so. We choose the gratification, but not
the sin, as an end. To choose the gratification as an end is sinful, but
it is not the sin that is the object of choice. Our mother Eve ate the
forbidden fruit. This eating was sinful. But the thing that she chose or
intended, was not the sinfulness of eating, but the gratification
expected from the fruit. It is not, it cannot in any case be true, that sin
is chosen as an end, or for its own sake. Sin is only the quality of
selfishness. Selfishness is the choice, not of sin as an end, or for its
own sake, but of self-gratification; and this choice of self-gratification
as an end is sinful. That is, the moral quality of the choice is sin. To
say that sin is, or can be, chosen for its own sake, is untrue and
absurd. It is the same as saying that a choice can terminate on an
element, quality, or attribute, of itself; that the thing chosen is really an
element of the choice itself.
But it is said, that sinners are sometimes conscious of choosing sin
for its own sake, or because it is sin; that they possess such a
malicious state of mind, that they love sin for its own sake; that they
"roll sin as a sweet morsel under their tongue"; that "they eat up the
sins of God's people as they eat bread"; (Psalms 14:4), that is, that
they love their own sins and the sins of others, as they do their
necessary food, and choose it for that reason, or just as they do their
food; that they not only sin themselves with greediness, but also have
pleasure in them that do the same. Now all this may be true, yet it
does not at all disprove the position which I have taken, namely, that
sin never is, and never can be chosen as an end, or for its own sake.
Sin may be sought and loved as a means, but never as an end. The
choice of food will illustrate this. Food is never chosen as an ultimate
end; it never can be so chosen. It is always as a means. It is the
gratification, or the utility of it, in some point of view, that constitutes
the reason for choosing it. Gratification is always the end for which a
selfish man eats. It may not be merely the present pleasure of eating
which he alone or principally seeks. But, nevertheless, if a selfish
man, he has his own gratification in view as an end. It may be that it is
not so much a present, as a remote gratification he has in view. Thus
he may choose food to give him health and strength to pursue some
distant gratification, the acquisition of wealth, or something else that
will gratify him.
It may happen that a sinner may get into a state of rebellion against
God and the universe, of so frightful a character, that he shall take
pleasure in willing, and in doing, and saying, things that are sinful, just
because they are sinful and displeasing to God and to holy beings.
But, even in this case, sin is not chosen as an end, but as a means of
gratifying this malicious feeling. It is, after all, self-gratification that is
chosen as an end, and not sin. Sin is the means, and self-gratification
is the end.
Now we are prepared to understand how it is that both the intellect
and sensibility can often be opposed to sin, and yet the will cleave to
the indulgence. An inebriate is contemplating the moral character of
drunkenness. He instantly and necessarily condemns the
abomination. His sensibility sympathizes with the intellect. He loathes
the sinfulness of drinking strong drink, and himself on account of it.
He is ashamed, and were it possible, he would spit in his own face.
Now, in this state, it would surely be absurd to suppose that he could
choose sin, the sin of drinking, as an end, or for its own sake. This
would be choosing it for an impossible reason, and not for no reason.
But still he may choose to continue his drink, not because it is sinful,
but notwithstanding it is so. For while the intellect condemns the sin of
drinking strong drink, and the sensibility loathes the sinfulness of the
indulgence, nevertheless there still exists so strong an appetite, not for
the sin, but for the liquor, that the will seeks the gratification,
notwithstanding the sinfulness of it. So it is, and so it must be, in every
case where sin is committed in the face of the remonstrances of the
intellect and the loathing of the sensibility. The sensibility loathes the
sinfulness, but more strongly desires the thing the choice of which is
sinful. The will in a selfish being yields to the strongest impulse of the
sensibility, and the end chosen is, in no case, the sinfulness of the act,
but the self-gratification. Those who suppose this opposition of the
intellect, or of the sensibility, to be a holy principle, are fatally deluded.
It is this kind of opposition to sin, that often manifests itself among
wicked men, and that leads them to take credit for goodness or virtue,
not an atom of which do they possess. They will not believe
themselves to be morally and totally depraved, while they are
conscious of so much hostility to sin within them. But they should
understand, that this opposition is not of the will, or they cold not go on
in sin; that it is purely an involuntary state of mind, and has no moral
character whatever. Let it be ever remembered, then, that a virtuous
opposition to sin is always and necessarily an attribute of
benevolence, a phenomenon of the will; and that it is naturally
impossible, that this opposition of will should coexist with the
commission of sin.
As this opposition to sin is plainly implied in, and is an essential
attribute of, benevolence, or true love to God, it follows, that obedience
to the law of God cannot be partial, in the sense that we both love God
and sin at the same time.
11. Compassion for the miserable is also an attribute of
benevolence, or of pure love to God and man. This is benevolence
viewed in its relations to misery and to guilt.
There is a compassion also which is a phenomenon of the
sensibility. It may, and does often, exist in the form of an emotion.
But this emotion being involuntary, has no moral character in itself.
The compassion which is a virtue, and which is required of us as a
duty, is a phenomenon of the will, and is of course an attribute of
benevolence. Benevolence, as has been often said, is good willing, or
willing the highest happiness and well-being of God and the universe
for its own sake, or as an end. It is impossible, therefore, from its own
nature, that compassion for the miserable should not be one of its
attributes. Compassion of will to misery is the choice or wish that it
might not exist. Benevolence wills that happiness should exist for its
own sake. It must, therefore, wish that misery might not exist. This
attribute or peculiarity of benevolence consists in wishing the
happiness of the miserable. Benevolence, simply considered, is
willing the good or happiness of being in general. Compassion of will
is a willing particularly that the miserable should be happy.
Compassion of sensibility is simply a feeling of pity in view of misery.
As has been said, it is not a virtue. It is only a desire, but not willing;
consequently, does not benefit its object. It is the state of mind of
which James speaks: "If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of
daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye
warmed and filled; notwithstanding ye give them not those things
which are needful to the body, what doth it profit?" (James 2:15, 16).
This kind of compassion may evidently coexist with selfishness. But
compassion of heart or will cannot; for it consists in willing the
happiness of the miserable for its own sake, and of course impartially.
It will, and from its very nature must, deny self to promote its end,
whenever it wisely can, that is, when it is seen to be demanded by the
highest general good. Circumstances may exist that render it unwise
to express this compassion by actually extending relief to the
miserable. Such circumstances forbid that God should extend relief to
the lost in hell. But for their character and governmental relations,
God's compassion would no doubt make immediate efforts for their
relief.
Many circumstances may exist in which, although compassion would
hasten to the relief of its object, yet, on the whole, the misery that
exists is regarded as the less of two evils, and therefore, the wisdom
of benevolence forbids it to put forth exertions to save its object.
But it is of the last importance to distinguish carefully between
compassion, as a phenomenon of the sensibility, or as a mere feeling,
and compassion considered as a phenomenon of the will. This, be it
remembered, is the only form of virtuous compassion. Many, who,
from the laws of their mental constitution, feel quickly and deeply,
often take credit to themselves for being compassionate, while they
seldom do much for the downtrodden and the miserable. Their
compassion is a mere feeling. It says, "Be ye warmed and filled," but
does not that for them which is needful. It is this particular attribute of
benevolence that was so conspicuous in the life of Howard,
Wilberforce, and many other Christian philanthropists.
It should be said, before I leave the consideration of this attribute,
that the will is often influenced by the feeling of compassion. In this
case, the mind is no less selfish in seeking to promote the relief and
happiness of its object than it is in any other form of selfishness. In
such cases, self-gratification is the end sought, and the relief of the
suffering is only a means. Pity is stirred, and the sensibility is deeply
pained and excited by the contemplation of misery. The will is
influenced by this feeling, and makes efforts to relieve the painful
emotion on the one hand, and to gratify the desire to see the sufferer
happy on the other. This is only an imposing form of selfishness. We,
no doubt, often witness displays of this kind of self-gratification. The
happiness of the miserable is not in this case sought as an end, or for
its own sake, but as a means of gratifying our own feelings. This is not
obedience of will to the law of the intellect, but obedience to the
impulse of the sensibility. It is not a natural and intelligent
compassion, but just such compassion as we often see mere animals
exercise. They will risk, and even lay down, their lives, to give relief to
one of their number, or to a man who is in misery. In them this has no
moral character having no reason, it is not sin for them to obey their
sensibility; nay, this is a law of their being. This they cannot but do.
For them, then, to seek their own gratification as an end is not sin. But
man has reason; he is bound to obey it. He should will and seek the
relief and the happiness of the miserable, for its own sake, or for its
intrinsic value. When he seeks it for no higher reason than to gratify
his feelings, he denies his humanity He seeks it, not out of regard to
the sufferer, but in self-defense, or to relieve his own pain, and to
gratify his own desires. This in him is sin.
Many, therefore, who take to themselves much credit for
benevolence, are, after all, only in the exercise of this imposing form of
selfishness. They take credit for holiness, when their holiness is only
sin. What is especially worthy of notice here, is, that this class of
persons appear to themselves and others, to be all the more virtuous
by how much more manifestly and exclusively they are led on by the
impulse of feeling. They are conscious of feeling deeply, of being
more sincere and earnest in obeying their feelings. Every body who
knows them can also see, that they feel deeply, and are influenced by
the strength of their feelings, rather than by their intellect. Now, so
gross is the darkness of most persons upon this subject, that they
award praise to themselves and to others, just in proportion as they
are sure that they are actuated by the depth of their feelings, rather
than by their sober judgme