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HUMAN GOVERNMENT
Human governments a part of the moral government of God.
LECTURE 20
In the discussion of this subject I will:
Inquire into the ultimate end of God in creation.
We have seen in former lectures, that God is a moral agent, the
self-existent and supreme; and is therefore Himself, as ruler of all,
subject to, and observant of, moral law in all His conduct. That is, His
own infinite intelligence must affirm that a certain course of willing is
suitable, fit, and right in Him. This idea, or affirmation, is law to Him;
and to this His will must be conformed, or He is not good. This is
moral law, a law founded in the eternal and self-existent nature of
God. This law does, and must, demand benevolence in God.
Benevolence is good willing. God's intelligence must affirm that He
ought to will good for its own intrinsic value. It must affirm His
obligation to choose the highest possible good as the great end of His
being. If God is good, the highest good of Himself, and of the
universe, must have been the end which He had in view in the work of
creation. This is of infinite value, and ought to be willed by God. If
God is good, this must have been His end. We have also seen:
That providential and moral governments are indispensable means
of securing the highest good of the universe.
The highest good of moral agents is conditionated upon their
holiness. Holiness consists in conformity to moral law. Moral law
implies moral government. Moral government is a government of
moral law and of motives. Motives are presented by providential
government; and providential government is, therefore, a means of
moral government. Providential and moral government must be
indispensable to securing the highest good of the universe.
Civil and family governments are indispensable to the securing of
this end, and are, therefore, really a part of the providential and moral
government of God.
In the discussion of this question I remark,
similar degrees of knowledge. No human community exists, or ever
will exist, the members of which will agree in opinion on all subjects.
This creates a necessity for human legislation and adjudication, to
apply the great principles of moral law to all human affairs. There are
multitudes of human wants and necessities that cannot properly be
met, except through the instrumentality of human governments.
2. This necessity will continue as long as human beings exist in this
world. This is as certain as that the human body will always need
sustenance and clothing; and that the human soul will always need
instruction; and that the means of instruction will not come
spontaneously, without expense and labor. It is as certain as that men
of all ages and circumstances will never possess equal talents and
degrees of information on all subjects. If all men were perfectly holy
and disposed to do right, the necessity for human governments would
not be set aside, because this necessity is founded in the ignorance of
mankind, though greatly aggravated by their wickedness. The
decisions of legislators and judges must be authoritative, so as to
settle questions of disagreement in opinion, and at once to bind and
protect all parties.
The Bible presents human governments not only as existing, but as
deriving their authority and right to punish evildoers, and to protect the
righteous, from God. But:
3. Human governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part
of the moral government of God.
"He changeth the times and the seasons; He removeth kings, and
setteth up kings: He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to
them that know understanding" (Daniel 2:21). "This matter is by the
decree of the watchers, and the demand by the word of the holy ones;
to the intent that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the
kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will, and setteth up
over it the basest of men." "They shall drive thee from men, and thy
dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field, and they shall make thee
to eat grass as oxen, and they shall wet thee with the dew of heaven,
and seven times shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High
ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will"
(Daniel 4:17, 25). "He was driven from the sons of men; and his heart
was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses:
they fed him with grass like oxen, and his body was wet with the dew
of heaven till he knew that the Most High God ruleth in the kingdom of
men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will" (Daniel 5:21).
"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no
power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God.
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of
God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For
rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not
be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have
praise of the same: for he is the minister of God to thee for good. But
if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in
vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon
him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for
wrath but also for conscience's sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute
also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very
thing. Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is
due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor"
(Romans 13:1-7). "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and
powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work" (Titus
3:1). "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's
sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto
them that are sent by Him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the
praise of them that do well" (1 Peter 2:13, 14). These passages prove
conclusively, that God establishes human government, as parts of
moral government.
4. It is the duty of all men to aid in the establishment and support of
human government.
As the great law of benevolence, or universal good willing, demands
the existence of human governments, all men are under a perpetual
and unalterable moral obligation to aid in their establishment and
support. In popular or elective governments, every man having a right
to vote, every human being who has moral influence, is bound to exert
that influence in the promotion of virtue and happiness. And as human
governments are plainly indispensable to the highest good of man,
they are bound to exert their influence to secure a legislation that is in
accordance with the law of God. The obligation of human beings to
support and obey human governments, while they legislate upon the
principles of the moral law, is as unalterable as the moral law itself.
5. I will answer objections.
Objection: 1. The kingdom of God is represented in the Bible as
subverting all other kingdoms.
Answer: This is true, but all that can be meant by it is, that the time
shall come when God shall be regarded as the supreme and universal
sovereign of the universe, when His law shall be regarded as
universally obligatory; when all kings, legislators, and judges shall act
as His servants, declaring, applying, and administering the great
principles of His law to all the affairs of human beings. Thus God will
be the supreme sovereign, and earthly rulers will be governors, kings,
and judges under Him, and acting by His authority as revealed in the
Bible.
Objection: 2. It is alleged that God only providentially establishes
human governments, and that He does not approve of their selfish and
wicked administration; that He only uses them providentially, as He
does Satan, for the promotion of His own designs.
Answer: God nowhere commands mankind to obey Satan, but He
does command them to obey magistrates and rulers. "Let every soul
be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God:
the powers that be are ordained of God" (Romans 13:1). "Submit
yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it
be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are
sent by Him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of
them that do well" (1 Peter 2:13, 14).
He nowhere recognizes Satan as His servant, sent and set by Him to
administer justice and execute wrath upon the wicked; but He does
this in respect to human governments. "Whosoever therefore resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall
receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good
works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do
that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is
the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil,
be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of
God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore
ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience's
sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also; for they are God's
ministers, attending continually upon this very thing" (Romans 13:2-6).
It is true indeed that God approves of nothing that is ungodly and
selfish in human governments. Neither did He approve of what was
ungodly and selfish in the scribes and Pharisees; and yet Christ said to
His disciples, "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat.
Therefore, whatsoever things they command you, that observe and
do; but do ye not after their works, for they say, and do not" (Matt.
23:2-3). Here the plain common-sense principle is recognized, that we
are to obey when the requirement is not inconsistent with the moral
law, whatever may be the character or the motive of the ruler. We are
always to obey heartily as unto the Lord, and not unto men, and
render obedience to magistrates for the honor and glory of God, and
as doing service to Him.
Objection: 3. It is said that Christians should leave human
governments to the management of the ungodly, and not be diverted
from the work of saving souls, to intermeddle with human
governments.
Answer: To uphold and assist good government is not being diverted
from the work of saving souls. The promotion of public and private
order and happiness is one of the indispensable means of doing good
and saving souls. It is nonsense to admit that Christians are under an
obligation to obey human government, and still have nothing to do with
the choice of those who shall govern.
Objection: 4. It is affirmed that we are commanded not to avenge
ourselves, that "Vengeance is Mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord"
(Romans 12:19). It is said, that if I may not avenge or redress my own
wrongs in my own person, I may not do it through the instrumentality
of human government.
Answer: It does not follow, that because you may not take it upon
yourself to redress your own wrongs by a summary and personal
infliction of punishment upon the transgressor, that therefore human
governments may not punish them. All private wrongs are a public
injury; and irrespective of any particular regard to your personal
interest, magistrates are bound to punish crime for the public good.
While God has expressly forbidden you to redress your own wrongs,
by administering personal and private chastisement, He has expressly
recognized the right, and made it the duty of public magistrates to
punish crimes.
Objection: 5. It is alleged, that love is so much better than law, that
where love reigns in the heart, law can be universally dispensed with.
Answer: This supposes that, if there is only love, there need be no
rule of duty; no revelation, directing love in its efforts to secure the end
upon which it terminates. But this is as untrue as possible. The
objection overlooks the fact, that law is in all worlds the rule of duty,
and that legal sanctions make up an indispensable part of that circle of
motives that are suited to the nature, relations, and government of
moral beings.
Objection: 6. It is asserted, that Christians have something else to do
besides meddling with politics.
Answer: In a popular government, politics are an important part of
religion. No man can possibly be benevolent or religious, to the full
extent of his obligations, without concerning himself, to a greater or
less extent, with the affairs of human government. It is true, that
Christians have something else to do than to go with a party to do evil,
or to meddle with politics in a selfish or ungodly manner. But they are
bound to meddle with politics in popular governments, because they
are bound to seek the universal good of all men; and this is one
department of human interests, materially affecting all their higher
interests.
Objection: 7. It is said that human governments are nowhere
expressly authorized in the Bible.
Answer: This is a mistake. Both their existence and lawfulness are
as expressly recognized in the above quoted scriptures as they can
be. But if God did not expressly authorize them, it would still be both
the right and the duty of mankind to institute human governments,
because they are plainly demanded by the necessities of human
nature. It is a first truth, that whatever is essential to the highest good
of moral beings in any world, they have a right to pursue, and are
bound to pursue according to the best dictates of reason and
experience. So far, therefore, are men from needing any express
authority to establish human governments, that no inference from the
silence of scripture could avail to render their establishment unlawful.
It has been shown, in these lectures on moral government, that moral
law is a unit that it is that rule of action which is in accordance with
the nature, relations, and circumstances of moral beings that
whatever is in accordance with, and demanded by the nature,
relations, and circumstances of moral beings, is obligatory on them. It
is moral law, and no power in the universe can set it aside. Therefore,
were the scriptures entirely silent (which they are not) on the subject of
human governments, and on the subject of family government, as they
actually are on a great many important subjects, this would be no
objection to the lawfulness and expediency, necessity and duty of
establishing human governments.
Objection: 8. It is said that human governments are founded in and
sustained by force, and that this is inconsistent with the spirit of the
gospel.
Answer: There cannot be a difference between the spirit of the Old
and the New Testament, or between the spirit of the law and the
gospel, unless God has changed, and unless Christ has undertaken to
make void the law through faith, which cannot be. "Do we then make
void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law"
(Romans 3:32). Just human governments, and such governments
only are contended for, will not exercise force, unless it is demanded
to promote the highest public good. If it be necessary to this end, it
can never be wrong. Nay, it must be the duty of human governments
to inflict penalties, when their infliction is demanded by the public
interest.
Objection: 9. It has been said by some persons, that church
government is sufficient to meet the necessities of the world, without
secular or state governments.
Answer: What! Church governments regulate commerce, make
internal arrangements, such as roads, bridges, and taxation, and
undertake to manage all the business affairs of the world!
Preposterous and impossible! Church government was never
established for any such end; but simply to regulate the spiritual, in
distinction from the secular concerns of men to try offenders and
inflict spiritual chastisement, and never to perplex and embarrass itself
with managing the business and commercial interests of the world.
Objection: 10. It is said, that were all the world holy, legal penalties
would not be needed.
Answer: Were all men perfectly holy, the execution of penalties
would not be needed; but still, if there were law, there must be
penalties; and it would be both the right and the duty of magistrates to
inflict them, whenever the needful occasion should call for their
execution. But the state of the world supposed is not at hand, and
while the world is what it is, laws must remain, and be enforced.
Objection: 11. It is asserted, that family government is the only form
of government approved of God.
Answer: This is a ridiculous assertion, because God as expressly
commands obedience to magistrates as to parents. He makes it as
absolutely the duty of magistrates to punish crime, as of parents to
punish their own disobedient children. The right of family government,
though commanded by God, is not founded in the arbitrary will of God,
but in the highest good of human beings; so that family government
would be both necessary and obligatory, had God not commanded it.
So the right of human government has not its foundation in the
arbitrary will of God, but in the necessities of human beings. The
larger the community the more absolute the necessity of government.
If in the small circle of the family, laws and penalties are needed, how
much more in the larger communities of states and nations. Now,
neither the ruler of a family, nor any other human ruler, has a right to
legislate arbitrarily, or enact, or enforce any other laws, than those that
are demanded by the nature, relations, and circumstances of human
beings. Nothing can be obligatory on moral beings, but that which is
consistent with their nature, relations, and circumstances. But human
beings are bound to establish family governments, state governments,
national governments, and in short, whatever government may be
requisite for the universal instruction, government, virtue, and
happiness of the world, or any portion of it.
Christians therefore have something else to do than to confound the
right of government with the abuse of this right by the ungodly.
Instead of destroying human governments, Christians are bound to
reform and uphold them. To attempt to destroy, rather than reform
human governments, is the same in principle as is often aimed at, by
those who are attempting to destroy, rather than to reform, the church.
There are those who, disgusted with the abuses of Christianity
practiced in the church, seem bent on destroying the church
altogether, as the means of saving the world. But what mad policy is
this! It is admitted that selfish men need, and must feel the restraints
of law; but yet it is contended that Christians should have no part in
restraining them by law. But suppose the wicked should agree among
themselves to have no law, and therefore should not attempt to
restrain themselves, nor each other by law; would it be neither the
right nor the duty of Christians to attempt their restraint, through the
influence of wholesome government? It would be strange, that selfish
men should need the restraints of law, and yet that Christians should
have no right to meet this necessity, by supporting governments that
will restrain them. It is right and best that there should be law. It is
even absolutely necessary that there should be law. Universal
benevolence demands it; can it then be wrong in Christians to have
anything to do with it?
Point out the limits or boundaries of the right of government.
Observe, the end of government is the highest good of human
beings, as a part of universal good. All valid human legislation must
propose this as its end, and no legislation can have any authority that
has not the highest good of the whole for its end. No being can
arbitrarily create law. All law for the government of moral agents must
be moral law: that is, it must be that rule of action best suited to their
natures and relations. All valid human legislation must be only
declaratory of this one only law. Nothing else than this can by any
possibility be law. God puts forth no enactments, but such as are
declaratory of the common law of the universe; and should He do
otherwise, they would not be obligatory. Arbitrary legislation can never
be really obligatory.
The right of human government is founded in the intrinsic value of
the good of being, and is conditionated upon its necessity, as a means
to that end. So far as legislation and control are indispensable to this
end, so far and no farther does the right to govern extend. All
legislation and all constitutions not founded upon this basis, and not
recognizing the moral law as the only law of the universe, are null and
void, and all attempts to establish and enforce them are odious
tyranny and usurpation. Human beings may form constitutions,
establish governments, and enact statutes for the purpose of
promoting the highest virtue and happiness of the world, and for the
declaration and enforcement of moral law; and just so far human
governments are essential to this end, but absolutely no farther.
It follows, that no government is lawful or innocent that does not
recognize the moral law as the only universal law, and God as the
Supreme Lawgiver and Judge, to whom nations in their national
capacity, as well as all individuals, are amenable. The moral law of
God is the only law of individuals and of nations, and nothing can be
rightful government but such as is established and administered with a
view to its support.
LECTURE 21
HUMAN GOVERNMENT
I propose now to make several remarks respecting forms of
government, the right and duty of revolution, etc.
upon the virtue and intelligence of the people.
When virtue and intelligence are nearly universal, democratic forms
of government are well suited to promote the public good. In such a
state of society, democracy is greatly conducive to the general
diffusion of knowledge on governmental subjects; and although, in
some respects less convenient, yet in a suitable state of society, a
democracy is in many respects the most desirable form of
government.
God has always providentially given to mankind those forms of
government that were suited to the degrees of virtue and intelligence
among them. If they have been extremely ignorant and vicious, He
has restrained them by the iron rod of human despotism. If more
intelligent and virtuous, He has given them the milder form of limited
monarchies. If still more intelligent and virtuous, He has given them
still more liberty, and providentially established republics for their
government. Whenever the general state of intelligence has permitted
it, He has put them to the test of self-government and self-restraint, by
establishing democracies.
If the world ever becomes perfectly virtuous, governments will be
proportionally modified, and employed in expounding and applying the
great principles of moral law.
2. That form of government is obligatory, that is best suited to meet
the necessities of the people.
This follows as a self-evident truth, from the consideration, that
necessity is the condition of the right of human government. To meet
this necessity is the object of government; and that government is
obligatory and best which is demanded by the circumstances,
intelligence, and morals of the people.
Consequently, in certain states of society, it would be a Christian's
duty to pray for and sustain even a military despotism; in a certain
other state of society, to pray for and sustain a monarchy; and in other
states, to pray for and sustain a republic; and in a still more advanced
stage of virtue and intelligence, to pray for and sustain a democracy; if
indeed a democracy is the most wholesome form of self government,
which may admit of doubt. It is ridiculous to set up the claim of a
Divine right for any given form of government. That form of
government which is demanded by the state of society, and the virtue
and intelligence of the people, has of necessity the Divine right and
sanction, and none other has or can have.
3. Revolutions become necessary and obligatory, when the virtue
and intelligence, or the vice and ignorance, of the people, demand
them.
This is a thing of course. When one form of government fails to
meet any longer the necessities of the people, it is the duty of the
people to revolutionize. In such cases, it is vain to oppose revolution;
for in some way the benevolence of God will bring it about. Upon this
principle alone, can what is generally termed the American Revolution
be justified. The intelligence and virtue of our Puritan forefathers
rendered a monarchy an unnecessary burden, and a republican form
of government both appropriate and necessary; and God always
allows His children as much liberty as they are prepared to enjoy.
The stability of our republican institutions must depend upon the
progress of general intelligence and virtue. If in these respects the
nation falls, if general intelligence, public and private virtue, sink to that
point below which self-control becomes practicably impossible, we
must fall back into monarchy, limited or absolute; or into civil or military
despotism; just according to the national standard of intelligence and
virtue. This is just as certain as that God governs the world, or that
causes produce their effects.
Therefore, it is the maddest conceivable policy, for Christians to
attempt to uproot human governments, while they ought to be
engaged in sustaining them upon the great principles of the moral law.
It is certainly the grossest folly, if not abominable wickedness, to
overlook either in theory or practice, these plain, common sense and
universal truths.
4. In what cases are we bound to disobey human governments?
(1.) We may yield obedience, when the thing required does not
involve a violation of moral obligation.
(2.) We are bound to obey when the thing required has no moral
character in itself; upon the principle, that obedience in this case is a
less evil than resistance and revolution. But:
(3.) We are bound in all cases to disobey, when human legislation
contravenes moral law, or invades the rights of conscience.
Apply the foregoing principles to the rights and duties of
governments and subjects in relation to the execution of the necessary
penalties of law: the suppression of mobs, insurrections, rebellion; and
also in relation to war, slavery, Sabbath desecration, etc.
promotion of the public interests, implies the right and duty to use any
means necessary to this result. It is absurd to say that the ruler has
the right to govern, and yet that he has not a right to use the
necessary means. Some have taken the ground of the inviolability of
human life, and have insisted that to take life is wrong per se, and of
course that governments are to be sustained without taking life.
Others have gone so far as to assert, that governments have no right
to resort to physical force to sustain the authority of law. But this is a
most absurd philosophy, and amounts just to this: The ruler has a right
to govern while the subject is pleased to obey; but if the subject
refuses obedience, why then the right to govern ceases: for it is
impossible that the right to govern should exist when the right to
enforce obedience does not exist. This philosophy is, in fact, a denial
of the right to use the necessary means for the promotion of the great
end for which all moral agents ought to live. And yet, strange to tell,
this philosophy professes to deny the right to use force, and to take life
in support of government, on the ground of benevolence, that is, that
benevolence forbids it. What is this but maintaining that the law of
benevolence demands that we should love others too much to use the
indispensable means to secure their good? Or that we should love the
whole too much to execute the law upon those who would destroy all
good? Shame on such philosophy! It overlooks the foundation of
moral obligation, and of all morality and religion. Just as if an
enlightened benevolence could forbid the due, wholesome, and
necessary execution of law. This philosophy impertinently urges the
commandment, "Thou shalt not kill" (Deut. 5:17), as prohibiting all
taking of human life. But it may be asked, why say human life? The
commandment, so far as the letter is concerned, as fully prohibits the
killing of animals or vegetables as it does of men. The question is,
what kind of killing does this commandment prohibit? Certainly not all
killing of human beings, for in the next chapter the Jews were
commanded to kill human beings for certain crimes. The ten
commandments are precepts, and the Lawgiver, after laying down the
precepts, goes on to specify the penalties that are to be inflicted by
men for a violation of these precepts. Some of these penalties are
death, and the penalty for the violation of the precept under
consideration is death. It is certain that this precept was not intended
to prohibit the taking of life for murder. A consideration of the law in its
tenor and spirit renders it most evident that the precept in question
prohibits murder, and the penalty of death is added by the lawgiver to
the violation of this precept. Now how absurd and impertinent it is, to
quote this precept in prohibition of taking life under the circumstances
included in the precept!
Men have an undoubted right to do whatever is plainly indispensable
to the highest good of man; and, therefore, nothing can, by any
possibility be law, that should prohibit the taking of human life, when it
becomes indispensable to the great end of government. This right is
every where recognized in the Bible, and if it were not, still the right
would exist. This philosophy that I am opposing, assumes that the will
of God creates law, and that we have no right to take life, without an
express warrant from Him. But the facts are, that God did give to the
Jews, at least, an express warrant and injunction to take life for certain
crimes; and, if He had not, it would have been duty to do so whenever
the public good required it. Let it be remembered, that the moral law is
the law of nature, and that everything is lawful and right that is plainly
demanded for the promotion of the highest good of being.
The philosophy of which I am speaking lays much stress upon what
it calls inalienable rights. It assumes that man has a title or right to life,
in such a sense, that he cannot forfeit it by crime. But the fact is, there
are no rights inalienable in this sense. There can be no such rights.
Whenever any individual by the commission of crime comes into such
a relation to the public interest, that his death is a necessary means of
securing the highest public good, his life is forfeited, and to take the
forfeiture at his hands is the duty of the government.
2. It will be seen, that the same principles are equally applicable to
insurrections, rebellions, etc. While government is right, it is duty, and
while it is right and duty, because necessary as a means to the great
end upon which benevolence terminates, it must be both the right and
the duty of government, and of all the subjects, to use any
indispensable means for the suppression of insurrections, rebellion,
etc., as also for the due administration of justice in the execution of
law.
3. These principles will guide us in ascertaining the right, and of
course the duty of governments in relation to war.
Observe, war to be in any case a virtue, or to be less than a crime of
infinite magnitude, must not only be honestly believed, by those who
engage in it, to be demanded by the law of benevolence, but it must
also be engaged in by them with an eye single to the glory of God, and
the highest good of being. That war has been in some instances
demanded by the spirit of the moral law, there can be no reasonable
doubt, since God has sometimes commanded it, which He could not
have done had it not been demanded by the highest good of the
universe. In such cases, if those who were commanded to engage in
war, had benevolent intentions in prosecuting it as God had in
commanding it, it is absurd to say that they sinned. Rulers are
represented as God's ministers to execute wrath upon the guilty. If, in
the providence of God, He should find it duty to destroy or to rebuke a
nation for His own glory, and the highest good of being, He may
beyond question command that they should be chastised by the hand
of man. But in no case is war anything else than a most horrible
crime, unless it is plainly the will of God that it should exist, and unless
it be actually undertaken in obedience to His will. This is true of all,
both of rulers and of subjects, who engage in war. Selfish war is
wholesale murder. For a nation to declare war, or for persons to
enlist, or in any way designedly to aid or abet, in the declaration or
prosecution of war, upon any other conditions than those just
specified, involves the guilt of murder.
There can scarcely be conceived a more abominable and fiendish
maxim than "our country right or wrong." Recently this maxim seems
to have been adopted and avowed in relation to the war of the United
States with Mexico. It seems to be supposed by some, that it is the
duty of good subjects to sympathize with, and support government in
the prosecution of a war in which they have unjustly engaged, and to
which they have committed themselves, upon the ground that since it
is commenced it must be prosecuted as the less of two evils. The
same class of men seem to have adopted the same philosophy in
respect to slavery. Slavery, as it exists in this country, they
acknowledge to be indefensible on the ground of right. It is a great evil
and a great sin, but it must be let alone as the less of two evils. It
exists, say they, and it cannot be abolished without disturbing the
friendly relations and federal union of the States, therefore the
institution must be sustained. The philosophy is this: war and slavery
as they exist in this nation are unjust, but they exist, and to sustain
them is duty, because their existence, under the circumstances, is the
less of two evils.
Nothing can sanctify any crime but that which renders it no crime, but
a virtue. But the philosophers, whose views I am examining, must, if
consistent, take the ground, that since war and slavery exist, although
their commencement was unjust and sinful, yet since they exist, it is no
crime but a virtue to sustain them, as the least of two natural evils. But
I would ask, to whom are they the least of two evils? To ourselves or
to being in general? The least of two present, or of two ultimate evils?
Our duty is not to calculate the evils in respect merely to ourselves, or
to this nation and those immediately oppressed and injured, but to look
abroad upon the world and the universe, and inquire what are the evils
resulting, and likely to result, to the world, to the church, and to the
universe, from the declaration and prosecution of such a war, and from
the support of slavery by a nation professing what we profess a
nation boasting of liberty; who have drawn the sword and bathed it in
blood in defense of the principle, that all men have an inalienable right
to liberty; that they are born free and equal. Such a nation proclaiming
such a principle, and fighting in the defense of it, standing with its
proud foot on the neck of three millions of crushed and prostrate
slaves! O horrible! This a less evil to the world than emancipation, or
even than the dismemberment of our hypocritical union! "O shame,
where is thy blush!" The prosecution of a war, unjustly engaged in, a
less evil than repentance and restitution! It is impossible. Honesty is
always and necessarily the best policy. Nations are bound by the
same law as individuals. If they have done wrong, it is always duty,
and honorable for them to repent, confess and make restitution. To
adopt the maxim, "Our country right or wrong," and to sympathize with
the government, in the prosecution of a war unrighteously waged,
must involve the guilt of murder. To adopt the maxim, "Our union,
even with perpetual slavery," is an abomination so execrable, as not to
be named by a just mind without indignation.
4. The same principles apply to governmental Sabbath desecration.
The Sabbath is plainly a divine institution, founded in the necessities of
human beings. The letter of the law of the Sabbath forbids all labor of
every kind, and under all circumstances on that day. But, as has been
said in a former lecture, the spirit of the law of the Sabbath, being
identical with the law of benevolence, sometimes requires the violation
of the letter of the law. Both governments and individuals may do, and
it is their duty to do, on the Sabbath whatever is plainly required by the
great law of benevolence. But nothing more, absolutely. No human
legislature can nullify the moral law. No human legislation can make it
right or lawful to violate any command of God. All human enactments
requiring or sanctioning the violation of any command of God, are not
only null and void, but they are a blasphemous usurpation and
invasion of the prerogative of God.
5. The same principles apply to slavery. No human constitution or
enactment can, by any possibility, be law, that recognizes the right of
one human being to enslave another, in a sense that implies
selfishness on the part of the slave holder. Selfishness is wrong per
se. It is, therefore, always and unalterably wrong. No enactment,
human or divine, can legalize selfishness and make it right, under any
conceivable circumstances. Slavery or any other evil, to be a crime,
must imply selfishness. It must imply a violation of the command,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 19:19). If it implies a
breach of this, it is wrong invariably and necessarily, and no
legislation, or any thing else, can make it right. God cannot authorize
it. The Bible cannot sanction it, and if both God and the Bible were to
sanction it, it could not be lawful. God's arbitrary will is not law. The
moral law, as we have seen, is as independent of His will, as His own
necessary existence is. He cannot alter or repeal it. He could not
sanctify selfishness and make it right. Nor can any book be received
as of divine authority that sanctions selfishness. God and the Bible
quoted to sustain and sanctify slave holding in a sense implying
selfishness! 'This blasphemous! That slave holding, as exists in this
country, implies selfishness, at least in almost all instances, is too plain
to need proof. The sinfulness of slave holding and war, in almost all
cases, and in every case where the terms slave holding and war are
used in their popular signification, will appear irresistibly, if we consider
that sin is selfishness, and that all selfishness is necessarily sinful.
Deprive a human being of liberty who has been guilty of no crime; rob
him of himself his body his soul his time, and his earnings, to
promote the interest of his master, and attempt to justify this on the
principles of moral law! It is the greatest absurdity, and the most
revolting wickedness.
LECTURE 22
MORAL DEPRAVITY
In discussing the subject of human depravity, I shall:
Define the term depravity.
The word is derived from the Latin de and pravus. Pravus means
"crooked." De is intensive. Depravatus literally and primarily means
"very crooked," not in the sense of original or constitutional
crookedness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term
does not imply original mal-conformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed
from right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a
former state of moral or physical perfection.
Depravity always implies a departure from a state of original integrity,
or from conformity to the laws of the being who is the subject of
depravity. Thus we should not consider that being depraved, who
remained in a state of conformity to the original laws of his being,
physical and moral. But we justly call a being depraved, who has
departed from conformity to those laws, whether those laws be
physical or moral.
Point out the distinction between physical and moral depravity.
Physical depravity, as the word denotes, is the depravity of
constitution, or substance, as distinguished from depravity of free
moral action. It may be predicated of body or of mind. Physical
depravity, when predicated of the body, is commonly and rightly called
disease. It consists in a physical departure from the laws of health; a
lapsed, or fallen state, in which healthy organic action is not sustained.
When physical depravity is predicated of mind, it is intended that the
powers of the mind, either in substance, or in consequence of their
connection with, and dependence upon, the body, are in a diseased,
lapsed, fallen, degenerate state, so that the healthy action of those
powers is not sustained.
Physical depravity, being depravity of substance as opposed to
depravity of the actions of free will, can have no moral character. It
may as we shall see, be caused by moral depravity; and a moral agent
may be blameworthy for having rendered himself physically depraved,
either in body or mind. But physical depravity, whether of body or of
mind, can have no moral character in itself, for the plain reason that it
is involuntary, and in its nature is disease, and not sin. Let this be
remembered.
Moral depravity is the depravity of free will, not of the faculty itself,
but of its free action. It consists in a violation of moral law. Depravity
of the will, as a faculty, is, or would be, physical, and not moral
depravity. It would be depravity of substance, and not of free,
responsible choice. Moral depravity is depravity of choice. It is a
choice at variance with moral law, moral right. It is synonymous with
sin or sinfulness. It is moral depravity, because it consists in a
violation of moral law, and because it has moral character.
Of what physical depravity can be predicated.
organized substance is liable to become depraved. Depravity is a
possible state of every organized body or substance in existence.
2. Physical depravity may be predicated of mind, as has already
been said, especially in its connection with an organized body. As
mind, in connection with body, manifests itself through it, acts by
means of it, and is dependent upon it, it is plain that if the body
become diseased, or physically depraved, the mind cannot but be
affected by this state of the body, through and by means of which it
acts. The normal manifestations of mind cannot, in such case, be
reasonably expected. Physical depravity may be predicated of all the
involuntary states of the intellect, and of the sensibility. That is, the
actings and states of the intellect may become disordered, depraved,
deranged, or fallen from the state of integrity and healthiness. This
every one knows, as it is matter of daily experience and observation.
Whether this in all cases is, and must be, caused by the state of the
bodily organization, that is, whether it is always and necessarily to be
ascribed to the depraved state of the brain and nervous system, it is
impossible for us to know. It may, for aught we know, in some
instances at least, be a depravity or derangement of the substance of
the mind itself.
The sensibility, or feeling department of the mind, may be sadly and
physically depraved. This is a matter of common experience. The
appetites and passions, the desires and cravings, the antipathies and
repellencies of the feelings fall into great disorder and anarchy.
Numerous artificial appetites are generated, and the whole sensibility
becomes a wilderness, a chaos of conflicting and clamorous desires,
emotions and passions. That this state of the sensibility is often, and
perhaps in some measure always, owing to the state of the nervous
system with which it is connected, through and by which it manifests
itself, there can be but little room to doubt. But whether this is always
and necessarily so, no one can tell. We know that the sensibility
manifests great physical depravity. Whether this depravity belong
exclusively to the body, or to the mind, or to both in conjunction, I will
not venture to affirm. In the present state of our knowledge, or of my
knowledge, I dare not hazard an affirmation upon the subject. The
human body is certainly in a state of physical depravity. The human
mind also certainly manifests physical depravity. But observe,
physical depravity has in no case any moral character, because it is
involuntary.
Of what moral depravity can be predicated.
does not directly legislate.
2. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any involuntary acts or
states of mind. These surely cannot be violations of moral law apart
from the ultimate intention; for moral law legislates directly only over
free, intelligent choices.
3. Moral depravity cannot be predicated of any unintelligent act of
will, that is, of acts of will that are put forth in a state of idiocy, of
intellectual derangement, or of sleep. Moral depravity implies moral
obligation; moral obligation implies moral agency; and moral agency
implies intelligence, or knowledge of moral relations. Moral agency
implies moral law, or the development of the idea of duty, and a
knowledge of what duty is.
4. Moral depravity can only be predicated of violations of moral law,
and of the free volitions by which those violations are perpetrated.
Moral law, as we have seen, requires love, and only love, to God and
man, or to God and the universe. This love, as we have seen, is
goodwill, choice, the choice of an end, the choice of the highest
well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences.
Moral depravity is sin. Sin is a violation of moral law. We have seen
that sin must consist in choice, in the choice of self-indulgence or
self-gratification as an end.
5. Moral depravity cannot consist in any attribute of nature or
constitution, nor in any lapsed and fallen state of nature; for this is
physical and not moral depravity.
6. It cannot consist in anything that is an original and essential part of
mind, or of body; nor in any involuntary action or state of either mind or
body.
7. It cannot consist in anything back of choice, and that sustains to
choice the relation of a cause. Whatever is back of choice, is without
the pale of legislation. The law of God, as has been said, requires
good willing only; and sure it is, that nothing but acts of will can
constitute a violation of moral law. Outward actions, and involuntary
thoughts and feelings, may be said in a certain sense to possess
moral character because they are produced by the will. But, strictly
speaking, moral character belongs only to choice, or intention.
It was shown in a former lecture, that sin does not, and cannot
consist in malevolence, properly speaking, or in the choice of sin or
misery as an end, or for its own sake. It was also shown, that all sin
consists, and must consist in selfishness, or in the choice of
self-gratification as a final end. Moral depravity then, strictly speaking,
can only be predicated of selfish ultimate intention.
Moral depravity, as I use the term, does not consist in, nor imply a
sinful nature, in the sense that the substance of the human soul is
sinful in itself. It is not a constitutional sinfulness. It is not an
involuntary sinfulness. Moral depravity, as I use the term, consists in
selfishness; in a state of voluntary committal of the will to
self-gratification. It is a spirit of self-seeking, a voluntary and entire
consecration to the gratification of self. It is selfish ultimate intention; it
is the choice of a wrong end of life; it is moral depravity, because it is a
violation of moral law. It is a refusal to consecrate the whole being to
the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and obedience to
the moral law, and consecrating it to the gratification of self. Moral
depravity sustains to the outward life, the relation of a cause. This
selfish intention, or the will in this committed state, of course, makes
efforts to secure its end, and these efforts make up the outward life of
the selfish man. Moral depravity is sinfulness, not of nature but of
voluntary state. It is a sinfully committed state of the will to
self-indulgence. It is not a sinful nature but a sinful heart. It is a sinful
ultimate aim, or intention. The Greek term amartia, rendered sin in our
English Bible, signifies to miss the mark, to aim at the wrong end. Sin
is a wrong aim, or intention. It is aiming at, or intending
self-gratification as the ultimate and supreme end of life, instead of
aiming, as the moral law requires, at the highest good of universal
being, as the end of life.
Mankind are both physically and morally depraved.
ranks and classes of human beings that inhabit this world. The
physical organization of the whole race has become impaired, and
beyond all doubt has been becoming more and more so since
intemperance of any kind was first introduced into our world. This is
illustrated and confirmed by the comparative shortness of human life.
This is a physiological fact.
2. As the human mind in this state of existence is dependent upon
the body for all its manifestations, and as the human body is
universally in a state of greater or less physical depravity or disease, it
follows that the manifestations of mind thus dependent on a physically
depraved organization, will be physically depraved manifestations.
Especially is this true of the human sensibility. The appetites,
passions, and propensities are in a state of most unhealthy
development. This is too evident, and too much a matter of universal
notoriety, to need proof or illustration. Every person of reflection has
observed, that the human mind is greatly out of balance, in
consequence of the monstrous development of the sensibility. The
appetites, passions, and propensities have been indulged, and the
intelligence and conscience stultified by selfishness. Selfishness, be it
remembered, consists in a disposition or choice to gratify the
propensities, desires, and feelings. This of course, and of necessity,
produces just the unhealthy and monstrous developments which we
daily see: sometimes one ruling passion or appetite lording it, not only
over the intelligence and over the will, but over all the other appetites
and passions, crushing and sacrificing them all upon the altar of its
own gratification. See that bloated wretch, the inebriate! His appetite
for strong drink has played the despot. His whole mind and body,
reputation, family, friends, health, time, eternity, all, all are laid by him
upon its filthy altar. There is the debauchee, the glutton, the gambler,
the miser, and a host of others, each in his turn giving striking and
melancholy proof of the monstrous development and physical
depravity of the human sensibility.
3. That men are morally depraved is one of the most notorious facts
of human experience, observation and history. Indeed, I am not aware
that it has ever been doubted, when moral depravity has been
understood to consist in selfishness. The moral depravity of the
human race is everywhere assumed and declared in the Bible, and so
universal and notorious is the fact of human selfishness, that should
any man practically call it in question should he, in his business
transactions, and in his intercourse with men, assume the contrary, he
would justly subject himself to the charge of insanity. There is not a
fact in the world more notorious and undeniable than this. Human
moral depravity is as palpably evident as human existence. It is a fact
everywhere assumed in all governments, in all the arrangements of
society, and it has impressed its image, and written its name, upon
every thing human.
Subsequent to the commencement of moral agency, and previous to
regeneration, the moral depravity of mankind is universal.
By this it is not intended to deny that, in some instances, the Spirit of
God may, from the first moment of moral agency, have so enlightened
the mind as to have secured conformity to moral law, as the first moral
act. This may or may not be true. It is not my present purpose to
affirm or to deny this, as a possibility, or as a fact.
But by this is intended, that every moral agent of our race is, from
the dawn of moral agency to the moment of regeneration by the Holy
Spirit, morally depraved, unless we except those possible cases just
alluded to. The Bible exhibits proof of it:
possessing one common wicked heart or character. "And God saw
that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every
imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Gen.
6:5). "This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun,
that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men
is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after
that they go to the dead" (Eccl. 9:3). "The heart is deceitful above all
things and desperately wicked: who can know it?" (Jere. 17:9).
"Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to
the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Romans 8:7).
2. In those passages that declare the universal necessity of
regeneration. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say
unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
God" (John 3:3).
3. Passages that expressly assert the universal moral depravity of all
unregenerate moral agents of our race. "What then? Are we better
than they? No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and
Gentiles, that they are all under sin; as it is written, There is none
righteous, no, not one. There is none that understandeth, there is
none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they
are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no
not one. Their throat is an open sepulcher; with their tongues they
have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips: whose mouth
is full of cursing and bitterness: their feet are swift to shed blood:
destruction and misery are in their ways: and the way of peace have
they not known: there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we
know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are
under the law: that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world
may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law
there shall no flesh be justified in His sight; for by the law is the
knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:9-20).
4. Universal history proves it. What is this world's history but the
shameless chronicle of human wickedness?
5. Universal observation attests it. Who ever saw one unregenerate
human being that was not selfish, that did not obey his feelings rather
than the law of his intelligence, that was not under some form, or in
some way, living to please self? Such an unregenerate human being,
I may safely affirm, was never seen since the fall of Adam.
6. I may also appeal to the universal consciousness of the
unregenerate. They know themselves to be selfish, to be aiming to
please themselves, and they cannot honestly deny it.
The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race is
total.
By this is intended, that the moral depravity of the unregenerate is
without any mixture of moral goodness or virtue, that while they remain
unregenerate, they never in any instance, nor in any degree, exercise
true love to God and to man. It is not intended, that they may not
perform many outward actions, and have many inward feelings, that
are such as the regenerate perform and experience: and such too as
are accounted virtue by those who place virtue in the outward action.
But it is intended, that virtue does not consist either in involuntary
feelings or in outward actions, and that it consists alone in entire
consecration of heart and life to God and the good of being, and that
no unregenerate sinner previous to regeneration, is or can be, for one
moment, in this state.
When virtue is clearly seen to consist in the heart's entire
consecration to God and the good of being, it must be seen, that the
unregenerate are not for one moment in this state. It is amazing, that
some philosophers and theologians have admitted and maintained,
that the unregenerate do sometimes do that which is truly virtuous.
But in these admissions they necessarily assume a false philosophy,
and overlook that in which all virtue does and must consist, namely,
supreme ultimate intention. They speak of virtuous actions and of
virtuous feelings, as if virtue consisted in them, and not in the
intention.
Henry P. Tappan, for example, for the most part an able, truthful,
and beautiful writer, assumes, or rather affirms, that volitions may be
put forth inconsistent with, and contrary to the present choice of an
end, and that consequently, unregenerate sinners, whom he admits to
be in the exercise of a selfish choice of an end, may and do
sometimes put forth right volitions, and perform right actions, that is,
right in the sense of virtuous actions. But let us examine this subject.
We have seen that all choice and all volition must respect either an
end or means, that is, that everything willed or chosen, is willed or
chosen for some reason. To deny this, is the same as to deny that
anything is willed or chosen, because the ultimate reason for a choice
and the thing chosen are identical. Therefore, it is plain, as was
shown in a former lecture, that the will cannot embrace at the same
time, two opposite ends; and that while but one end is chosen, the will
cannot put forth volitions to secure some other end, which end is not
yet chosen. In other words, it certainly is absurd to say, that the will,
while maintaining the choice of one end, can use means for the
accomplishment of another and opposite end.
When an end is chosen, that choice confines all volition to securing
its accomplishment, and for the time being, and until another end is
chosen, and this one relinquished, it is impossible for the will to put
forth any volition inconsistent with the present choice. It therefore
follows, that while sinners are selfish, or unregenerate, it is impossible
for them to put forth a holy volition. They are under the necessity of
first changing their hearts, or their choice of an end, before they can
put forth any volitions to secure any other than a selfish end. And this
is plainly the everywhere assumed philosophy of the Bible. That
uniformly represents the unregenerate as totally depraved, and calls
upon them to, repent, to make to themselves a new heart; and never
admits directly, or by way of implication, that they can do anything
good or acceptable to God, while in the exercise of a wicked or selfish
heart.
LECTURE 23
MORAL DEPRAVITY
Let us consider the proper method of accounting for the universal
and total moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our
race.
In the discussion of this subject, I will:
In examining this part of the subject, it is necessary to have distinctly
in view that which constitutes moral depravity. All the error that has
existed upon this subject, has been founded in false assumptions in
regard to the nature or essence of moral depravity. It has been almost
universally true, that no distinction has been made between moral and
physical depravity; and consequently, physical depravity has been
confounded with and treated of, as moral depravity. This of course
has led to vast confusion and nonsense upon this subject. Let the
following fact, which has been shown in former lectures, be distinctly
borne in mind.
That moral depravity consists in selfishness, or in the choice of
self-interest, self-gratification, or self-indulgence, as an end.
Consequently it cannot consist,
(1.) In a sinful constitution, or in a constitutional appetency or craving
for sin. This has been shown in a former lecture, on what is not
implied in disobedience to the moral law.
(2.) Moral depravity is sin itself and not the cause of sin. It is not
something prior to sin, that sustains to it the relation of a cause, but it
is the essence and the whole of sin.
(3.) It cannot be an attribute of human nature, considered simply as
such, for this would be physical, and not moral depravity.
(4.) Moral depravity is not then to be accounted for by ascribing it to
a nature or constitution sinful in itself. To talk of a sinful nature, or
sinful constitution, in the sense of physical sinfulness, is to ascribe
sinfulness to the Creator, who is the author of nature. It is to overlook
the essential nature of sin, and to make sin a physical virus, instead of
a voluntary and responsible choice. Both sound philosophy and the
Bible, make sin to consist in obeying the flesh, or in the spirit of
self-pleasing, or self-indulgence, or, which is the same thing, in
selfishness in a carnal mind, or in minding the flesh. But writers on
moral depravity have assumed, that moral depravity was distinct from,
and the cause of sin, that is, of actual transgression. They call it
original sin, indwelling sin, a sinful nature, an appetite for sin, an
attribute of human nature, and the like. We shall presently see what
has led to this view of the subject.
I will, in the next place, notice a modern, and perhaps the most
popular view of this subject, which has been taken by any late writer,
who has fallen into the error of confounding physical and moral
depravity. I refer to the prize essay of Dr. Woods, of Andover, Mass.
He defines moral depravity to be the same as "sinfulness." He also, in
one part of his essay, holds and maintains, that it is always and
necessarily, voluntary. Still, his great effort is to prove that sinfulness
or moral depravity, is an attribute of human nature. It is no part of my
design to expose the inconsistency of holding moral depravity to be a
voluntary state of mind, and yet a natural attribute, but only to examine
the philosophy, the logic, and theory of his main argument. The
following quotation will show the sense in which he holds moral
depravity to belong to the nature of man. At page 54 he says:
"The word depravity, relating as it here does to man's moral
character, means the same as sinfulness, being the opposite of moral
purity, or holiness." In this use of the word there is a general
agreement. But what is the meaning of native, or natural? Among the
variety of meanings specified by Johnson, Webster, and others, I refer
to the following, as relating particularly to the subject before us.
Native. Produced by nature. Natural, or such as is according to
nature; belonging by birth; original. Natural has substantially the same
meaning: `produced by nature; not acquired.' So Crabbe: `Of a
person we say, his worth is native, to designate it as some valuable
property born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon him; but
we say of his disposition, that it is natural, as opposed to that which is
acquired by habit.' And Johnson defines nature to be `the native state
or properties of any thing, by which it is discriminated from others.' He
quotes the definition of Boyle: `Nature sometimes means what belongs
to a living creature at its nativity, or accrues to it by its birth, as when
we say a man is noble by nature, or a child is naturally froward.' `This,'
he says, `may be expressed by saying, the man was born so.'
"After these brief definitions, which come to nearly the same thing, I
proceed to inquire, what are the marks or evidence which show
anything in man to be natural, or native; and how far these marks are
found in relation to depravity."
Again, page 66, he says:
"The evil, then, cannot be supposed to originate in any unfavorable
external circumstances, such as corrupting examples, or insinuating
and strong temptations; for if we suppose these entirely removed, all
human beings would still be sinners. With such a moral nature as they
now have, they would not wait for strong temptations to sin. Nay, they
would be sinners in opposition to the strongest motives to the contrary.
Indeed, we know that human beings will turn those very motives which
most powerfully urge to holiness, into occasions of sin. Now, does not
the confidence and certainty with which we foretell the commission of
sin, and of sin unmixed with moral purity, presuppose a full conviction
in us, and a conviction resting upon what we regard as satisfactory
evidence, that sin, in all its visible actings, arises from that which is
within the mind itself, and which belongs to our very nature as moral
beings? Have we not as much evidence that this is the case with
moral evil as with any of our natural affections or bodily appetites?"
This quotation, together with the whole argument, shows that he
considers moral depravity to be an attribute of human nature, in the
same sense that the appetites and passions are. Before I proceed
directly to the examination of his argument, that sinfulness, or moral
depravity, is an "attribute of human nature," I would premise, that an
argument, or fact, that may equally well consist with either of two
opposing theories, can prove neither. The author in question presents
the following facts and considerations in support of his great position,
that moral depravity, or sinfulness, is an attribute of human nature; and
three presidents of colleges indorse the soundness and
conclusiveness of the argument.
He proves his position first from the "universality of moral
depravity." To this I answer, that this argument proves nothing to the
purpose, unless it be true, and assumed as a major premise, that
whatever is universal among mankind, must be a natural attribute of
man as such; that whatever is common to all men, must be an
attribute of human nature. But this assumption is a begging of the
question. Sin may be the result of temptation; temptation may be
universal, and of such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily, to result
in sin, unless a contrary result be secured by a Divine moral suasion.
This I shall endeavor to show is the fact. This argument assumes, that
there is but one method of accounting for the universality of human
sinfulness. But this is the question in debate, and is not to be thus
assumed as true.
Again: Selfishness is common to all unregenerate men. Is
selfishness a natural attribute? We have seen, in a former lecture,
that it consists in choice. Can choice be an attribute of human nature?
Again: This argument is just as consistent with the opposite theory,
to wit, that moral depravity is selfishness. The universality of
selfishness is just what might be expected, if selfishness consists in
the committal of the will to the gratification of self. This will be a thing
of course, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, greatly to enlighten the
intellect, and break up the force of habit, and change the attitude of the
will, already, at the first dawn of reason, committed to the impulses of
the sensibility. If moral depravity is to be accounted for, as I shall
hereafter more fully show, by ascribing it to the influence of temptation,
or to a physically depraved constitution, surrounded by the
circumstances in which mankind first form their moral character, or put
forth their first moral choices, universality might of course be expected
to be one of its characteristics. This argument, then, agreeing equally
well with either theory, proves neither.
His second argument is, that "Moral depravity develops itself in early
life." Answer:
This is just what might be expected upon the opposite theory. If
moral depravity consist in the choice of self-gratification, it would of
course appear in early life. So this argument agrees quite as well with
the opposing theory, and therefore proves nothing. But this
argument is good for nothing, unless the following be assumed as a
major premise, and unless the fact assumed be indeed a truth,
namely, "Whatever is developed in early life, must be an attribute of
human nature." But this again is assuming the truth of the point in
debate. This argument is based upon the assumption that a course of
action common to all men, and commencing at the earliest moment of
their moral agency, can be accounted for only by ascribing it to an
attribute of nature, having the same moral character as that which
belongs to the actions themselves. But this is not true. There may be
more than one way of accounting for the universal sinfulness of human
actions from the dawn of moral agency. It may be ascribed to the
universality and peculiar nature of temptation, as has been said.
His third argument is, that "Moral depravity is not owing to any
change that occurs subsequent to birth." Answer:
No, the circumstances of temptation are sufficient to account for it
without supposing the nature to be changed. This argument proves
nothing, unless it be true, that the peculiar circumstances of temptation
under which moral agents act, from the dawn of moral agency, cannot
sufficiently account for their conduct, without supposing a change of
nature subsequent to birth. What then, does this arguing prove?
Again, this argument is just as consistent with the opposing theory,
and therefore proves neither.
His fourth argument is, "That moral depravity acts freely and
spontaneously." Answer:
"The moral agent acts freely, and acts selfishly, that is, wickedly.
This argument assumes, that if a moral agent acts freely and wickedly
moral depravity, or sin, must be an attribute of his nature. Or more
fairly, if mankind universally, in the exercise of their liberty, act sinfully,
sinfulness must be an attribute of human nature." But what is sin?
Why sin is a voluntary transgression of law, Dr. Woods being judge.
Can a voluntary transgression of law be denominated an attribute of
human nature?
But again, this argument alleges nothing but what is equally
consistent with the opposite theory. If moral depravity consist in the
choice of self-gratification as an end, it would of course freely and
spontaneously manifest itself. This argument then, is good for
nothing.
His fifth argument is, "That moral depravity is hard to overcome, and
therefore it must be an attribute of human nature." Answer:
If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be overcome at
all, without a change of the human constitution. It is hard to overcome,
just as selfishness naturally would be, in beings of a physically
depraved constitution, and in the presence of so many temptations to
self-indulgence. If it were an attribute of human nature, it could not be
overcome without a change of personal identity. But the fact that it
can be overcome without destroying the consciousness of personal
identity, proves that it is not an attribute of human nature.
His sixth argument is, that "We can predict with certainty, that in due
time it will act itself out." Answer:
Just as might be expected. If moral depravity consists in selfishness,
we can predict with certainty, that the spirit of self-pleasing will, in due
time, and at all times, act itself out. We can also predict, without the
gift of prophecy, that with a constitution physically depraved, and
surrounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the
circumstances in which human beings first form their moral character,
they will seek universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented by
the illuminations of the Holy Spirit. This argument is just as consistent
with the opposite theory, and therefore proves neither.
It is unnecessary to occupy any more time with the treatise of Dr.
Woods. I will now quote the standards of the Presbyterian church,
which will put you in possession of their views upon this subject. At
pp. 30, 31, of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, we have the
following: "By this sin, they (Adam and Eve) fell from their original
righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin,
and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They
being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the
same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity,
descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original
corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made
opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all
actual transgressions."
Again, pp. 152-154, Shorter Catechism. "Question 22. Did all
mankind fall in that first transgression? Answer: The covenant being
made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only, but for his
posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation,
sinned in him, and fell with him in that first transgression.
"Question 23. Into what estate did the fall bring mankind? Answer:
The fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.
"Question 24. What is sin? Answer: Sin is any want of conformity
unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the
reasonable creature.
"Question 25. Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate where
into man fell? Answer: The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man
fell, consisteth in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of that
righteousness wherein he was created, and the corruption of his
nature, whereby he is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite
unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that
continually, which is commonly called original sin, and from which do
proceed all actual transgressions.
"Question 26. How is original sin conveyed from our first parents
unto their posterity? Answer: Original sin is conveyed from our first
parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as all that
proceed from them in that way, are conceived and born in sin."
These extracts show, that the framers and defenders of this
confession of faith, account for the moral depravity of mankind by
making it to consist in a sinful nature, inherited by natural generation
from Adam. They regard the constitution inherited from Adam, as in
itself sinful, and the cause of all actual transgression. They make no
distinction between physical and moral depravity. They also
distinguish between original and actual sin. Original sin is the
sinfulness of the constitution, in which Adam's posterity have no other
hand than to inherit it by natural generation, or by birth. This original
sin, or sinful nature, renders mankind utterly disabled from all that is
spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all that is evil. This is their
account of moral depravity. This, it will be seen, is substantially the
ground of Dr. Woods:
It has been common with those who confound physical with moral
depravity, and who maintain that human nature is itself sinful, to quote
certain passages of Scripture to sustain their position. An examination
of these proof texts, must, in the next place, occupy our attention. But
before I enter upon this examination, I must first call your attention to
certain well-settled rules of biblical interpretation.
(1.) Different passages must be so interpreted, if they can be, as not
to contradict each other.
(2.) Language is to be interpreted according to the subject matter of
discourse.
(3.) Respect is always to be had to the general scope and design of
the speaker or writer.
(4.) Texts that are consistent with either theory, prove neither.
(5.) Language is to be so interpreted, if it can be, as not to conflict
with sound philosophy, matters of fact, the nature of things, or
immutable justice.
Let us now, remembering and applying these plain rules of sound
interpretation, proceed to the examination of those passages that are
supposed to establish the theory of depravity I am examining.
"Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own
likeness and after his own image, and called his name Seth" (Gen.
5:3). It is not very easy to see, why this text should be pressed into
the service of those who hold that human nature is in itself sinful. Why
should it be assumed that the likeness and image here spoken of was
a moral likeness or image? But unless this be assumed, the text has
nothing to do with the subject.
Again: it is generally admitted, that in all probability Adam was a
regenerate man at the time and before the birth of Seth. Is it intended
that Adam begat a saint or a sinner? If, as is supposed, Adam was a
saint of God, if this text is anything to the purpose, it affirms that Adam
begat a saint. But this is the opposite of that in proof of which the text
is quoted.
Another text is: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not
one" (Job 14:4). This text is quoted in support of the position of the
Presbyterian Confession of Faith, that children inherit from their
parents, by natural generation, a sinful nature. Upon this text, I
remark, that all that can be made of it, even if we read it without regard
to the translation or the context, is, that a physically depraved parent
will produce a physically depraved offspring. That this is its real
meaning, is quite evident, when we look into the context. Job is
treating of the frail and dying state of man, and manifestly has in the
text and context his eye wholly on the physical state, and not on the
moral character of man. What he intends is; who can bring other than
a frail, dying offspring from a frail dying parent? Not one. This is
substantially the view that Professor Stuart takes of this text. The
utmost that can be made of it is, that as he belonged to a race of
sinners, nothing else could be expected than that he should be a
sinner, without meaning to affirm anything in regard to the quo modo
of this result.
Again: "What is man that he should be clean, and he that is born of a
woman that he should be righteous" (Job 15:14).
These are the words of Eliphaz, and it is improper to quote them as
inspired truth. For God Himself testifies that Job's friends did not hold
the truth. But, suppose we receive the text as true, what is its import?
Why, it simply asserts, or rather implies, the righteousness or
sinfulness of the whole human race. It expresses the universality of
human depravity, in the very common way of including all that are born
of woman. This certainly says nothing, and implies nothing, respecting
a sinful constitution. It is just as plain, and just as warrantable, to
understand this passage as implying that mankind have become so
physically depraved, that this fact, together with the circumstances
under which they come into being, and begin their moral career, will
certainly, (not necessarily), result in moral depravity. I might use just
such language as that found in this text, and, naturally enough,
express by it my own views of moral depravity, to wit, that it results
from a physically depraved constitution; and the circumstances of
temptation under which children come into this world, and begin and
prosecute their moral career; certainly this is the most that can be
made of this text.
Again: "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother
conceive me" (Psalms 51:5).
Upon this I remark, that it would seem, if this text is to be understood
literally, that the Psalmist intended to affirm the sinful state of his
mother, at the time of his conception, and during gestation. But, to
interpret these passages as teaching the constitutional sinfulness of
man, is to contradict God's own definition of sin, and the only definition
that human reason or common sense can receive, to wit, that "sin is a
transgression of the law." This is, no doubt, the only correct definition
of sin. But we have seen that the law does not legislate over
substance, requiring men to have a certain nature, but over voluntary
action only. If the Psalmist really intended to affirm, that the substance
of his body was sinful from its conception, then he not only arrays
himself against God's own definition of sin, but he also affirms sheer
nonsense. The substance of an unborn child sinful! It is impossible!
But what did the Psalmist mean? I answer: This verse is found in
David's penitential psalm. He was deeply convinced of sin, and was,
as he had good reason to be, much excited, and expressed himself,
as we all do in similar circumstances, in strong language. His eye, as
was natural and is common in such cases, had been directed back
along the pathway of life up to the days of his earliest recollection. He
remembered sins among the earliest acts of his recollected life. He
broke out in the language of this text to express, not the anti-scriptural
and nonsensical dogma of a sinful constitution, but to affirm in his
strong, poetic language, that he had been a sinner from the
commencement of his moral existence, or from the earliest moment of
his capability of being a sinner. This is the strong language of poetry.
Some suppose that, in the passage in question, the Psalmist referred
to, and meant to acknowledge and assert, his low and despicable
origin, and to say, I was always a sinner, and my mother that
conceived me was a sinner, and I am but the degenerate plant of a
strange vine, without intending to affirm anything in respect to the
absolute sinfulness of his nature.
Again, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as
soon as they be born, speaking lies" (Psalms 58:3). Upon this text I
remark that it has been quoted at one time to establish the doctrine of
a sinful nature, and at another to prove that infants commit actual sin
from the very day and hour of their birth. But certainly no such use
can be legitimately made of this text. It does not affirm anything of a
sinful nature, but this has been inferred from what it does affirm, that
the wicked are estranged from their birth. But does this mean, that
they are really and literally estranged from the day and hour of their
birth, and that they really go astray the very day they are born,
speaking lies? This every one knows to be contrary to fact. The text
cannot then be pressed to the letter. What then does it mean? It must
mean, like the text last examined, that the wicked are estranged and
go astray from the commencement of their moral agency. If it means
more than this, it would contradict other plain passages of scripture. It
affirms, in strong, graphic, and poetic language, the fact, that the first
moral conduct and character of children is sinful. This is all that in
truth it can assert; and it doubtless dates the beginning of their moral
depravity at a very early period, and expresses it in very strong
language, as if it were literally from the hour of birth. But when it adds,
that they go astray, speaking lies, we know that this is not, and cannot
be, literally taken, for, as every one knows, children do not speak at all
from their birth. Should we understand the Psalmist as affirming, that
children go astray as soon as they go at all, and speak lies as soon as
they speak at all, this would not prove that their nature was in itself
sinful, but might well consist with the theory that their physical
depravity, together with their circumstances of temptation, led them
into selfishness, from the very first moment of their moral existence.
Again, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born
of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6).
Upon this I remark that it may, if literally taken, mean nothing more
than this, that the body which is born of flesh is flesh, and that
which is born of the spirit is spirit; that is, that this birth of which he was
speaking was of the soul, and not of the body. But it may be
understood to mean, that which results from the influence of the
flesh is flesh, in the sense of sin; for this is a common sense of the
term flesh in the New Testament, and that which results from the
Spirit, is spirit or spiritual, in the sense of holy. This I understand to be
the true sense. The text when thus understood, does not at all support
the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution, but only this, that the flesh
tends to sin, that the appetites and passions are temptations to sin, so
that when the will obeys them it sins. Whatever is born of the
propensities, in the sense that the will yields to their control, is sinful.
And, on the other hand, whatever is born of the Spirit, that is, whatever
results from the agency of the Holy Spirit, in the sense that the will
yields to Him, is holy.
Again, "By nature the children of wrath, even as others" (Eph. 2:3).
Upon this text I remark that it cannot, consistently with natural justice,
be understood to mean, that we are exposed to the wrath of God on
account of our nature. It is a monstrous and blasphemous dogma,
that a holy God is angry with any creature for possessing a nature with
which he was sent into being without his knowledge or consent. The
Bible represents God as angry with men for their wicked deeds, and
not for their nature.
It is common and proper to speak of the first state in which men
universally are, as a natural state. Thus we speak of sinners before
regeneration, as in a state of nature, as opposed to a changed state, a
regenerate state, and a state of grace. By this we do not necessarily
mean, that they have a nature sinful in itself, but merely that before
regeneration they are universally and morally depraved, that this is
their natural, as opposed to their regenerate state. Total moral
depravity is the state that follows, and results from their first birth, and
is in this sense natural, and in this sense alone, can it truly be said,
that they are "by nature children of wrath." Against the use that is
made of this text, and all this class of texts, may be arrayed the whole
scope of scripture, that represents man as to blame, and to be judged
and punished only for his deeds. The subject matter of discourse in
these texts is such as to demand that we should understand them as
not implying, or asserting, that sin is an essential part of our nature.
LECTURE 24
MORAL DEPRAVITY
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED IN
SUPPORT OF THE POSITION THAT HUMAN NATURE IS IN ITSELF
SINFUL.
The defenders of the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, or moral
depravity, urge as an additional argument:
That sin is a universal effect of human nature, and therefore human
nature must be itself sinful.
Answer: This is a non sequitur. Sin may be, and must be, an abuse
of free agency; and this may be accounted for, as we shall see, by
ascribing it to the universality of temptation, and does not at all imply a
sinful constitution. But if sin necessarily implies a sinful nature, how
did Adam and Eve sin? Had they a sinful nature to account for, and to
cause their first sin? How did angels sin? Had they also a sinful
nature? Either sin does not imply a sinful nature, or a nature in itself
sinful, or Adam and angels must have had sinful natures before their
fall.
Again: Suppose we regard sin as an event or effect. An effect only
implies an adequate cause. Free, responsible will is an adequate
cause in the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful
constitution, as has been demonstrated in the case of Adam and of
angels. When we have found an adequate cause, it is unphilosophical
to look for and assign another.
Again: it is said that no motive to sin could be a motive or a
temptation, if there were not a sinful taste, relish, or appetite, inherent
in the constitution, to which the temptation or motive is addressed. For
example, the presence of food, it is said, would be no temptation to
eat, were there not a constitutional appetency terminating on food. So
the presence of any object could be no inducement to sin, were there
not a constitutional appetency or craving for sin. So that, in fact, sin in
action were impossible, unless there were sin in the nature. To this I
reply:
Suppose this objection be applied to the sin of Adam and of angels.
Can we not account for Eve's eating the forbidden fruit without
supposing that she had a craving for sin? The Bible informs us that
her craving was for the fruit, for knowledge, and not for sin. The words
are, "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and
that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one
wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave also unto her
husband with her, and he did eat" (Gen. 3:6). Here is nothing of a
craving for sin. Eating this fruit was indeed sinful; but the sin consisted
in consenting to gratify, in a prohibited manner, the appetites, not for
sin, but for food and knowledge. But the advocates of this theory say
that there must be an adaptedness in the constitution, a something
within answering to the outward motive or temptation, otherwise sin
were impossible. This is true. But the question is, What is that
something within, which responds to the outward motive? Is it a
craving for sin? We have just seen what it was in the case of Adam
and Eve. It was simply the correlation that existed between the fruit
and their constitution, its presence exciting the desires for food and
knowledge. This led to prohibited indulgence. But all men sin in
precisely the same way. They consent to gratify, not a craving for sin,
but a craving for other things, and the consent to make
self-gratification an end, is the whole of sin.
The theologians whose views we are canvassing, maintain that the
appetites, passions, desires, and propensities, which are constitutional
and entirely involuntary, are in themselves sinful. To this I reply, that
Adam and Eve possessed them before they fell. Christ possessed
them, or He was not a man, nor, in any proper sense, a human being.
No, these appetites, passions, and propensities, are not sinful, though
they are the occasions of sin. They are a temptation to the will to seek
their unlawful indulgence. When these lusts or appetites are spoken
of as the "passions of sin," or as "sinful lusts or passions," it is not
because they are sinful in themselves, but because they are the
occasions of sin. It has been asked, Why are not the appetites and
propensities to be regarded as sinful, since they are the prevalent
temptations to sin? I reply:
They are involuntary, and moral character can no more be
predicated of them, on account of their being temptations, than it could
of the fruit that was a temptation to Eve. They have no design to
tempt. They are constitutional, unintelligent, involuntary; and it is
impossible that moral character should be predicable of them. A moral
agent is responsible for his emotions, desires, etc., so far as they are
under the direct or indirect control of his will, and no further. He is
always responsible for the manner in which he gratifies them. If he
indulges them in accordance with the law of God, he does right. If he
makes their gratification his end, he sins.
Again: the death and suffering of infants previous to actual
transgression, is adduced as an argument to prove, that infants have a
sinful nature. To this I reply:
That this argument must assume, that there must be sin wherever
there is suffering and death. But this assumption proves too much, as
it would prove that mere animals have a sinful nature, or have
committed actual sin. An argument that proves too much proves
nothing.
Physical sufferings prove only physical, and not moral, depravity.
Previous to moral agency, infants are no more subjects of moral
government than brutes are; therefore, their sufferings and death are
to be accounted for as are those of brutes, namely, by ascribing them
to physical interference with the laws of life and health.
Another argument for a sinful constitution is, that unless infants have
a sinful nature, they do not need sanctification to fit them for heaven.
Answer:
This argument assumes, that, if they are not sinful, they must be
holy; whereas they are neither sinful or holy, until they are moral
agents, and render themselves so by obedience or disobedience to
the moral law. If they are to go to heaven, they must be made holy or
must be sanctified. This objection assumes, that previous sinfulness is
a condition of the necessity of being holy. This is contrary to fact.
Were Adam and angels first sinful before they were sanctified? But it
is assumed that unless moral agents are at first sinners, they do not
need the Holy Spirit to induce them to be holy. That is, unless their
nature is sinful, they would become holy without the Holy Spirit. But
where do we ascertain this? Suppose that they have no moral
character, and that their nature is neither holy nor sinful. Will they
become holy without being enlightened by the Holy Spirit? Who will
assert that they will?
That infants have a sinful nature has been inferred from the
institution of circumcision so early as the eighth day after birth.
Circumcision, it is truly urged, was designed to teach the necessity of
regeneration, and by way of implication, the doctrine of moral
depravity. It is claimed, that its being enjoined as obligatory upon the
eighth day after birth, was requiring it at the earliest period at which it
could be safely performed. From this it is inferred, that infants are to
be regarded as morally depraved from their birth.
In answer to this I would say, that infant circumcision was doubtless
designed to teach the necessity of their being saved by the Holy Spirit
from the dominion of the flesh; that the influence of the flesh must be
restrained, and the flesh circumcised, or the soul would be lost. This
truth needed to be impressed on the parents, from the birth of their
children. This very significant, and bloody, and painful rite, was well
calculated to impress this truth upon parents, and to lead them from
their birth to watch over the development and indulgence of their
propensities, and to pray for their sanctification. Requiring it at so
early a day was no doubt designed to indicate, that they are from the
first under the dominion of their flesh, without however affording any
inference in favor of the idea, that their flesh was in itself sinful, or that
the action of their will at that early age was sinful. If reason was not
developed, the subjection of the will to appetite could not be sinful.
But whether this subjection of the will to the gratification of the appetite
was sinful or not, the child must be delivered from it, or it could never
be fitted for heaven, any more than a mere brute can be fitted for
heaven. The fact, that circumcision was required on the eighth day,
and not before, seems to indicate, not that they are sinners absolutely
from birth, but that they very early become so, even from the
commencement of moral agency.
Again: the rite must be performed at some time. Unless a particular
day were appointed, it would be very apt to be deferred, and finally not
performed at all. It is probable, that God commanded that it should be
done at the earliest period at which it could be safely done, not only for
the reasons already assigned, but to prevent its being neglected too
long, and perhaps altogether: and perhaps, also, because it would be
less painful and dangerous at that early age, when the infant slept
most of the time. The longer it was neglected the greater would be the
temptation to neglect it altogether. So painful a rite needed to be
enjoined by positive statute, at some particular time; and it was
desirable on accounts that it should be done as early as it safely could
be. This argument, then, for native constitutional moral depravity
amounts really to nothing.
Again: it is urged, that unless infants have a sinful nature, should
they die in infancy, they could not be saved by the grace of Christ.
To this I answer, that, in this case they would not, and could not, as a
matter of course, be sent to the place of punishment for sinners;
because that were to confound the innocent with the guilty, a thing
morally impossible with God.
But what grace could there be in saving them from a sinful
constitution, that is not exercised in saving them from circumstances
that would certainly result in their becoming sinners, if not snatched
from them? In neither case do they need pardon for sin. Grace is
unearned favor a gratuity. If the child has a sinful nature, it is his
misfortune, and not his crime. To save him from this nature is to save
him from those circumstances that will certainly result in actual
transgression, unless he is rescued by death and by the Holy Spirit.
So if his nature is not sinful, yet it is certain that his nature and
circumstances are such, that he will surely sin unless rescued by
death or by the Holy Spirit, before he is capable of sinning. It certainly
must be an infinite favor to be rescued from such circumstances, and
especially to have eternal life conferred as a mere gratuity. This surely
is grace. And as infants belong to a race of sinners who are all, as it
were, turned over into the hands of Christ, they doubtless will ascribe
their salvation to the infinite grace of Christ.
Again: is it not grace that saves us from sinning? What then is it but
grace that saves infants from sinning, by snatching them away from
circumstances of temptation? In what way does grace save adults
from sinning, but by keeping them from temptation, or by giving them
grace to overcome it? And is there no grace in rescuing infants from
circumstances that are certain, if they are left in them, to lead them
into sin?
All that can be justly said in either case is, that if infants are saved at
all, which I suppose they are, they are rescued by the benevolence of
God from circumstances that would result in certain and eternal death,
and are by grace made heirs of eternal life. But after all, it is useless
to speculate about the character and destiny of those who are
confessedly not moral agents. The benevolence of God will take care
of them. It is nonsensical to insist upon their moral depravity before
they are moral agents, and it is frivolous to assert, that they must be
morally depraved, as a condition of their being saved by grace.
We deny that the human constitution is morally depraved, because it
is impossible that sin should be a quality of the substance of soul or
body. It is, and must be, a quality of choice or intention, and not of
substance. To make sin an attribute or quality of substance is contrary
to God's definition of sin. "Sin," says the apostle, "is anomia," a
"transgression of, or a want of conformity to, the moral law." That is, it
consists in a refusal to love God and our neighbor, or, which is the
same thing, in loving ourselves supremely.
To represent the constitution as sinful, is to represent God, who is
the author of the constitution, as the author of sin. To say that God is
not the direct former of the constitution, but that sin is conveyed by
natural generation from Adam, who made himself sinful, is only to
remove the objection one step farther back, but not to obviate it; for
God established the physical laws that of necessity bring about this
result.
But how came Adam by a sinful nature? Did his first sin change his
nature? or did God change it as a penalty for sin? What ground is
there for the assertion that Adam's nature became in itself sinful by the
fall? This is a groundless, not to say ridiculous, assumption, and an
absurdity. Sin an attribute of nature! A sinful substance! Sin a
substance! Is it a solid, a fluid, a material, or a spiritual substance?
I have received from a brother the following note on this subject:
"The orthodox creeds are in some cases careful to say that original sin
consists in the substance of neither soul nor body. Thus
Bretschneider, who is reckoned among the rationalists in Germany,
says: `The symbolical books very rightly maintain that original sin is not
in any sense the substance of man, his body or soul, as Flacius
taught, but that it has been infused into human nature by Satan, and
mixed with it, as poison and wine are mixed.'
"They rather expressly guard against the idea that they mean by the
phrase `man's nature,' his substance, but somewhat which is fixed in
the substance. They explain original sin, therefore, not as an essential
attribute of man, that is, a necessary and essential part of his being,
but as an accident, that is, somewhat which does not subsist in itself,
but as something accidental, which has come into human nature. He
quotes the Formula Concordantiae as saying: `Nature does not denote
the substance itself of man, but something which inheres fixed in the
nature or substance.' Accident is defined, `what does not subsist by
itself, but is in some substance and can be distinguished from it.'"
Here, it seems, is sin by itself, and yet not a substance or
subsistence not a part or attribute of soul or body. What can it be?
Does it consist in wrong action? No, not in action, but is an accident
which inheres fixed in the nature of substance. But what can it be?
Not substance, nor yet action. But if it be anything, it must be either
substance or action. If it be a state of substance, what is this but
substance in a particular state? Do these writers think by this subtlety
and refinement to relieve their doctrine of constitutional moral
depravity of its intrinsic absurdity?
I object to the doctrine of constitutional sinfulness, that it makes all
sin original and actual, a mere calamity, and not a crime. For those
who hold that sin is an essential and inseparable part of our nature, to
call it a crime, is to talk nonsense. What! A sinful nature the crime of
him upon whom it is entailed, without his knowledge or consent? If the
nature is sinful, in such a sense that action must necessarily be sinful,
which is the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then sin in action must
be a calamity, and can be no crime. It is the necessary effect of a
sinful nature. This cannot be a crime, since the will has nothing to do
with it.
Of course it must render repentance, either with or without the grace
of God, impossible, unless grace sets aside our reason. If repentance
implies self-condemnation, we can never repent in the exercise of our
reason. Constituted as we are, it is impossible that we should
condemn ourselves for a sinful nature, or for actions that are
unavoidable. The doctrine of original sin, or of a sinful constitution,
and of necessary sinful actions, represents the whole moral
government of God, the plan of salvation by Christ, and indeed every
doctrine of the gospel, as a mere farce. Upon this supposition the law
is tyranny, and the gospel an insult to the unfortunate.
It is difficult, and, indeed, impossible for those who really believe this
doctrine to urge immediate repentance and submission on the sinner,
feeling that he is infinitely to blame unless he instantly comply. It is a
contradiction to affirm, that a man can heartily believe in the doctrine in
question, and yet truly and heartily blame sinners for not doing what is
naturally impossible to them. The secret conviction must be in the
mind of such an one, that the sinner is not really to blame for being a
sinner. For in fact, if this doctrine is true, he is not to blame for being a
sinner, any more than he is to blame for being a human being. This
the advocate of this doctrine must know. It is vain for him to set up the
pretence that he truly blames sinners for their nature, or for their
conduct that was unavoidable. He can no more do it, than he can
honestly deny the necessary affirmations of his own reason.
Therefore the advocates of this theory must merely hold it as a theory,
without believing it, or otherwise they must in their secret conviction
excuse the sinner.
This doctrine naturally and necessarily leads its advocates, secretly
at least, to ascribe the atonement of Christ rather to justice than to
grace to regard it rather as an expedient to relieve the unfortunate,
than to render the forgiveness of the inexcusable sinner possible. The
advocates of the theory cannot but regard the case of the sinner as
rather a hard one, and God as under an obligation to provide a way for
him to escape a sinful nature, entailed upon him in spite of himself,
and from actual transgressions which result from his nature by a law of
necessity. If all this is true, the sinner's case is infinitely hard, and God
would appear the most unreasonable and cruel of beings, if He did not
provide for their escape. These convictions will, and must, lodge in
the mind of him who really believes the dogma of a sinful nature. This,
in substance, is sometimes affirmed by the defenders of the doctrine
of original sin.
The fact that Christ died in the stead and behalf of sinners, proves
that God regarded them not as unfortunate, but as criminal and
altogether without excuse. Surely Christ need not have died to atone
for the misfortunes of men. His death was to atone for their guilt, and
not for their misfortunes. But if they are without excuse for sin, they
must be without a sinful nature that renders sin unavoidable. If men
are without excuse for sin, as the whole law and gospel assume and
teach, it cannot possibly be that their nature is sinful, for a sinful nature
would be the best of all excuses for sin.
This doctrine is a stumbling-block both to the church and the world,
infinitely dishonorable to God, and an abomination alike to God and
the human intellect, and should be banished from every pulpit, and
from every formula of doctrine, and from the world. It is a relic of
heathen philosophy, and was foisted in among the doctrines of
Christianity by Augustine, as every one may know who will take the
trouble to examine for himself. This view of moral depravity that I am
opposing, has long been the stronghold of Universalism. From it, the
Universalists inveigh with resistless force against the idea that sinners
should be sent to an eternal hell. Assuming the long-defended
doctrine of original or constitutional sinfulness, they proceeded to
show, that it would be infinitely unreasonable and unjust in God to
send them to hell. What! Create them with a sinful nature, from which
proceed, by a law of necessity, actual transgressions, and then send
them to an eternal hell for having this nature, and for transgressions
that are unavoidable! Impossible! They say; and the human intellect
responds, Amen.
From the dogma of a sinful nature or constitution also, has naturally
and irresistibly flowed the doctrine of inability to repent, and the
necessity of a physical regeneration. These too have been a sad
stumbling-block to Universalists, as every one knows who is at all
acquainted with the history of Universalism. They infer the salvation of
all men, from the fact of God's benevolence and physical
omnipotence! God is almighty, and He is love. Men are
constitutionally depraved, and are unable to repent. God will not,
cannot send them to hell. They do not deserve it. Sin is a calamity,
and God can save them, and He ought to do so. This is the substance
of their argument. And assuming the truth of their premises, there is
no evading their conclusion. But the whole argument is built on "such
stuff as dreams are made of." Strike out the erroneous dogma of a
sinful nature, and the whole edifice of Universalism comes to the
ground in a moment. We come now to consider:
2. The proper method of accounting for moral depravity.
We have more than once seen that the Bible has given us the history
of the introduction of sin into our world; and that from the narrative, it is
plain, that the first sin consisted in selfishness or in consenting to
indulge the excited constitutional propensities in a prohibited manner.
In other words, it consisted in yielding the will to the impulses of the
sensibility, instead of abiding by the law of God, as revealed in the
intelligence. Thus, the Bible ascribes the first sin of our race to the
influence of temptation.
The Bible once, and only once, incidentally intimates that Adam's
first sin has in some way been the occasion, not the necessary
physical cause of all the sins of men (Rom. 5:12-19). It neither says
nor intimates anything in relation to the manner in which Adam's sin
has occasioned this result. It only incidentally recognizes the fact, and
then leaves it, just as if the quo modo was too obvious to need
explanation. In other parts of the Bible we are informed how we are to
account for the existence of sin among men. James says, that a man
is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lusts,
(epithumia-"desires") and enticed (James 1:14). That is, his lusts, or
the impulses of his sensibility, are his tempters. When he or his will is
overcome of these, he sins. Paul and other inspired writers represent
sin as consisting in a carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind of the flesh, or
in minding the flesh. It is plain that by the term flesh they mean what
we understand by the sensibility, as distinguished from intellect, and
that they represent sin as consisting in obeying, minding, the impulses
of the sensibility. They represent the world, and the flesh, and Satan,
as the three great sources of temptation. It is plain that the world and
Satan tempt by appeals to the flesh, or to the sensibility. Hence, the
apostles have much to say of the necessity of the destruction of the
flesh, of the members, of putting off the old man with his deeds, etc.
Now, it is worthy of remark, that all this painstaking, on the part of
Inspiration, to intimate the source from whence our sin proceeds, and
to apprise us of the proper method of accounting for it, and also of
avoiding it, has probably been the occasion of leading certain
philosophers and theologians who have not carefully examined the
whole subject, to take a view of it which is directly opposed to the truth
intended by the inspired writers. Because so much is said of the
influence of the flesh over the mind, they have inferred that the nature
and physical constitution of man is itself sinful. But the representations
of Scripture are, that the body is the occasion of sin. The law in his
members, that warred against the law of his mind, of which Paul
speaks, is manifestly the impulse of the sensibility opposed to the law
of the reason. This law, that is, the impulse of his sensibility, brings
him into captivity, that is, influences his will, in spite of all his
convictions to the contrary.
Moral depravity consists, remember, in the committal of the will to
the gratification or indulgence of self in the will's following, or
submitting itself to be governed by, the impulses and desires of the
sensibility, instead of submitting itself to the law of God revealed in the
reason.
This definition of the thing shows how it is to be accounted for,
namely: the sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the
moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to
procure its gratification, before the reason is at all developed. The will
is thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite, when first
the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the
will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character, until the idea of
moral obligation is developed. The moment this idea is developed,
this committal of the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned, or it
becomes selfishness, or moral depravity. But, as the will is already in
a state of committal, and has to some extent already formed the habit
of seeking to gratify feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at
first but feebly developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light
on the soul, the will, as might be expected, retains its hold on
self-gratification. Here alone moral character commences, and must
commence. No one can conceive of its commencing earlier.
This selfish choice is the wicked heart the propensity to sin that
causes what is generally termed actual transgression. This sinful
choice is properly enough called indwelling sin. It is the latent,
standing, controlling preference of the mind and the cause of all the
outward and active life. It is not the choice of sin itself, distinctly
conceived of, or chosen as sin, but the choice of self-gratification,
which choice is sin.
Again: It should be remembered, that the physical depravity of our
race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical
system renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities
more clamorous and despotic in their demands, and of course
constantly urging to selfishness, confirms and strengthens it. It should
be distinctly remembered that physical depravity has no moral
character in itself. But yet it is a source of fierce temptation to
selfishness. The human sensibility is, manifestly, deeply physically
depraved; and as sin, or moral depravity, consists in committing the
will to the gratification of the sensibility, its physical depravity will
mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral depravity is then
universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is tempted to
self-indulgence, and yields to the temptation, and this yielding, and not
the temptation, is sin or moral depravity. This is manifestly the way in
which Adam and Eve became morally depraved. They were tempted,
even by undepraved appetite, to prohibited indulgence, and were
overcome. The sin did not lie in the constitutional desire of food, or of
knowledge, nor in the excited state of these appetites or desires, but in
the consent of the will to prohibited indulgence. Just in the same way
all sinners become such, that is, they become morally depraved, by
yielding to temptation to self-gratification under some form. Indeed, it
is impossible that they should become morally depraved in any other
way. To deny this were to overlook the very nature of moral depravity.
To sum up the truth upon this subject in few words, I would say:
addressed to the unperverted susceptibilities of their nature. When
these susceptibilities became strongly excited, they overcame the will;
that is, the human pair were over-persuaded, and fell under the
temptation. This has been repeatedly said, but needs repetition in a
summing up.
2. All moral depravity commences in substantially the same way.
Proof:
(1.) The impulses of the sensibility are developed, gradually,
commencing from the birth, and depending on physical development
and growth.
(2.) The first acts of will are in obedience to these.
(3.) Self-gratification is the rule of action previous to the development
of reason.
(4.) No resistance is offered to the will's indulgence of appetite, until
a habit of self-indulgence is formed.
(5.) When reason affirms moral obligation, it finds the will in a state of
habitual and constant committal to the impulses of the sensibility.
(6.) The demands of the sensibility have become more and more
despotic every hour of indulgence.
(7.) In this state of things, unless the Holy Spirit interpose, the idea of
moral obligation will be but dimly developed.
(8.) The will of course rejects the bidding of reason, and cleaves to
self-indulgence.
(9.) This is the settling of a fundamental question. It is deciding in
favor of appetite, against the claims of conscience and of God.
(10.) Light once rejected, can be afterwards more easily resisted,
until it is nearly excluded altogether.
(11.) Selfishness confirms, and strengthens, and perpetuates itself
by a natural process. It grows with the sinner's growth, and
strengthens with his strength; and will do so for ever, unless overcome
by the Holy Spirit through the truth.
Remarks
wisest constitution of things, greatly affect for good or evil his whole
posterity.
2. His sin in many ways exposed his posterity to aggravated
temptation. Not only the physical constitution of all men, but all the
influences under which they first form their moral character, are widely
different from what they would have been, if sin had never been
introduced.
3. When selfishness is understood to be the whole of moral
depravity, its quo modo, or in what way it comes to exist, is manifest.
Clear conceptions of the thing will instantly reveal the occasion and
manner.
4. The only difficulty in accounting for it, has been the false
assumption, that there must be, and is, something lying back of the
free actions of the will, which sustains to those actions the relation of a
cause, that is itself sinful.
5. If holy Adam, and holy angels could fall under temptations
addressed to their undepraved sensibility, how absurd it is to
conclude, that sin in those who are born with a physically depraved
constitution, cannot be accounted for, without ascribing it to original
sin, or to a nature that is in itself sinful.
6. Without divine illumination, the moral character will of course be
formed under the influence of the flesh. That is, the lower propensities
will of course influence the will, unless the reason be developed by the
Holy Spirit.
7. The dogma of constitutional moral depravity, is a part and parcel
of the doctrine of a necessitated will. It is a branch of a grossly false
and heathenish philosophy. How infinitely absurd, dangerous, and
unjust, then, to embody it in a standard of Christian doctrine, to give it
the place of an indispensable article of faith, and denounce all who will
not swallow its absurdities, as heretics!
8. We are unable to say precisely at what age infants become moral
agents, and of course how early they become sinners. Doubtless
there is much difference among children in this respect. Reason is
developed in one earlier than in another, according to the constitution
and circumstances.
A thorough consideration of the subject, will doubtless lead to the
conviction, that children become moral agents much earlier than is
generally supposed. The conditions of moral agency are, as has been
repeatedly said in former lectures, the possession of the powers of
moral agency, together with the development of the ideas of the good
or valuable, of moral obligation or oughtness of right and wrong of
praise and blameworthiness. I have endeavored to show, in former
lectures, that mental satisfaction, blessedness or happiness, is the
ultimate good. Satisfaction arising from the gratification of the
appetites, is one of the earliest experiences of human beings. This no
doubt suggests or develops, at a very early period, the idea of the
good or the valuable. The idea is doubtless developed, long before
the word that expresses it is understood. The child knows that
happiness is good, and seeks it in the form of self-gratification, long
before the terms that designate this state of mind are at all
understood. It knows that its own enjoyment is worth seeking, and
doubtless very early has the idea, that the enjoyment of others is worth
seeking, and affirms to itself, not in words, but in idea, that it ought to
please its parents and those around it. It knows, in fact, though
language is as yet unknown, that it loves to be gratified, and to be
happy, that it loves and seeks enjoyment for itself, and doubtless has
the idea that it ought not to displease and distress those around it, but
that it ought to endeavor to please and gratify them. This is probably
among the first ideas, if not the very first idea, of the pure reason that
is developed, that is, the idea of the good, the valuable, the desirable;
and the next must be that of oughtness, or of moral obligation, or of
right and wrong, etc. I say again, these ideas are, and must be
developed, before the signs or words that express them are at all
understood, and the words would never be understood except the idea
were first developed. We always find, at the earliest period at which
children can understand words, that they have the idea of obligation,
of right and wrong. As soon as these words are understood by them,
they recognize them as expressing ideas already in their own minds,
and which ideas they have had further back than they can remember.
Some, and indeed most persons, seem to have the idea, that children
affirm themselves to be under moral obligation, before they have the
idea of the good; that they affirm their obligation to obey their parents
before they know, or have the idea of the good or of the valuable. But
this is, and must be a mistake. They may and do affirm obligation to
obey their parents, before they can express in language, and before
they would understand, a statement of the ground of their obligation.
The idea, however, they have, and must have, or they could not affirm
obligation.
9. Why is sin so natural to mankind? Not because their nature is
itself sinful, but because the appetites and passions tend so strongly to
self-indulgence. These are temptations to sin, but sin itself consists
not in these appetites and propensities, but in the voluntary committal
of the will to their indulgence. This committal of the will is selfishness,
and when the will is once given up to sin, it is very natural to sin. The
will once committed to self-indulgence as its end, selfish actions are in
a sense spontaneous.
10. The constitution of a moral being as a whole, when all the
powers are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an
opposite direction; as is manifest from the fact that when reason is
thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the
sensibility, and turns the heart to God. The difficulty is, that the
sensibility gets the start of reason, and engages the attention in
devising means of self-gratification, and thus retards, and in a great
measure prevents, the development of the ideas of the reason which
were designed to control the will. It is this morbid development that
the Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth upon the attention,
as to secure the development of the reason. By doing this, He brings
the will under the influence of truth. Our senses reveal to us the
objects correlated to our animal nature and propensities. The Holy
Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world, and all that class of objects
that are correlated to our higher nature, so as to give reason the
control of the will. This is regeneration and sanctification, as we shall
see in its proper place.
LECTURE 25
ATONEMENT
We come now to the consideration of a very important feature of the
moral government of God; namely, the atonement. In discussing this
subject, I will:
Call attention to several well-established principles of government.
arbitrary will of God or of any other being, but that it has its foundation
in the nature and relations of moral agents, that it is that rule of action
or of willing which is imposed on them by the law of their own intellect.
2. As the will of no being can create moral law, so the will of no being
can repeal or alter moral law. It being just that rule of action that is
agreeable to the nature and relations of moral agents, it is as
immutable as those natures and relations.
3. There is a distinction between the letter and the spirit of moral law.
The letter relates to the outward life or action; the spirit respects the
motive or intention from which the act should proceed. For example:
the spirit of the moral law requires disinterested benevolence, and is
all expressed in one word love. The letter of the law is found in the
commandments of the decalogue, and in divers other precepts relating
to outward acts.
4. To the letter of the law there may be many exceptions, but to the
spirit of moral law there can be no exception. That is, the spirit of the
moral law may sometimes admit and require, that the letter of the law
shall be disregarded or violated; but the spirit of the law ought never to
be disregarded or violated. For example: the letter of the law prohibits
all labor on the Sabbath day. But the spirit of the law often requires
labor on the Sabbath. The spirit of the law requires the exercise of
universal and perfect love or benevolence to God and man, and the
law of benevolence often requires that labor shall be done on the
Sabbath; as administering to the sick, relieving the poor, feeding
animals; and in short, whatever is plainly the work of necessity or
mercy, in such a sense that enlightened benevolence demands it, is
required by the spirit of moral law upon the Sabbath, as well as all
other days. This is expressly taught by Christ, both by precept and
example. So again, the letter of the law says, "The soul that sinneth, it
shall die" (Ezek. 18:20), but the spirit of the law admits and requires
that upon certain conditions, to be examined in their proper place, the
soul that sinneth shall live. The letter of the law is inexorable; it
condemns and sentences to death all violators of its precepts, without
regard to atonement or repentance. The spirit of moral law allows and
requires that upon condition of satisfaction being made to public
justice, and the return of the sinner to obedience, he shall live and not
die.
5. In establishing a government and promulgating law, the lawgiver is
always understood as pledging himself duly to administer the laws in
support of public order, and for the promotion of public morals, toward
the innocent with his favor and protection, and to punish the
disobedient with the loss of his protection and favor.
6. Laws are public property in which every subject of the government
has an interest. Every obedient subject of government is interested to
have law supported and obeyed, and wherever the law is violated,
every subject of the government is injured, and his rights are invaded;
and each and all have a right to expect the government duly to
execute the penalties of law when it is violated.
7. There is an important distinction between retributive and public
justice. Retributive justice consists in treating every subject of
government according to his character. It respects the intrinsic merit
or demerit of each individual, and deals with him accordingly. Public
justice, in its exercise, consists in the promotion and protection of the
public interests, by such legislation and such an administration of law,
as is demanded by the highest good of the public. It implies the
execution of the penalties of law where the precept is violated, unless
something else is done that will as effectually secure the public
interests. When this is done, public justice demands, that the
execution of the penalty shall be dispensed with by extending pardon
to the criminal. Retributive justice makes no exceptions, but punishes
without mercy in every instance of crime. Public justice makes
exceptions, as often as this is permitted or required by the public good.
Public justice is identical with the spirit of the moral law, and in its
exercise, regards only the law. Retributive justice cleaves to the letter,
and makes no exceptions to the rule, "The soul that sinneth, it shall
die" (Ezek. 18:20).
8. The design of legal penalties is to secure obedience to the
precept. The same is also the reason for executing them when the
precept is violated. The sanctions are to be regarded as an
expression of the views of the lawgiver, in respect to the importance of
his law; and the execution of penalties is designed and calculated to
evince his sincerity in enacting, and his continued adherence to, and
determination to abide by, the principles of his government as
revealed in the law; his abhorrence of all crime; his regard to the public
interests; and his unalterable determination to carry out, support and
establish, the authority of his law.
9. It is a fact well established by the experience of all ages and
nations, that the exercise of mercy, in setting aside the execution of
penalties, is a matter of extreme delicacy and danger. The influence
of law, as might be expected, is found very much to depend upon the
certainty felt by the subjects that it will be duly executed. It is found in
experience, to be true, that the exercise of mercy in every government
where no atonement is made, weakens government, by begetting and
fostering a hope of impunity in the minds of those who are tempted to
violate the law. It has been asserted, that the same is true when an
atonement has been made, and that therefore, the doctrines of
atonement and consequent forgiveness tend to encourage the hope of
impunity in the commission of sin, and for this reason, are dangerous
doctrines, subversive of high and sound morality. This assertion I
shall notice in its appropriate place.
10. Since the head of the government is pledged to protect and
promote the public interests, by a due administration of law, if in any
instance where the precept is violated, he would dispense with the
execution of penalties, public justice requires that he shall see, that a
substitute for the execution of law is provided, or that something is
done that shall as effectually secure the influence of law, as the
execution of the penalty would do. He cannot make exceptions to the
spirit of the law. Either the soul that sinneth must die, according to the
letter of the law, or a substitute must be provided in accordance with
the spirit of the law.
11. Whatever will as fully evince the lawgiver's regard for his law, his
determination to support it, his abhorrence of all violations of its
precepts, and withal guard as effectually against the inference, that
violators of the precept might expect to escape with impunity, as the
execution of the penalty would do, is a full satisfaction of public justice.
When these conditions are fulfilled, and the sinner has returned to
obedience, public justice not only admits, but absolutely demands, that
the penalty shall be set aside by extending pardon to the offender.
The offender still deserves to be punished, and, upon the principles of
retributive justice, might be punished according to his deserts. But the
public good admits and requires, that upon the above condition he
should live; hence, public justice, in compliance with the public
interests and the spirit of the law of love, spares and pardons him.
12. If mercy or pardon is to be extended to any who have violated
law, it ought to be done in a manner and upon some conditions that
will settle the question, and establish the truth, that the execution of
penalties is not to be dispensed with merely upon condition of the
repentance of the offender. In other words, if pardon is to be
extended, it should be known to be upon a condition not within the
power of the offender. Else he may know, that he can violate the law,
and yet be sure to escape with impunity, by fulfilling the conditions of
forgiveness, which are upon the supposition, all within his own power.
13. So, if mercy is to be exercised, it should be upon a condition that
is not to be repeated. The thing required by public justice is, that
nothing shall be done to undermine or disturb the influence of law.
Hence it cannot consent to have the execution of penalties dispensed
with, upon any condition that shall encourage the hope of impunity.
Therefore, public justice cannot consent to the pardon of sin but upon
condition of an atonement, and also upon the assumption that
atonement is not to be repeated, nor to extend its benefits beyond the
limits of the race for whom it was made, and that only for a limited
time. If an atonement were to extend its benefits to all worlds, and to
all eternity, it would nullify its own influence, and encourage the
universal hope of impunity, in case the precepts of the law were
violated. This would be indefinitely worse than no atonement; and
public justice might as well consent to have mercy exercised, without
any regard to securing the authority and influence of law.
The term Atonement.
The English word atonement is synonymous with the Hebrew word
cofer. This is a noun from the verb caufar, to cover. The cofer or cover
was the name of the lid or cover of the ark of the covenant, and
constituted what was called the mercy-seat. The Greek word
rendered atonement is katallage. This means reconciliation to favor,
or more strictly, the means or conditions of reconciliation to favor; from
katallasso, to "change, or exchange." The term properly means
substitution. An examination of these original words, in the connection
in which they stand, will show that the atonement is the governmental
substitution of the sufferings of Christ for the punishment of sinners. It
is a covering of their sins by His sufferings.
The teachings of natural theology, or the a priori affirmations of
reason upon this subject.
The doctrine of atonement has been regarded as so purely a
doctrine of revelation as to preclude the supposition, that reason
could, a priori, make any affirmations about it. It has been generally
regarded as lying absolutely without the pale of natural theology, in so
high a sense, that, aside from revelation, no assumption could be
made, nor even a reasonable conjecture indulged. But there are
certain facts in this world's history, that render this assumption
exceedingly doubtful. It is true, indeed, that natural theology could not
ascertain and establish the fact, that an atonement had been made, or
that it certainly would be made; but if I am not mistaken, it might have
been reasonably inferred, the true character of God being known and
assumed, that an atonement of some kind would be made to render it
consistent with His relations to the universe, to extend mercy to the
guilty inhabitants of this world. The manifest necessity of a divine
revelation has been supposed to afford a strong presumptive
argument, that such a revelation has been or will be made. From the
benevolence of God, as affirmed by reason, and manifested in His
works and providence, it has been, as I suppose, justly inferred, that
He would make arrangements to secure the holiness and salvation of
men, and as a condition of this result, that He would grant them a
further revelation of His will than had been given in creation and
providence. The argument stands thus:
retribution; and from all the facts in the case that lie open to
observation, this is evidently a state of trial or probation.
2. The providence of God in this world is manifestly disciplinary, and
designed to reform mankind.
3. These facts, taken in connection with the great ignorance and
darkness of the human mind on moral and religious subjects, afford a
strong presumption that the benevolent Creator will make to the
inhabitants of this world who are so evidently yet in a state of trial, a
further revelation of His will. Now, if this argument is good, so far as it
goes, I see not why we may not reasonably go still further.
Since the above are facts, and since it is also a fact that when the
subject is duly considered, and the more thoroughly the better, there is
manifestly a great difficulty in the exercise of mercy without satisfaction
being made to public justice; and since the benevolence of God would
not allow Him on the one hand to pardon sin at the expense of public
justice, nor on the other to punish or execute the penalty of law, if it
could be wisely and consistently avoided, these facts being
understood and admitted, it might naturally have been inferred, that
the wisdom and benevolence of God would devise and execute some
method of meeting the demands of public justice, that should render
the forgiveness of sin possible. That the philosophy of government
would render this possible, is to us very manifest. I know, indeed, that
with the light the gospel has afforded us, we much more clearly
discern this, than they could who had no other light than that of nature.
Whatever might have been known to the ancients, and those who
have not the Bible, I think that when the facts are announced by
revelation, we can see that such a governmental expedient was not
only possible, but just what might have been expected of the
benevolence of God. It would of course have been impossible for us,
a priori, to have devised, or reasonably conjectured, the plan that has
been adopted. So little was known or knowable on the subject of the
trinity of God, without revelation, that natural theology could, perhaps,
in its best estate, have taught nothing further than that, if it was
possible, some governmental expedient would be resorted to, and was
in contemplation, for the ultimate restoration of the sinning race, who
were evidently spared hitherto from the execution of law, and placed
under a system of discipline.
But since the gospel has announced the fact of the atonement, it
appears that natural theology or governmental philosophy can
satisfactorily explain it; that reason can discern a divine philosophy in
it.
Natural theology can teach:
selfishness, and not the law of benevolence, is that to which
unconverted men conform their lives.
2. It can teach that God is benevolent, and hence that mercy must
be an attribute of God; and that this attribute will be manifested in the
actual pardon of sin, when this can be done with safety to the divine
government.
3. Consequently that no atonement could be needed to satisfy any
implacable spirit in the divine mind; that He was sufficiently and
infinitely disposed to extend pardon to the penitent, if this could be
wisely, benevolently, and safely done.
4. It can also abundantly teach, that there is a real and a great
danger in the exercise of mercy under a moral government, and
supremely great under a government so vast and so enduring as the
government of God; that, under such a government, the danger is very
great, that the exercise of mercy will be understood as encouraging
the hope of impunity in the commission of sin.
5. It can also show the indispensable necessity of such an
administration of the divine government as to secure the fullest
confidence throughout the universe, in the sincerity of God in
promulgating His law with its tremendous penalty, and of His
unalterable adherence to its spirit, and determination not to falter in
carrying out and securing its authority at all events. That this is
indispensable to the well-being of the universe, is entirely manifest.
6. Hence it is very obvious to natural theology, that sin cannot be
pardoned unless something is done to forbid the otherwise natural
inference that sin will be forgiven under the government of God upon
condition of repentance alone, and of course upon a condition within
the power of the sinner himself. It must be manifest, that to proclaim
throughout the universe that sin would be pardoned universally upon
condition of repentance alone, would be a virtual repeal of the divine
law. All creatures would instantly perceive, that no one need to fear
punishment, in any case, as his forgiveness was secure, however
much he might trample on the divine authority, upon a single condition
which he could at will perform.
7. Natural theology is abundantly competent to show, that God could
not be just to His own intelligence, just to His character, and hence just
to the universe, in dispensing with the execution of divine law, except
upon the condition of providing a substitute of such a nature as to
reveal as fully, and impress as deeply, the lessons that would be
taught by the execution, as the execution itself would do. The great
design of penalties is prevention, and this is of course the design of
executing penalties. The head of every government is pledged to
sustain the authority of law, by a due administration of rewards and
punishments, and has no right in any instance to extend pardon,
except upon conditions that will as effectually support the authority of
law as the execution of its penalties would do. It was never found to
be safe, or even possible under any government, to make the
universal offer of pardon to violators of law, upon the bare condition of
repentance, for the very obvious reason already suggested, that it
would be a virtual repeal of all law. Public justice, by which every
executive magistrate in the universe is bound, sternly and peremptorily
forbids that mercy shall be extended to any culprit, without some
equivalent being rendered to the government; that is, without
something being done that will fully answer as a substitute for the
execution of penalties. This principle God fully admits to be binding
upon Him; and hence He affirms that He gave His Son to render it just
in Him to forgive sin. "Being justified freely by His grace, through the
redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a
propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for
the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to
declare, I say, at this time, His righteousness; that He might be just,
and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus" (Romans 3:24-26).
8. All nations have felt the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. This is
evident from the fact that all nations have offered them.
9. The wisest heathen philosophers, who saw the intrinsic inefficacy
of animal sacrifices, held that God could not forgive sin. This proves
to a demonstration, that they felt the necessity of an atonement, or
expiatory sacrifice. And having too just views of God and His
government, to suppose that either animal, or merely human,
sacrifices, could be efficacious under the government of God, they
were unable to understand upon what principles sin could be forgiven.
10. Public justice required, either that an atonement should be made,
or that the law should be executed upon every offender. By public
justice is intended, that due administration of law, that shall secure in
the highest manner which the nature of the case admits, private and
public interests, and establish the order and well-being of the universe.
In establishing the government of the universe, God had given the
pledge, both impliedly and expressly, that He would regard the public
interests, and by a due administration of the law, secure and promote,
as far as possible, public and individual happiness.
11. Public justice could strictly require only the execution of law; for
God had neither expressly nor impliedly given a pledge to do anything
more for the promotion of virtue and happiness, than to administer due
rewards to the righteous, and due punishment to the wicked. Yet an
atonement, as we shall see, would more fully meet the necessities of
government, and act as a more efficient preventive of sin, and a more
powerful persuasive to holiness, than the infliction of the legal penalty
would do.
12. An atonement was needed for the removal of obstacles to the
free exercise of benevolence toward our race. Without an atonement,
the race of man after the fall sustained to the government of God the
relation of rebels and outlaws. And before God, as the great executive
magistrate of the universe, could manifest His benevolence toward
them, an atonement must be decided upon and made known, as the
reason upon which His favorable treatment of them was conditioned.
13. An atonement was needed to promote the glory and influence of
God in the universe. But more of this hereafter.
14. An atonement was needed to present overpowering motives to
repentance.
15. An atonement was needed, that the offer of pardon might not
seem like connivance at sin.
16. An atonement was needed to manifest the sincerity of God in His
legal enactments.
17. An atonement was needed to make it safe to present the offer
and promise of pardon.
18. Natural theology can inform us, that, if the lawgiver would or
could condescend so much to deny himself, as to attest his regard to
his law, and his determination to support it by suffering its curse, in
such a sense as was possible and consistent with his character and
relations, and so far forth as emphatically to inculcate the great lesson,
that sin was not to be forgiven upon the bare condition of repentance
in any case, and also to establish the universal conviction, that the
execution of law was not to be dispensed with, but that it is an
unalterable rule under his divine government, that where there is sin
there must be inflicted suffering this would be so complete a
satisfaction of public justice, that sin might safely be forgiven.
The fact of atonement.
This is purely a doctrine of revelation, and in the establishment of
this truth appeal must be made to the scriptures alone.
dispensation of the Jews, attest, most unequivocally, the necessity of
an atonement.
2. The New Testament is just as unequivocal in its testimony to the
same point.
I shall here take it as established, that Christ was properly "God
manifest in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3:16), and proceed to cite a few out of
the great multitude of passages, that attest the fact of His death, and
also its vicarious nature; that is, that it was for us, and as a satisfaction
to public justice for our sins, that His blood was shed. I will first quote
a few passages to show that the atonement and redemption through it,
was a matter of understanding and covenant between the Father and
Son. "I have made a covenant with My chosen, I have sworn unto
David My servant. Thy seed will I establish forever, and build up thy
throne to all generations. Selah" (Psalms 89:3, 4). "Yet it pleased the
Lord to bruise Him; He hath put Him to grief: when Thou shalt make
His soul an offering for sin He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His
days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand. He shall
see of the travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied; by His knowledge
shall My righteous servant justify many; for He shall bear their
iniquities. Therefore will I divide Him a portion with the great, and He
shall divide the spoil with the strong; because He hath poured out His
soul unto death: and He was numbered with the transgressors" (Isaiah
53:10, 11, 12). "All that the Father giveth Me shall come to Me: and
he that cometh to Me I will in no wise cast out. For I came down from
heaven, not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. And
this is the Father's will which hath sent Me, that of all which He hath
given Me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last
day" (John 6:37-39) "I have manifested Thy name unto the men which
Thou gavest Me out of the world: Thine they were, and Thou gavest
them Me; and they have kept Thy word. I pray for them: I pray not for
the world, but for them which Thou hast given Me; for they are Thine.
And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I
come to Thee. Holy Father, keep through Thine own name those
whom Thou hast given Me, that they may be one, as we are" (John
17:6, 9, 11).
I will next quote some passages to show, that, if sinners were to be
saved at all, it must be through an atonement. "Neither is there
salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven
given among men whereby we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). "Be it
known unto you therefore, men and brethren, that through this man is
preached unto you the forgiveness of sins: And by Him all that believe
are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the
law of Moses" (Acts 13:38, 39). "Now we know, that what things
soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every
mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before
God. Therefore, by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be
justified in His sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin" (Romans
3:19, 20). "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law,
but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ,
that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of
the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. I do not
frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then
Christ is dead in vain" (Gal. 2:16, 21). "For as many as are of the
works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every
one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the
law to do them. But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of
God, it is evident: for, The just shall live by faith. And the law is not of
faith: but the man that doeth them shall live in them. For if the
inheritance be of the law, it is no more of promise: but God gave it to
Abraham by promise. Wherefore then serveth the law? It was added
because of transgressions, until the seed should come to whom the
promise was made; and it was ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator. Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one. Is
the law, then, against the promises of God? God forbid, for if there
had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness
should have been by the law. Wherefore the law was our
schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by
faith" (Gal. 3:10-12, 18-21, 24). "And almost all things are by the law
purged with blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission. It
was therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens
should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with
better sacrifices than these" (Heb. 9:22, 23).
I will now cite some passages that establish the fact of the vicarious
death of Christ, and redemption through His blood. "But He was
wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities: the
chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and with His stripes we are
healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one
to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all"
(Isaiah 53:5, 6). "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered
unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (Matt.
20:28). "For this is My blood of the new testament which is shed for
many for the remission of sins" (Matt. 26:28). "And as Moses lifted up
the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted
up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal
life" (John 3:14, 15). "I am the living bread which came down from
heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the
bread that I will give is My flesh, which I will give for the life of the
world" (John 6:51). "Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all
the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to
feed the church of God, which He hath purchased with His own blood"
(Acts 20:28). "Being justified freely by His grace, through the
redemption that is in Christ Jesus. To declare, I say, at this time, His
righteousness: that He might be just, and the justifier of him which
believeth in Jesus. For when we were yet without strength, in due
time Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will
one die: yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to
die. But God commandeth His love toward us, in that while we were
yet sinners Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by
His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. And not only
so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we
have now received the atonement. Therefore, as by the offence of
one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the
righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification
of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners,
so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (Romans
3:24-26, 5:9-11, 18, 19). "Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye
may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened. For even Christ our
Passover is sacrificed for us: for I delivered unto you first of all that
which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the
scriptures" (1 Cor. 5:7, 15:3). "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless
I live: yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in
the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave
Himself for me. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law,
being made a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that
hangeth on a tree. That the blessing of Abraham might come on the
Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of
the Spirit through faith" (Gal. 2:20, 3:13, 14). "But now in Christ Jesus
ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ.
And walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given Himself
for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour"
(Eph. 2:13, 5:2). "Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by His
own blood He entered in once into the holy place, having obtained
eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and
the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the
purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who
through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge
your conscience from dead works to serve the living God? And almost
all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of
blood is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the patterns of
things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the heavenly
things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not
entered into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of
the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God
for us. Nor yet that He should offer Himself often, as the high priest
entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others; for then
must He often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now
once in the end of the world hath He appeared to put away sin by the
sacrifice of Himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, but
after this the judgment: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of
many: and unto them that look for Him shall He appear the second
time without sin unto salvation" (Heb. 9:12-14, 22-28). "By the which
will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ
once for all. And every priest standeth daily ministering and offering
oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but
this man, after He had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down
on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till His enemies be
made His footstool. For by one offering He hath perfected forever
them that are sanctified" (Heb. 10:10-14). "Having therefore, brethren,
boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and
living way which He hath consecrated for us through the veil, that is to
say, His flesh" (Heb. 10:19, 20), "For as much as ye know that ye were
not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your
vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers; but with the
precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without
spot" (1 Peter 1:18, 19). "Who His own self bare our sins in His own
body on the tree, that we being dead to sins should live unto
righteousness; by whose stripes ye were healed" (1 Peter 2:24). "For
Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He
might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened
by the Spirit" (1 Peter 3:8). "But if we walk in the light as He I in the
light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus
Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin" (1 John 1:7). "And ye know
that He was manifested to take away our sins; and in Him is no sin" (1
John 3:5). "In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because
that God sent His only begotten Son into the world, that we might live
through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved
us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (1 John 4:9,
10).
These, as every reader of the Bible must know, are only some of the
passages that teach the doctrine of atonement and redemption by the
death of Christ. It is truly wonderful in how many ways this doctrine is
taught, assumed, and implied in the Bible. Indeed, it is emphatically
the great theme of the Bible. It is expressed or implied upon nearly
every page of divine inspiration.
The next inquiry is what constitutes the atonement.
The answer to this inquiry has been already, in part, unavoidably
anticipated. Under this head I will show:
did not constitute the atonement.
(1.) Christ owed obedience to the moral law, both as God and man.
He was under as much obligation to be perfectly benevolent as any
moral agent is. It was, therefore, impossible for Him to perform any
works of supererogation; that is, so far as obedience to law was
concerned, He could, neither as God nor as man, do anything more
than fulfil its obligations.
(2.) Had He obeyed for us, He would not have suffered for us. Were
His obedience to be substituted for our obedience, He need not
certainly have both fulfilled the law for us, as our substitute, under a
covenant of works, and at the same time have suffered as a substitute,
in submitting to the penalty of the law.
(3.) If He obeyed the law as our substitute, then why should our own
return to personal obedience be insisted upon as a sine qua non of our
salvation?
(4.) The idea that any part of the atonement consisted in Christ's
obeying the law for us, and in our stead and behalf, represents God as
requiring:
(a.) The obedience of our substitute.
(b.) The same suffering, as if no obedience had been rendered.
(c.) Our repentance.
(d.) Our return to personal obedience.
(e.) And then represents him as, after all, ascribing our salvation to
grace. Strange grace this, that requires a debt to be paid several
times over, before the obligation is discharged!
2. I must show that the atonement was not a commercial transaction.
Some have regarded the atonement simply in the light of the payment
of a debt; and have represented Christ as purchasing the elect of the
Father, and paying down the same amount of suffering in His own
person that justice would have exacted of them. To this I answer:
(1.) It is naturally impossible, as it would require that satisfaction
should be made to retributive justice. Strictly speaking, retributive
justice can never be satisfied, in the sense that the guilty can be
punished as much and as long as he deserves; for this would imply
that he was punished until he ceased to be guilty, or became innocent.
When law is once violated, the sinner can make no satisfaction. He
can never cease to be guilty, or to deserve punishment, and no
possible amount of suffering renders him the less guilty or the less
deserving of punishment: therefore, to satisfy retributive justice is
impossible.
(2.) But, as we have seen in a former lecture, retributive justice must
have inflicted on Him eternal death. To suppose, therefore, that Christ
suffered in amount, all that was due to the elect, is to suppose that He
suffered an eternal punishment multiplied by the whole number of the
elect.
3. The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public
justice.
The moral law did not originate in the divine will, but is founded in His
self-existence and immutable nature. He cannot therefore repeal or
alter it. To the letter of the moral law there may be exceptions. God
cannot repeal the precept, and just for this reason, He cannot set
aside the spirit of the sanctions. For to dispense with the sanctions
were a virtual repeal of the precept. He cannot, therefore, set aside
the execution of the penalty when the precept has been violated,
without something being done that shall meet the demands of the true
spirit of the law. "Being justified freely by His grace through the
redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a
propitiation through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness for
the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to
declare, I say, at this time His righteousness: that He might be just,
and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus" (Romans 3:24-26).
This passage assigns the reason, or declares the design, of the
atonement, to have been to justify God in the pardon of sin, or in
dispensing with the execution of law. "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise
Him; He hath put Him to grief: when Thou shalt make His soul an
offering for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days, and
the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand. He shall see of the
travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied: by His knowledge shall My
righteous servant justify many; for He shall bear their iniquities.
Therefore will I divide Him a portion with the great, and He shall divide
the spoil with the strong; because He hath poured out His soul unto
death: and He was numbered with the transgressors: and He bare the
sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors" (Isaiah
53:10-12).
I present several further reasons why an atonement in the case of
the inhabitants of this world was preferable to punishment, or to the
execution of the divine law. Several reasons have already been
assigned, to which I will add the following, some of which are plainly
revealed in the Bible; others are plainly inferrible from what the Bible
does reveal; and others still are plainly inferrible from the very nature
of the case.
(1.) God's great and disinterested love to sinners themselves was a
prime reason for the atonement.
"For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son,
that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have
everlasting life" (John 3:16).
(2.) His great love to the universe at large must have been another
reason, inasmuch as it is impossible that the atonement should not
exert an amazing influence over moral beings, in whatever world they
might exist, and where the fact of atonement should be known.
(3.) Another reason for substituting the sufferings of Christ in the
place of the eternal damnation of sinners, is, that an infinite amount of
suffering might be prevented. The relation of Christ to the universe
rendered His sufferings so infinitely valuable and influential, as an
expression of God's abhorrence of sin on the one hand, and His great
love to His subjects on the other, that an infinitely less amount of
suffering in Him than must have been inflicted on sinners, would be
equally, and no doubt vastly more, influential in supporting the
government of God, than the execution of the law upon them would
have been. Be it borne in mind, that Christ was the lawgiver, and His
suffering in behalf of sinners is to be regarded as the lawgiver and
executive magistrate suffering in the behalf and stead of a rebellious
province of his empire. As a governmental expedient it is easy to see
the great value of such a substitute; that on the one hand it fully
evinced the determination of the ruler not to yield the authority of His
law, and on the other, to evince His great and disinterested love for
His rebellious subjects.
(4.) By this substitution, an immense good might be gained, the
eternal happiness of all that can be reclaimed from sin, together with
all the augmented happiness of those who have never sinned, that
must result from this glorious revelation of God.
(5.) Another reason for preferring the atonement to the punishment
of sinners must have been, that sin had afforded an opportunity for the
highest manifestation of virtue in God: the manifestation of
forbearance, mercy, self-denial, and suffering for enemies that were
within His own power, and for those from whom He could expect no
equivalent in return.
It is impossible to conceive of a higher order of virtues than are
exhibited in the atonement of Christ. It was vastly desirable that God
should take advantage of such an opportunity to exhibit His true
character, and show to the universe what was in His heart. The
strength and stability of any government must depend upon the
estimation in which the sovereign is held by his subjects. It was
therefore indispensable, that God should improve the opportunity,
which sin had afforded, to manifest and make known His true
character, and thus secure the highest confidence of His subjects.
(6.) In the atonement God consulted His own happiness and His own
glory. To deny Himself for the salvation of sinners, was a part of His
own infinite happiness, always intended by Him, and therefore always
enjoyed. This was not selfishness in Him, as His own well-being is of
infinitely greater value than that of all the universe besides; He ought
so to regard and treat it, because of its supreme and intrinsic value.
(7.) The atonement would present to creatures the highest possible
motives to virtue. Example is the highest moral influence that can be
exerted. If God, or any other being, would make others benevolent,
He must manifest benevolence Himself. If the benevolence
manifested in the atonement does not subdue the selfishness of
sinners, their case is hopeless.
(8.) The circumstances of His government rendered an atonement
necessary; as the execution of law was not, as a matter of fact, a
sufficient preventive of sin. The annihilation of the wicked would not
answer the purposes of government. A full revelation of mercy,
blended with such an exhibition of justice, was called for by the
circumstances of the universe.
(9.) To confirm holy beings. Nothing could be more highly calculated
to establish and confirm the confidence, love, and obedience of holy
beings, than this disinterested manifestation of love to sinners and
rebels.
(10.) To confound His enemies. How could anything be more
directly calculated to silence all cavils, and to shut every mouth, and
forever close up all opposing lips, than such an exhibition of love and
willingness to make sacrifices for sinners?
(11.) The fact, that the execution of the law of God on rebel angels
had not arrested, and could not arrest, the progress of rebellion in the
universe, proves that something more needed to be done, in support
of the authority of law, than would be done in the execution of its
penalty upon rebels. While the execution of law may have a strong
tendency to prevent the beginning of rebellion among loyal subjects,
and to restrain rebels themselves; yet penal inflictions do not, in fact,
subdue the heart, under any government, whether human or divine.
As a matter of fact, the law was only exasperating rebels, without
confirming holy beings. Paul affirmed, that the action of the law upon
his own mind, while in impenitence, was to beget in him all manner of
concupiscence. One grand reason for giving the law was, to develop
the nature of sin, and to show that the carnal mind is not subject to the
law of God, neither indeed can be. The law was therefore given that
the offence might abound, that thereby it might be demonstrated, that
without an atonement there could be no salvation for rebels under the
government of God.
(12.) The nature, degree, and execution of the penalty of the law,
made the holiness and the justice of God so prominent, as to absorb
too much of public attention to be safe. Those features of His
character were so fully revealed, by the execution of His law upon the
rebel angels, that to have pursued the same course with the
inhabitants of this world, without the offer of mercy, might have had,
and doubtless would have had, an injurious influence upon the
universe, by creating more of fear than of love to God and His
government. Hence, a fuller revelation of the love and compassion of
God was necessary, to guard against the influence of slavish fear.
His taking human nature, and obeying unto death, under such
circumstances, constituted a good reason for our being treated as
righteous. It is a common practice in human governments, and one
that is founded in the nature and laws of mind, to reward distinguished
public service by conferring favors on the children of those who have
rendered this service, and treating them as if they had rendered it
themselves. This is both benevolent and wise. Its governmental
importance, its wisdom and excellent influence, have been most
abundantly attested in the experience of nations. As a governmental
transaction, this same principle prevails, and for the same reason,
under the government of God. All that are Christ's children and belong
to Him, are received for His sake, treated with favor, and the rewards
of the righteous are bestowed upon them for His sake. And the public
service which He has rendered to the universe, by laying down His life
for the support of the divine government, has rendered it eminently
wise, that all who are united to Him by faith should be treated as
righteous for His sake.
LECTURE 26
EXTENT OF ATONEMENT
For whose benefit the atonement was intended.
and happiness, as the supreme and most influential reason for all His
conduct. This is wise and right in Him, because His own glory and
happiness are infinitely the greatest good in and to the universe. He
made the atonement to satisfy Himself. "God so loved the world, that
He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him
should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John 3:16). God Himself,
then, was greatly benefited by the atonement: in other words, His
happiness has in a great measure resulted from its contemplation,
execution, and results.
2. He made the atonement for the benefit of the universe. All holy
beings are, and must be, benefited by it, from its very nature, as it
gives them a higher knowledge of God than ever they had before, or
ever could have gained in any other way. The atonement is the
greatest work that He could have wrought for them, the most blessed
and excellent, and benevolent thing He could have done for them. For
this reason, angels are described as desiring to look into the
atonement. The inhabitants of heaven are represented as being
deeply interested in the work of atonement, and those displays of the
character of God that are made in it. The atonement is then no doubt
one of the greatest blessings that ever God conferred upon the
universe of holy beings.
3. The atonement was made for the benefit particularly of the
inhabitants of this world, from its very nature, as it is calculated to
benefit all the inhabitants of this world; as it is a most stupendous
revelation of God to man. Its nature is adapted to benefit all mankind.
All mankind can be pardoned, if they are rightly affected and brought
to repentance by it, as well as any part of mankind.
4. All do certainly receive many blessings on account of it. It is
probable that, but for the atonement, none of our race, except the first
human pair, would ever have had an existence.
5. All the blessings which mankind enjoy, are conferred on them on
account of the atonement of Christ; that is, God could not consistently
wait on sinners, and bless, and do all that the nature of the case
admits, to save them, were it not for the fact of atonement.
6. That it was made for all mankind, is evident from the fact that it is
offered to all indiscriminately.
7. Sinners are universally condemned for not receiving it.
8. If the atonement is not intended for all mankind, it is impossible for
us not to regard God as insincere, in making them the offer of
salvation through the atonement.
9. If the atonement was made only for a part, no man can know
whether he has a right to embrace it, until by a direct revelation God
has made known to him that he is one of that part.
10. If ministers do not believe that it was made for all men, they
cannot heartily and honestly press its acceptance upon any individual,
or congregation in the world; for they cannot assure any individual, or
congregation, that there is any atonement for him or them, any more
than there is for Satan.
If to this it should be replied, that for fallen angels no atonement has
been made, but for some men an atonement has been made, so that it
may be true of any individual that it was made for him, and if he will
truly believe, he will thereby have the fact revealed, that it was, in fact,
made for him; I reply, What is a sinner to believe, as a condition of
salvation? Is it merely that an atonement was made for somebody? Is
this saving faith? Must he not embrace it, and personally and
individually commit himself to it, and to Christ? Trust in it as made for
him? But how is he authorized to do this upon the supposition that the
atonement was made for some men only, and perhaps for him? Is it
saving faith to believe that it was possibly made for him, and by
believing this possibility, will he thereby gain the evidence that it was,
in fact, made for him? No, he must have the word of God for it, that it
was made for him. Nothing else can warrant the casting of his soul
upon it. How then is "he truly to believe," or trust in the atonement,
until he has the evidence, not merely that it possibly may have been,
but that it actually was made for him? The mere possibility that an
atonement has been made for an individual, is no ground of saving
faith. What is he to believe? Why, that of which he has proof. But the
supposition is, that he has proof only that it is possible that the
atonement was made for him. He has a right, then, to believe it
possible that Christ died for him. And is this saving faith? No, it is not.
What advantage, then, has he over Satan in this respect? Satan
knows that the atonement was not made for him; the sinner upon the
supposition knows that, possibly, it may have been made for him; but
the latter has really no more ground for trust and reliance than the
former. He might hope, but he could not rationally believe.
But upon this subject of the extent of the atonement, let the Bible
speak for itself: "The next day John seeth Jesus coming unto him, and
saith, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the
world." "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten
Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have
everlasting life. For God sent not His Son into the world, to condemn
the world: but that the world through Him might be saved." "And said
unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying; for we
have heard Him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the
Savior of the world" (John 1:29, 3:16, 17, 9:42). "Therefore, as by the
offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even
so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto
justification of life" (Romans 5:18). "For the love of Christ constraineth
us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead:
and that He died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live
unto themselves, but unto Him which died for them, and rose again" (2
Cor. 5:14, 15), "Who gave Himself a ransom for all, to be testified in
due time." "For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because
we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of
those that believe" (1 Tim. 2:6, 4:10). "And He is the propitiation for
our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world"
(1 John 2:2).
That the atonement is sufficient for all men, and, in that sense,
general, as opposed to particular, is also evident from the fact, that the
invitations and promises of the gospel are addressed to all men, and
all are freely offered salvation through Christ. "Look unto Me, and be
ye saved, all the ends of the earth: for I am God and there is none
else." "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that
hath no money; come ye, buy and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk
without money and without price. Wherefore do ye spend money for
that which is not bread, and your labor for that which satisfieth not?
Hearken diligently unto Me, and eat ye that which is good, and let your
soul delight itself in fatness. Incline your ear, and come unto Me: hear,
and your soul shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with
you, even the sure mercies of David" (Isaiah 14:22, 4:1-3). "Come
unto Me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest.
Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly in
heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For My yoke is easy, and
My burden is light." "Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell
them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my oxen
and my fatlings are killed, and all things are ready; come unto the
marriage" (Matt. 11:28-30, 22:4). "And sent his servant at supper time
to say to them that were bidden, Come, for all things are now ready"
(Luke 14:17). "In the last day, the great day of the feast, Jesus stood
and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me, and drink"
(John 7:37), "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock; if any man hear
My voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with
him, and he with Me." "And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And
let him that heareth say, Come, and let him that is athirst come. And
whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely" (Rev. 3:20, 22:17).
Again: I infer that the atonement was made, and is sufficient, for all
men, from the fact that God not only invites all, but expostulates with
them for not accepting His invitations. "Wisdom crieth without; she
uttereth her voice in the streets: she crieth in the chief place of
concourse, in the openings of the gates; in the city she uttereth her
words, saying, How long ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity? and
the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn
you at My reproof: behold I will pour out My Spirit unto you, I will make
known My words unto you" (Prov. 1:20-23). "Come now, and let us
reason together, saith the Lord: though your sins be as scarlet, they
shall be white as snow, though they be red like crimson, they shall be
as wool" (Isaiah 1:18). "Thus saith the Lord, thy Redeemer, the Holy
One of Israel, I am the Lord thy God which teacheth thee to profit,
which leadeth thee by the way that thou shouldest go. Oh that thou
hadst hearkened to My commandments! Then had thy peace been as
a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea" (Isaiah 48:17,
18). "Say unto them, as I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure
in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and
live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house
of Israel?" (Ezek. 33:11). "Hear ye now what the Lord saith: Arise,
contend thou before the mountains, and let the hills hear thy voice.
Hear ye, O mountains, the Lord's controversy, and ye strong
foundations of the earth; for the Lord hath a controversy with His
people, and He will plead with Israel. O My people, what have I done
unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? Testify against Me"
(Micah 6:1-3). "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets,
and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have
gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens
under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matt. 23:37).
Again: the same inference is forced upon us by the fact that God
complains of sinners for rejecting His overtures of mercy: "Because I
have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out My hand, and no
man regarded" (Prov. 1:24). "But they refused to hearken, and pulled
away the shoulder, and stopped their ears, that they should not hear.
Yea, they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should
hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in His
Spirit by the former prophets: therefore came a great wrath from the
Lord of hosts. Therefore, it is come to pass; that as he cried and they
would not hear: so they cried, and I would not hear, saith the Lord of
hosts" (Zech. 7:11-13). "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a certain
king which made a marriage for his son. And sent forth his servant to
call them that were bidden to the wedding: and they would not come.
Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are
bidden, Behold I have prepared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings
are killed, and all things are ready; come unto the marriage. But they
made light of it, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his
merchandise: and the remnant took his servants, and treated them
spitefully, and slew them" (Matt. 22:2-6). "And sent his servant at
supper time to say to them that were bidden, Come; for all things are
now ready. And they all with one consent began to make excuse.
The first said unto him, I have bought a piece of ground, and I must
needs go and see it: I pray thee have me excused. And another said,
I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to prove them: I pray thee
have me excused. And another said, I have married a wife; and
therefore I cannot come" (Luke 14:17-20). "And ye will not come to
Me, that ye might have life" (John 5:40). "Ye stiff-necked and
uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost:
as your fathers did, so do ye" (Acts 7:51). "And as he reasoned of
righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled, ad
answered, Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season I
will call for thee" (Acts 24:25).
I now proceed to answer objections.
atonement represents God as unmerciful. To this I answer,
(1.) This objection supposes that the atonement was demanded to
satisfy retributive instead of public justice.
(2.) The atonement was the exhibition of a merciful disposition. It
was because God was disposed to pardon that He consented to give
His own Son to die as the substitute of sinners.
(3.) The atonement is infinitely the most illustrious exhibition of mercy
ever made in the universe. The mere pardon of sin, as an act of
sovereign mercy, could not have been compared, had it been
possible, with the merciful disposition displayed in the atonement itself.
2. It is objected that the atonement is unnecessary.
The testimony of the world and of the consciences of all men are
against this objection. This is universally attested by their expiatory
sacrifices. These, as has been said, have been offered by nearly
every nation of whose religious history we have any reliable account.
This shows that human beings are universally conscious of being
sinners, and under the government of a sin-hating God; that their
intelligence demands either the punishment of sinners, or that a
substitute should be offered to public justice; that they all have the
idea that substitution is conceivable, and hence they offer their
sacrifices as expiatory. A heathen philosopher can answer this
objection, and rebuke the folly of him who makes it.
3. It is objected, that it is unjust to punish an innocent being instead
of the guilty.
(1.) Yes, it would not only be unjust, but it is impossible with God to
punish an innocent moral agent at all. Punishment implies guilt. An
innocent being may suffer, but he cannot be punished. Christ
voluntarily "suffered, the just for the unjust" (1 Peter 3:18). He had a
right to exercise this self-denial; and as it was by His own voluntary
consent, no injustice was done to any one.
(2.) If He had no right to make an atonement, He had no right to
consult and promote His own happiness and the happiness of others;
for it is said that "for the joy that was set before Him, He endured the
cross, despising the shame" (Heb. 12:2).
4. It is objected that the doctrine of atonement is utterly incredible.
To this I have replied in a former lecture; but will here again state, that
it would be utterly incredible upon any other supposition, than that God
is love. But if God is love, as the Bible expressly affirms that He is, the
work of atonement is just what might be expected of Him, under the
circumstances; and the doctrine of atonement is then the most
reasonable doctrine in the universe.
5. It is objected to the doctrine of atonement, that it is of a
demoralizing tendency.
There is a broad distinction between the natural tendency of a thing,
and such an abuse of a good thing as to make it the instrument of evil.
The best things and doctrines may be, and often are, abused, and
their natural tendency perverted. Although the doctrine of the
atonement may be abused, yet its natural tendency is the direct
opposite of demoralizing. Is the manifestation of infinitely disinterested
love naturally calculated to beget enmity? Who does not know that the
natural tendency of manifested love is to excite love in return? Those
who have the most cordially believed in the atonement, have exhibited
the purest morality that has ever been in this world; while the rejecters
of the atonement, almost without exception, exhibit a loose morality.
This is, as might be expected, from the very nature and moral
influence of atonement.
6. To a general atonement, it is objected that the Bible represents
Christ as laying down His life for His sheep, or for the elect only, and
not for all mankind.
(1.) It does indeed represent Christ as laying down His life for His
sheep, and also for all mankind. "And He is the propitiation for our
sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world" (1
John 2:2). "For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the
world; but that the world through Him might be saved" (John 3:17).
"But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the
suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that He, by the grace
of God, should taste death for every man" (Heb. 2:9).
(2.) Those who object to the general atonement, take substantially
the same course to evade this doctrine, that Unitarians do to set aside
the doctrine of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. They quote those
passages that prove the unity of God and the humanity of Christ, and
then take it for granted that they have disproved the doctrine of the
Trinity and Christ's Divinity. The asserters of limited atonement, in like
manner, quote those passages that prove that Christ died for the elect
and for His saints, and then take it for granted that He died for none
else. To the Unitarian, we reply, we admit the unity of God and the
humanity of Christ, and the full meaning of those passages of scripture
which you quote in proof of these doctrines; but we insist that this is
not the whole truth, but that there are still other passages which prove
the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Divinity of Christ. Just so to the
asserters of limited atonement, we reply, we believe that Christ laid
down His life for His sheep, as well as you; but we also believe that
"he tasted death for every man" (Heb. 2:9). "For God so loved the
world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in
Him should not perish, but have everlasting life" (John 3:16).
7. To the doctrine of general atonement it is objected, that it would
be folly in God to provide what He knew would be rejected; and that to
suffer Christ to die for those who, He foresaw, would not repent, would
be a useless expenditure of the blood and suffering of Christ.
(1.) This objection assumes that the atonement was a literal payment
of a debt, which we have seen does not consist with the nature of the
atonement.
(2.) If sinners do not accept it, in no view can the atonement be
useless, as the great compassion of God, in providing an atonement
and offering them mercy, will forever exalt His character, in the
estimation of holy beings, greatly strengthen His government, and
therefore benefit the whole universe.
(3.) If all men rejected the atonement, it would, nevertheless, be of
infinite value to the universe, as the most glorious revelation of God
that was ever made.
8. To the general atonement it is objected, that it implies universal
salvation.
It would indeed imply this, upon the supposition that the atonement is
the literal payment of a debt. It was upon this view of the atonement,
that Universalism first took its stand. Universalists taking it for granted,
that Christ had paid the debt of those for whom He died, and finding it
fully revealed in the Bible that He died for all mankind, naturally, and if
this were correct, properly, inferred the doctrine of universal salvation.
But we have seen, that this is not the nature of atonement. Therefore,
this inference falls to the ground.
9. It is objected that, if the atonement was not a payment of the debt
of sinners, but general in its nature, as we have maintained, it secures
the salvation of no one. It is true, that the atonement, of itself, does
not secure the salvation of any one; but the promise and oath of God,
that Christ shall have a seed to serve Him, provide that security.
LECTURE 27
REGENERATION
In the examination of this subject I will:
Point out the common distinction between regeneration and conversion.
divine agency in changing the heart. With them regeneration does not
include and imply the activity of the subject, but rather excludes it.
These theologians, as will be seen in its place, hold that a change of
heart is first effected by the Holy Spirit while the subject is passive,
which change lays a foundation for the exercise, by the subject, of
repentance, faith, and love.
2. The term conversion with them expresses the activity and turning
of the subject, after regeneration is effected by the Holy Spirit.
Conversion with them does not include or imply the agency of the Holy
Spirit, but expresses only the activity of the subject. With them the
Holy Spirit first regenerates or changes the heart, after which the
sinner turns or converts himself. So that God and the subject work
each in turn. God first changes the heart, and as a consequence, the
subject afterwards converts himself or turns to God. Thus the subject
is passive in regeneration, but active in conversion.
When we come to the examination of the philosophical theories of
regeneration, we shall see that the views of these theologians
respecting regeneration result naturally and necessarily from their
holding the dogma of constitutional moral depravity, which we have
recently examined. Until their views on that subject are corrected, no
change can be expected in their views of this subject.
The assigned reasons for this distinction.
agency of the subject.
2. We need and must adopt a term that will express the Divine
agency.
3. Regeneration is expressly ascribed to the Holy Spirit.
4. Conversion, as it implies and expresses the activity and turning of
the subject, does not include and imply any Divine agency, and
therefore does not imply or express what is intended by regeneration.
5. As two agencies are actually employed in the regeneration and
conversion of a sinner, it is necessary to adopt terms that will clearly
teach this fact, and clearly distinguish between the agency of God and
of the creature.
6. The terms regeneration and conversion aptly express this
distinction, and therefore should be theologically employed.
The objections to this distinction.
(1.) To beget. (2.) To bear or bring forth. (3.) To be begotten. (4.) To
be born, or brought forth.
2. Regeneration is, in the Bible, the same as the new birth.
3. To be born again is the same thing, in the Bible use of the term,
as to have a new heart, to be a new creature, to pass from death unto
life. In other words, to be born again is to have a new moral character,
to become holy. To regenerate is to make holy. To be born of God,
no doubt expresses and includes the Divine agency, but it also
includes and expresses that which the Divine agency is employed in
effecting, namely, making the sinner holy. Certainly, a sinner is not
regenerated whose moral character is unchanged. If he were, how
could it be truly said, that whosoever is born of God overcometh the
world, doth not commit sin, cannot sin, etc? If regeneration does not
imply and include a change of moral character in the subject, how can
regeneration be made the condition of salvation? The fact is, the term
regeneration, or the being born of God, is designed to express
primarily and principally the thing done, that is, the making of a sinner
holy, and expresses also the fact, that God's agency induces the
change. Throw out the idea of what is done, that is, the change of
moral character in the subject, and he would not be born again, he
would not be regenerated, and it could not be truly said, in such a
case, that God had regenerated him.
It has been objected, that the term really means and expresses only
the Divine agency; and, only by way of implication, embraces the idea
of a change of moral character and of course of activity in the subject.
To this I reply:
(1.) That if it really expresses only the Divine agency, it leaves out of
view the thing effected by Divine agency.
(2.) That it really and fully expresses not only the Divine agency, but
also that which this agency accomplishes.
(3.) The thing which the agency of God brings about, is a new or
spiritual birth, a resurrection from spiritual death, the inducing of a new
and holy life. The thing done is the prominent idea expressed or
intended by the term.
(4.) The thing done implies the turning or activity of the subject. It is
nonsense to affirm that his moral character is changed without any
activity or agency of his own. Passive holiness is impossible.
Holiness is obedience to the law of God, the law of love, and of course
consists in the activity of the creature.
(5.) We have said that regeneration is synonymous, in the Bible, with
a new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new
heart, which they could not do, if they were not active in this change.
If the work is a work of God, in such a sense, that He must first
regenerate the heart or soul before the agency of the sinner begins, it
were absurd and unjust to require him to make to himself a new heart,
until he is first regenerated.
Regeneration is ascribed to man in the gospel, which it could not be,
if the term were designed to express only the agency of the Holy Spirit.
"For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not
many fathers; for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the
gospel" (1 Cor. 4:15).
(6.) Conversion is spoken of in the Bible as the work of another than
the subject of it, and cannot therefore have been designed to express
only the activity of the subject of it.
(a.) It is ascribed to the word of God. "The law of the Lord is perfect,
converting the soul: the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the
simple" (Psalms 19:7).
(b.) To man. "Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one
convert him; let him know, that he which converteth the sinner from the
error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a
multitude of sins" (James 5:19, 20).
Both conversion and regeneration are sometimes in the Bible
ascribed to God, sometimes to man, and sometimes to the subject;
which shows clearly that the distinction under examination is arbitrary
and theological, rather than biblical. The fact is, that both terms imply
the simultaneous exercise of both human and Divine agency. The fact
that a new heart is the thing done, demonstrates the activity of the
subject; and the word regeneration, or the expression "born of the
Holy Spirit" (John 3:5), asserts the Divine agency. The same is true of
conversion, or the turning of the sinner to God. God is said to turn him
and he is said to turn himself. God draws him, and he follows. In both
alike God and man are both active, and their activity is simultaneous.
God works or draws, and the sinner yields or turns, or which is the
same thing, changes his heart, or, in other words, is born again. The
sinner is dead in trespasses and sins. God calls on him, "Awake thou
that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light"
(Eph. 5:14). God calls; the sinner hears and answers, Here am I, God
says, Arise from the dead. The sinner puts forth his activity, and God
draws him into life; or rather, God draws, and the sinner comes forth to
life.
(7.) The distinction set up is not only not recognized in the Bible, but
is plainly of most injurious tendency, for two reasons:
(a.) It assumes and inculcates a false philosophy of depravity and
regeneration.
(b.) It leads the sinner to wait to be regenerated, before he repents
or turns to God. It is of most fatal tendency to represent the sinner as
under a necessity of waiting to be passively regenerated, before he
gives himself to God.
As the distinction is not only arbitrary, but anti-scriptural and
injurious, and inasmuch as it is founded in, and is designed to teach a
philosophy false and pernicious on the subject of depravity and
regeneration, I shall drop and discard the distinction; and in our
investigations henceforth, let it be understood, that I use regeneration
and conversion as synonymous terms.
What regeneration is not.
It is not a change in the substance of soul or body. If it were, sinners
could not be required to effect it. Such a change would not constitute
a change of moral character. No such change is needed, as the
sinner has all the faculties and natural attributes requisite to render
perfect obedience to God. All he needs is to be induced to use these
powers and attributes as he ought. The words conversion and
regeneration do not imply any change of substance, but only a change
of moral state or of moral character. The terms are not used to
express a physical, but a moral change. Regeneration does not
express or imply the creation of any new faculties or attributes of
nature, nor any change whatever in the constitution of body or mind. I
shall remark further upon this point when we come to the examination
of the philosophical theories of regeneration before alluded to.
What regeneration is.
It has been said that regeneration and a change of heart are
identical. It is important to inquire into the scriptural use of the term
heart. The term, like most others, is used in the Bible in various
senses. The heart is often spoken of in the Bible, not only as
possessing moral character, but as being the source of moral action,
or as the fountain, from which good and evil actions flow, and of
course as constituting the fountain of holiness or of sin, or, in other
words still, as comprehending, strictly speaking, the whole of moral
character. "But those things which proceed out of the mouth come
forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart
proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false
witness, blasphemies" (Matt. 15:18, 19). "O generation of vipers, how
can ye, being evil, speak good things? For out of the abundance of
the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of
the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil
treasure bringeth forth evil things" (Matt. 12:34, 35). When the heart is
thus represented as possessing moral character, and as the fountain
of good and evil, it cannot mean,
cannot in itself possess moral character.
3. It is not any faculty or natural attribute.
4. It cannot consist in any constitutional taste, relish, or appetite, for
these cannot in themselves have moral character.
5. It is not the sensibility or feeling faculty of the mind: for we have
seen, that moral character cannot be predicated of it. It is true, and let
it be understood, that the term heart is used in the Bible in these
senses, but not when the heart is spoken of as the fountain of moral
action. When the heart is represented as possessing moral character,
the word cannot be meant to designate any involuntary state of mind.
For neither the substance of soul or body, nor any involuntary state of
mind can, by any possibility, possess moral character in itself. The
very idea of moral character implies, and suggests the idea of, a free
action or intention. To deny this, were to deny a first truth.
6. The term heart, when applied to mind, is figurative, and means
something in the mind that has some point of resemblance to the
bodily organ of that name, and a consideration of the function of the
bodily organ will suggest the true idea of the heart of the mind. The
heart of the body propels the vital current, and sustains organic life. It
is the fountain from which the vital fluid flows, from which either life or
death may flow, according to the state of the blood. The mind as well
as the body has a heart which, as we have seen, is represented as a
fountain, or as an efficient propelling influence, out of which flows good
or evil, according as the heart is good or evil. This heart is
represented, not only as the source or fountain of good and evil, but as
being either good or evil in itself, as constituting the character of man,
and not merely as being capable of moral character.
It is also represented as something over which we have control, for
which we are responsible, and which, in case it is wicked, we are
bound to change on pain of death. Again: the heart, in the sense in
which we are considering it, is that, the radical change of which
constitutes a radical change of moral character. This is plain from
Matt 12:34, 35, 15:18, 19 already considered.
7. Our own consciousness, then, must inform us that the heart of the
mind that possesses these characteristics, can be nothing else than
the supreme ultimate intention of the soul Regeneration is
represented in the Bible as constituting a radical change of character,
as the resurrection from a death in sin, as the beginning of a new and
spiritual life, as constituting a new creature, as a new creation, not a
physical, but a moral or spiritual creation, as conversion, or turning to
God, as giving God the heart, as loving God with all our heart, and our
neighbor as ourselves. Now we have seen abundantly, that moral
character belongs to, or is an attribute of, the ultimate choice or
intention of the soul.
Regeneration then is a radical change of the ultimate intention, and,
of course, of the end or object of life. We have seen, that the choice of
an end is efficient in producing executive volitions, or the use of means
to obtain its end. A selfish ultimate choice is, therefore, a wicked
heart, out of which flows every evil; and a benevolent ultimate choice
is a good heart, out of which flows every good and commendable
deed.
Regeneration, to have the characteristics ascribed to it in the Bible,
must consist in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its
ultimate choice, intention, or preference; a change from selfishness to
benevolence; from choosing self-gratification as the supreme and
ultimate end of life, to the supreme and ultimate choice of the highest
well-being of God and of the universe; from a state of entire
consecration to self-interest, self-indulgence, self-gratification for its
own sake or as an end, and as the supreme end of life, to a state of
entire consecration to God, and to the interests of His kingdom as the
supreme and ultimate end of life.
The universal necessity of regeneration.
coextensive with moral depravity. This has been shown to be
universal among the unregenerate moral agents of our race. It surely
is impossible, that a world or a universe of unholy or selfish beings
should be happy. It is impossible that heaven should be made up of
selfish beings. It is intuitively certain that without benevolence or
holiness no moral being can be ultimately happy. Without
regeneration, a selfish soul can by no possibility be fitted either for the
employments, or for the enjoyments, of heaven.
2. The scriptures expressly teach the universal necessity of
regeneration. "Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say
unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
God" (John 3:3). "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any
thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature" (Gal. 6:15).
Agencies employed in regeneration.
"Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born
of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.
That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the
Spirit is spirit" (John 3:5, 6). "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the
will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (John 1:15).
2. We have seen that the subject is active in regeneration, that
regeneration consists in the sinner changing his ultimate choice,
intention, preference; or in changing from selfishness to love or
benevolence; or, in other words, in turning from the supreme choice of
self-gratification, to the supreme love of God and the equal love of his
neighbor. Of course the subject of regeneration must be an agent in
the work.
3. There are generally other agents, one or more human beings
concerned in persuading the sinner to turn. The Bible recognizes both
the subject and the preacher as agents in the work. Thus, Paul says:
"I have begotten you through the gospel" (1 Cor. 4:15). Here the
same word is used which is used in another case, where regeneration
is ascribed to God.
Again: an apostle says, "Ye have purified your souls by obeying the
truth" (1 Peter 1:22). Here the work is ascribed to the subject. There
are then always two, and generally more than two agents employed in
effecting the work. Several theologians have held that regeneration is
the work of the Holy Spirit alone. In proof of this they cite those
passages that ascribe it to God. But I might just as lawfully insist that
it is the work of man alone, and quote those passages that ascribe it to
man, to substantiate my position. Or I might assert that it is alone the
work of the subject, and in proof of this position quote those passages
that ascribe it to the subject. Or again, I might assert that it is effected
by the truth alone, and quote such passages as the following to
substantiate my position: "Of His own will begat He us with the word of
truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of His creatures" (James
1:18). "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible
by the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever" (1 Peter 1:23).
It has been common to regard the third person as a mere instrument
in the work. But the fact is, he is a willing, designing, responsible
agent, as really so as God or the subject is.
If it be inquired how the Bible can consistently ascribe regeneration
at one time to God, at another to the subject, at another to the truth, at
another to a third person; the answer is to be sought in the nature of
the work. The work accomplished is a change of choice, in respect to
an end or the end of life. The sinner whose choice is changed, must
of course act. The end to be chosen must be clearly and forcibly
presented; this is the work of the third person, and of the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit takes of the things of Christ and shows them to the soul.
The truth is employed, or it is truth which must necessarily be
employed, as an instrument to induce a change of choice.
Instrumentalities employed in the work.
effecting it, for regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly
influenced by truth.
2. There may be, and often are, many providences concerned in
enlightening the mind, and in inducing regeneration. These are
instrumentalities. They are means or instruments of presenting the
truth. Mercies, judgments, men, measures, and in short all those
things that conduce to enlightening the mind, are instrumentalities
employed in effecting it.
Those who hold to physical or constitutional moral depravity must
hold, of course, to constitutional regeneration; and, of course,
consistency compels them to maintain that there is but one agent
employed in regeneration, and that is the Holy Spirit, and that no
instrument whatever is employed, because the work is, according to
them, an act of creative power; that the very nature is changed, and of
course no instrument can be employed, any more than in the creation
of the world. These theologians have affirmed, over and over again,
that regeneration is a miracle; that there is no tendency whatever in
the gospel, however presented, and whether presented by God or
man, to regenerate the heart. Dr. Griffin, in his Park Street Lectures,
maintains that the gospel, in its natural and necessary tendency,
creates and perpetuates only opposition to, and hatred of God, until
the heart is changed by the Holy Spirit. He understands the carnal
mind to be not a voluntary state, not a minding of the flesh, but the
very nature and constitution of the mind; and that enmity against God
is a part, attribute, or appetite of the nature itself. Consequently, he
must deny the adaptability of the gospel to regenerate the soul. It has
been proclaimed by this class of theologians, times without number,
that there is no philosophical connection between the preaching of the
gospel and the regeneration of sinners, no adaptedness in the gospel
to produce that result; but, on the contrary, that it is adapted to
produce an opposite result. The favorite illustrations of their views
have been Ezekiel's prophesying over the dry bones, and Christ's
restoring sight to the blind man by putting clay on his eyes. Ezekiel's
prophesying over the dry bones had no tendency to quicken them,
they say. And the clay used by the Saviour was calculated rather to
destroy than to restore sight. This shows how easy it is for men to
adopt a pernicious and absurd philosophy, and then to find, or think
they find, it supported by the Bible. What must be the effect of
inculcating the dogma, that the gospel has nothing to do with
regenerating the sinner? Instead of telling him that regeneration is
nothing else than his embracing the gospel, to tell him that he must
wait, and first have his constitution recreated before he can possibly
do anything but oppose God! This is to tell him the greatest and most
abominable and ruinous of falsehoods. It is to mock his intelligence.
What! Call on him, on pain of eternal death, to believe; to embrace the
gospel; to love God with all his heart, and at the same time represent
him as entirely helpless, and constitutionally the enemy of God and of
the gospel, and as being under the necessity of waiting for God to
regenerate his nature, before it is possible for him to do otherwise than
to hate God with all his heart!
In regeneration the subject is both passive and active.
very nature of the change.
2. That he is, at the same time, passive, is plain from the fact that he
acts only when and as he is acted upon. That is he is passive in the
perception of the truth presented by the Holy Spirit. I know that this
perception is no part of regeneration. But it is simultaneous with
regeneration. It induces regeneration. It is the condition and the
occasion of regeneration. Therefore the subject of regeneration must
be a passive recipient or percipient of the truth presented by the Holy
Spirit, at the moment, and during the act of regeneration. The Spirit
acts upon him through or by the truth: thus far he is passive. He
closes with the truth: thus far he is active. What a mistake those
theologians have fallen into who represent the subject as altogether
passive in regeneration! This rids the sinner at once of the conviction
of any duty or responsibility about it. It is wonderful that such an
absurdity should have been so long maintained in the church. But
while it is maintained, it is no wonder that sinners are not converted to
God. While the sinner believes this, it is impossible, if he has it in
mind, that he should be regenerated. He stands and waits for God to
do what God requires him to do, and which no one can do for him.
Neither God, nor any other being, can regenerate him, if he will not
turn. If he will not change his choice, it is impossible that it should be
changed. Sinners who have been taught thus and have believed what
they have been taught, would never have been regenerated had not
the Holy Spirit drawn off their attention from this error, and ere they
were aware, induced them to close in with the offer of life.
What is implied in regeneration.
is a change of choice, or of intention. This must be instantaneous.
The preparatory work of conviction and enlightening the mind may
have been gradual and progressive. But when regeneration occurs, it
must be instantaneous.
2. It implies an entire present change of moral character, that is, a
change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness. We have seen that it
consists in a change from selfishness to benevolence. We have also
seen that selfishness and benevolence cannot coexist in the same
mind; that selfishness is a state of supreme and entire consecration to
self; that benevolence is a state of entire and supreme consecration to
God and the good of the universe. Regeneration, then, surely implies
an entire change of moral character.
Again: the Bible represents regeneration as a dying to sin and
becoming alive to God. Death in sin is total depravity. This is
generally admitted. Death to sin and becoming alive to God, must
imply entire present holiness.
3. The scriptures represent regeneration as the condition of salvation
in such a sense, that if the subject should die immediately after
regeneration, and without any further change, he would go
immediately to heaven.
Again: the scriptures require only perseverance in the first love, as
the condition of salvation, in case the regenerate soul should live long
in the world subsequently to regeneration.
4. When the scriptures require us to grow in grace, and in the
knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, this does not imply that there is
yet sin remaining in the regenerate heart which we are required to put
away by degrees. But the spirit of the requirement must be, that we
should acquire as much knowledge as we can of our moral relations,
and continue to conform to all truth as fast as we know it. This, and
nothing else, is implied in abiding in our first love, or abiding in Christ,
living and walking in the Spirit.
LECTURE 28
PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF REGENERATION
The principal theories that have been advocated, so far as my
knowledge extends, are the following:
This theory is based upon that view of mental philosophy which
regards the mental heart as identical with the sensibility. Moral
depravity, according to this school, consists in a constitutional relish,
taste, or craving for sin. They hold the doctrine of original sin of a
sinful nature or constitution, as was shown in my lectures on moral
depravity. The heart of the mind, in the estimation of this school, is not
identical with choice or intention. They hold that it does not consist in
any voluntary state of mind, but that it lies back of, and controls
voluntary action, or the actions of the will. The wicked heart,
according to them, consists in an appetency or constitutional taste for
sin, and with them, the appetites, passions, and propensities of human
nature in its fallen state, are in themselves sinful. They often illustrate
their ideas of the sinful taste, craving, or appetite for sin, by reference
to the craving of carnivorous animals for flesh.
A change of heart, in the view of this philosophy, must consist in a
change of constitution. It must be a physical change, and wrought by
a physical, as distinguished from a moral agency. It is a change
wrought by the direct and physical power of the Holy Spirit in the
constitution of the soul, changing its susceptibilities, implanting or
creating a new taste, relish, appetite, craving for, or love of, holiness.
It is, as they express it, the implantation of a new principle of holiness.
It is described as a creation of a new taste or principle, as an infusion
of a holy principle, etc. This scheme, of course, holds and teaches
that, in regeneration, the subject is entirely passive. With this school,
regeneration is exclusively the work of the Holy Spirit, the subject
having no agency in it. It is an operation performed upon him, may be,
while he is asleep, or in a fit of derangement, while he is entirely
passive, or perhaps when at the moment he is engaged in flagrant
rebellion against God. The agency by which this work is wrought,
according to them, is sovereign, irresistible, and creative. They hold
that there are of course no means of regeneration, as it is a direct act
of creation. They hold the distinction already referred to and
examined, between regeneration and conversion; that when the Holy
Spirit has performed the sovereign operation and implanted the new
principle, then the subject is active in conversion, or in turning to God.
They hold that the soul, in its very nature, is enmity against God; that
therefore the gospel has no tendency to regenerate or convert the soul
to God; but, on the contrary, that previous to regeneration by the
sovereign and physical agency of the Holy Spirit, every exhibition of
God made in the gospel, tends only to inflame and provoke this
constitutional enmity.
They hold, that when the sinful taste, relish, or craving for sin is
weakened, for they deny that it is ever wholly destroyed in this life, or
while the soul continues connected with the body, and a holy taste,
relish, or craving is implanted or infused by the Holy Spirit into the
constitution of the soul, then, and not till then, the gospel has a
tendency to turn or convert the sinner from the error of his ways.
As I have said, their philosophy of moral depravity is the basis of
their philosophy of regeneration. It assumes the dogma of original sin,
as taught in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, and attempts to
harmonize the philosophy of regeneration with that philosophy of sin,
or moral depravity.
Upon this scheme or theory of regeneration, I remark:
(1.) That it has been sufficiently refuted in the lectures on moral
depravity. If, as was then shown, moral depravity is altogether
voluntary, and consists in selfishness, or in a voluntary state of mind,
this philosophy of regeneration is of course without foundation.
(2.) It was shown in the lectures on moral depravity, that sin is not
chosen for its own sake, that there is no constitutional relish, taste, or
craving for sin, that in sinful choice, sin is not the end or object
chosen, but that self-gratification is chosen, and that this choice is
sinful. If this is so, then the whole philosophy of the taste scheme
turns out to be utterly baseless.
The taste, relish, or craving, of which this philosophy speaks, is not a
taste, relish or craving for sin, but for certain things and objects, the
enjoyment of which is, to a certain extent, and upon certain conditions,
lawful. But when the will prefers the gratification of taste or appetite to
higher interests, this choice or act of will is sin. The sin never lies in
the appetite, but in the will's consent to unlawful indulgence.
(3.) This philosophy confounds appetite or temptation to unlawful
indulgence, with sin. Nay, it represents sin as consisting mostly, if not
altogether, in that which is only temptation.
(4.) It throws the blame of unregeneracy upon God. If the sinner is
passive, and has no agency in it; if it consists in what this philosophy
teaches, and is accomplished in the manner which this theory
represents, it is self-evident that God alone is responsible for the fact,
that any sinner is unregenerate.
(5.) It renders holiness after regeneration physically necessary, just
as sin was before, and perseverance also as physically necessary,
and falling from grace as a natural impossibility. In this case holy
exercises and living are only the gratification of a constitutional
appetite, implanted in regeneration. Let us consider next:
2. The divine efficiency scheme or theory.
This scheme is based upon, or rather is only a carrying out of, an
ancient heathen philosophy, bearing the same name. This ancient
philosophy denies second causes, and teaches that what we call laws
of nature are nothing else than the mode of divine operation. It denies
that the universe would even exist for a moment, if the divine
upholding were withdrawn. It maintains that the universe exists only
by an act of present and perpetual creation. It denies that matter, or
mind, has in itself any inherent properties that can originate laws or
motions; that all action, whether of matter or mind, is the necessary
result of direct divine irresistible efficiency or power; that this is not
only true of the natural universe, but also of all the exercises and
actions of moral agents in all worlds.
The abettors of the divine efficiency scheme of regeneration apply
this philosophy especially to moral agents. They hold, that all the
exercises and actions of moral agents in all worlds, and whether those
exercises be holy or sinful, are produced by a divine efficiency, or by a
direct act of Omnipotence; that holy and sinful acts are alike effects of
an irresistible cause, and that this cause is the power and agency, or
efficiency, of God.
This philosophy denies constitutional moral depravity, or original sin,
and maintains that moral character belongs alone to the exercises or
choices of the will; that regeneration does not consist in the creation of
any new taste, relish, or craving, nor in the implantation or infusion of
any new principles in the soul: but that it consists in a choice
conformed to the law of God, or in a change from selfishness to
disinterested benevolence; that this change is effected by a direct act
of divine power or efficiency, as irresistible as any creative act
whatever. This philosophy teaches, that the moral character of every
moral agent, whether holy or sinful, is formed by an agency as direct,
as sovereign, and as irresistible, as that which first gave existence to
the universe; that true submission to God implies the hearty consent of
the will to have the character thus formed, and then to be treated
accordingly, for the glory of God.
To this theory I make the following objections:
(1.) It tends to produce and perpetuate a sense of divine injustice.
To create a character by an agency as direct and irresistible as that of
the creation of the world itself, and then treat moral beings according
to that character so formed, is wholly inconsistent with all our ideas of
justice.
(2.) It contradicts human consciousness. I know it is said, that
consciousness only gives our mental actions and states, but not the
cause of them. This I deny, and affirm that consciousness not only
gives us our mental actions and states, but it also gives us the cause
of them; especially it gives the fact, that we ourselves are the
sovereign and efficient causes of the choices and actions of our will I
am as conscious of originating in a sovereign manner my choices, as I
am of the choices themselves. We cannot but affirm to ourselves, that
we are the efficient causes of our own choices and volitions.
(3.) The philosophy in question, really represents God as the only
agent, in any proper sense of that term, in the universe. If God
produces the exercises of moral beings in the manner represented by
this philosophy, then they are in fact no more agents than the planets
are agents. If their exercises are all directly produced by the power of
God, it is ridiculous to call them agents. What we generally call moral
beings and moral agents, are no more so than the winds and the
waves, or any other substance or thing in the universe.
(4.) If this theory be true, no being but God has, or can have, moral
character. No other being is the author of his own actions.
(5.) This theory obliges its advocates, together with all other
necessitarians, to give a false and nonsensical definition of free
agency. Free agency, according to them, consists in doing as we will,
while their theory denies the power to will, except as our willings are
necessitated by God. But as we have seen in former lectures, this is
no true account of freedom, or liberty. Liberty to execute my choices
is no liberty at all. Choice is connected with its sequents by a law of
necessity; and if an effect follow my volitions, that effect follows by
necessity, and not freely. All freedom of will must, as was formerly
shown, consist in the sovereign power to originate our own choices. If
I am unable to will, I am unable to do any thing; and it is absurd to
affirm, that a being is a moral or a free agent, who has not power to
originate his own choices.
(6.) If this theory is true, the whole moral government of God is no
government at all, distinct from, and superior to, physical government.
It overlooks and virtually denies the fundamentally important distinction
between moral and physical power, and moral and physical
government. All power and all government, upon this theory, are
physical.
(7.) This theory involves the delusion of all moral beings. God not
only creates our volitions, but also creates the persuasion and
affirmation that we are responsible for them.
3. The susceptibility scheme.
This theory represents, that the Holy Spirit's influences are both
physical and moral; that He, by a direct and physical influence, excites
the susceptibilities of the soul and prepares them to be affected by the
truth; that He, thereupon, exerts a moral or persuasive influence by
presenting the truth, which moral influence induces regeneration.
This philosophy maintains the necessity and the fact of a physical
influence superadded to the moral or persuasive influence of the Holy
Spirit as a sine qua non of regeneration. It admits and maintains, that
regeneration is effected solely by a moral influence, but also that a
work preparatory to the efficiency of the moral influence, and
indispensable to its efficiency, in producing regeneration, is performed
by a direct and physical agency of the Holy Spirit upon the
constitutional susceptibilities of the soul, to quicken and wake it up,
and predispose it to be deeply and duly affected by the truth.
It is maintained by the defenders of this scheme, that the
representations of the Bible upon the subject of the Holy Spirit's
agency in regeneration, are such as to forbid the supposition, that His
influence is altogether moral or persuasive, and such as plainly to
indicate that He also exerts a physical agency, in preparing the mind
to be duly affected by the truth.
In reply to this argument, I observe: that I fear greatly to disparage
the agency of the Holy Spirit in the work of man's redemption from sin,
and would, by no means, resist or deny, or so much as call in
question, any thing time is plainly taught or implied in the Bible upon
this subject. I admit and maintain that regeneration is always induced
and effected by the personal agency of the Holy Spirit. The question
now before us relates wholly to the mode, and not at all to the fact, of
divine agency in regeneration. Let this be distinctly understood, for it
has been common for theologians of the old school, as soon as the
dogma of a physical regeneration, and of a physical influence in
regeneration, has been called in question, to cry out and insist that this
is Pelagianism, and that it is a denial of divine influence altogether,
and that it is teaching a self-regeneration, independent of any divine
influence. I have been ashamed of such representations as these on
the part of Christian divines, and have been distressed by their want of
candor. It should, however, be distinctly stated that, so far as I know,
the defenders of the theory now under consideration have never
manifested this want of candor toward those who have called in
question that part of their theory that relates to a physical influence.
Since the advocates of this theory admit that the Bible teaches that
regeneration is induced by a divine moral suasion, the point of debate
is simply, whether the Bible teaches that there is also a physical
influence exerted by the Holy Spirit, in exciting the constitutional
susceptibilities. We will now attend to their proof texts. "Then opened
He their understanding, that they might understand the scriptures"
(Luke 24:45). It is affirmed, that this text seems to teach or imply a
physical influence in opening their understandings. But what do we
mean by such language as this in common life? Language is to be
understood according to the subject matter of discourse. Here the
subject of discourse is the understanding. But what can be intended
by opening it? Can this be a physical prying, pulling, or forcing open
any department of the constitution? Such language in common life
would be understood only to mean, that such instruction was imparted
as to secure a right understanding of the scriptures. Every one knows
this, and why should we suppose and assume that anything more is
intended here? The context plainly indicates that this was the thing,
and the only thing done in this case. "Then He said unto them, O
fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!
Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His
glory? And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded
unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning Himself. And said
unto them, thus it is written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and
to rise from the dead the third day" (Luke 24:25-27, 46). From these
verses it appears that He expounded the scriptures to them, when in
the light of what had passed, and in the light of that measure of divine
illumination which was then imparted to them, they understood the
things which He explained to them. It does not seem to me, that this
passage warrants the inference that there was a physical influence
exerted. It certainly affirms no such thing. "And a certain woman
named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which
worshiped God, heard us; whose heart the Lord opened, that she
attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul"(Acts 16:14).
Here is an expression similar to that just examined. Here it is said,
"that the Lord opened the heart of Lydia, so that she attended," etc. ;
that is, the Lord inclined her to attend. But how? Why, say the
advocates of this scheme, by a physical influence. But how does this
appear? What is her heart that it should be pulled, or forced open?
And what can be intended by the assertion, "that the Lord opened her
heart?" All that can be meant is, that the Lord secured her attention,
or disposed her to attend, and so enlightened her when she did attend,
that she believed. Surely here is no assertion of a physical influence,
nor, so far as I can see, any just ground for the inference, that such an
influence was exerted. A moral influence can sufficiently explain all
the phenomena; and any text that can equally well consist with either
of two opposing theories, can prove neither.
Again: there are many passages that represent God as opening the
spiritual eyes, and passages in which petitions are offered to God to
do this. It is by this theory assumed that such passages strongly imply
a physical influence. But this assumption appears to me
unwarrantable. We are in the habit of using just such language, and
speak of opening each other's eyes, when no such thing is intended or
implied, as a physical influence, and when nothing more than a moral
or persuasive influence is so much as thought of. Why then resort to
such an assumption here? Does the nature of the case demand it?
This I know is contended for by those who maintain a constitutional
moral depravity. But this dogma has been shown to be false, and it is
admitted to be so by those who maintain the theory now under
consideration. Admitting, then, that the constitution is not morally
depraved, should it be inferred that any constitutional change, or
physical influence is needed to produce regeneration? I can see no
sufficient reason for believing, or affirming, that a physical influence is
demanded or exerted. This much I freely admit, that we cannot affirm
the impossibility of such an influence, nor the impossibility of the
necessity of such an influence. The only question with me is, does the
Bible plainly teach or imply such an influence? Hitherto I have been
unable to see that it does. The passages already quoted are of a
piece with all that are relied upon in support of this theory, and as the
same answer is a sufficient reply to them all, I will not spend time in
citing and remarking upon them.
Again: A physical influence has been inferred from the fact, that
sinners are represented as dead in trespasses and sins, as asleep,
etc. But all such representations are only declaratory of a moral state,
a state of voluntary alienation from God. If the death is moral, and the
sleep moral, why suppose that a physical influence is needed to
correct a moral evil? Cannot truth, when urged and pressed by the
Holy Spirit, effect the requisite change?
But a physical influence is also inferred from the fact, that truth
makes so different an impression at one time from what it does at
another. Answer: this can well enough be accounted for by the fact,
that sometimes the Holy Spirit so presents the truth, that the mind
apprehends it and feels its power, whereas at another time He does
not.
But it is said, that there sometimes appears to have been a
preparatory work performed by a physical influence predisposing the
mind to attend to, and be affected by, the truth. Answer: There often is
no doubt a preparatory work predisposing the mind to attend to, and
be affected by, truth. But why assume that this is a physical influence?
Providential occurrences may have had much to do with it. The Holy
Spirit may have been directing the thoughts and communicating
instructions in various ways, and preparing the mind to attend and
obey. Who then is warranted in the affirmation that this preparatory
influence is physical? I admit that it may be, but I cannot see either
that it must be, or that there is any good ground for the assumption
that it is.
4. The last theory to be examined is that of a Divine Moral Suasion.
This theory teaches:
(1.) That regeneration consists in a change in the ultimate intention
or preference of the mind, or in a change from selfishness to
disinterested benevolence; and:
(2.) That this change is induced and effected by a divine moral
influence; that is, that the Holy Spirit effects it with, through, or by the
truth. The advocates of this theory assign the following as the
principal reasons in support of it.
(1.) The Bible expressly affirms it. "Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I
say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he
cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh
is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:5, 6).
"Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the
word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever" (1 Peter 1:23). "Of His
own will begat He us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of
first-fruits of His creatures" (James 1:18). "For though ye have ten
thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers: for in
Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel" (1 Cor. 4:15).
(2.) Men are represented as being sanctified by and through the
truth. "Sanctify them through Thy truth: Thy word is truth" (John
17:17) "Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto
you" (John 15:3).
(3.) The nature of regeneration decides the philosophy of it so far as
this, that it must be effected by truth, addressed to the heart through
the intelligence. The regenerate are conscious of having been
influenced by the truth in turning to God. They are conscious of no
other influence than light poured upon the intelligence, or truth
presented to the mind.
When God affirms that He regenerates the soul with or by the truth,
we have no right to infer that He does it in some other way. This He
does affirm; therefore the Bible has settled the philosophy of
regeneration. That He exerts any other than a moral influence, or the
influence of divine teaching and illumination, is sheer assumption.
Remarks
God.
2. Regeneration by the Holy Spirit through the truth illustrates the
wisdom of God. There is a deep and divine philosophy in
regeneration.
3. This theory is of great practical importance. For if sinners are to
be regenerated by the influence of truth, argument, and persuasion,
then ministers can see what they have to do, and how it is that they
are to be "workers together with God" (2 Cor. 6:1).
4. So also sinners may see, that they are not to wait for a physical
regeneration or influence, but must submit to, and embrace, the truth,
if they ever expect to be saved.
5. If this theory is true, sinners are most likely to be regenerated
while sitting under the sound of the gospel, while listening to the clear
exhibition of truth.
6. Ministers should lay themselves out, and press every
consideration upon the attention of sinners, just as heartily and as
freely, as if they expected to convert them themselves. They should
aim at, and expect the regeneration of sinners, upon the spot and
before they leave the house of God.
7. Sinners must not wait for and expect physical omnipotence to
regenerate them. The physical omnipotence of God affords no
presumption that all men will be converted; for regeneration is not
effected by physical power. God cannot do the sinner's duty, and
regenerate him without the right exercise of the sinner's own agency.
8. This view of regeneration shows that the sinner's dependence
upon the Holy Spirit arises entirely out of his own voluntary
stubbornness, and that his guilt is all the greater, by how much the
more perfect this kind of dependence is.
9. Physical regeneration, under every modification of it, is a
stumbling-block. Original or constitutional sinfulness, physical
regeneration, and all their kindred and resulting dogmas, are alike
subversive of the gospel, and repulsive to the human intelligence; and
should be laid aside as relics of a most unreasonable and confused
philosophy.
LECTURE 29
EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION
Introductory remarks.
regeneration, we must constantly keep in mind what is not, and what is
regeneration; what is not, and what is implied in it.
2. We must constantly recognize the fact, that saints and sinners
have precisely similar constitutions and constitutional susceptibilities,
and therefore that many things are common to both. What is common
to both cannot, of course, be an evidence of regeneration.
3. That no state of the sensibility has any moral character in itself.
That regeneration does not consist in, or imply, any physical change
whatever, either of the intellect, sensibility, or the faculty of will.
4. That the sensibility of the sinner is susceptible of every kind and
degree of feeling that is possible to saints.
5. The same is true of the consciences of both saints and sinners,
and of the intelligence generally.
6. The inquiry is, What are evidences of a change in the ultimate
intention? What is evidence that benevolence is the ruling choice,
preference, intention of the soul? It is a plain question, and demands,
and may have, a plain answer. But so much error prevails as to the
nature of regeneration, and, consequently, as to what are evidences of
regeneration, that we need patience, discrimination, and
perseverance, and withal candor, to get at the truth upon this subject.
Wherein the experience and outward life of saints and sinners may
agree.
It is plain that they may be alike, in whatever does not consist in, or
necessarily proceed from, the attitude of their will; that is, in whatever
is constitutional or involuntary. For example:
constitutional, and, of course, common to both saints and sinners.
2. They may both desire the happiness of others. This also is
constitutional, and of course common to both saints and sinners.
There is no moral character in these desires, any more than there is in
the desire for food and drink. That men have a natural desire for the
happiness of others, is evident from the fact that they manifest
pleasure when others are happy, unless they have some selfish
reason for envy, or unless the happiness of others is in some way
inconsistent with their own. They also manifest uneasiness and pain
when they see others in misery, unless they have some selfish reason
for desiring their misery.
3. Saints and sinners may alike dread their own misery, and the
misery of others. This is strictly constitutional, and has therefore no
moral character. I have known that very wicked men, and men who
had been infidels, when they were convinced of the truths of
Christianity, manifested great concern about their families and about
their neighbors; and, in one instance, I heard of an aged man of this
description who, when convinced of the truth, went and warned his
neighbors to flee from the wrath to come, avowing at the same time
his conviction, that there was no mercy for him, though he felt deeply
concerned for others. Such like cases have repeatedly been
witnessed. The case of the rich man in hell seems to have been one
of this description, or to have illustrated the same truth. Although he
knew his own case to be hopeless, yet he desired that Lazarus should
be sent to warn his five brethren, lest they also should come to that
place of torment. In this case and in the case of the aged man just
named, it appears that they not only desired that others should avoid
misery, but they actually tried to prevent it, and used the means that
were within their reach to save them. Now it is plain that this desire
took control of their will, and, of course, the state of the will was selfish.
It sought to gratify desire. It was the pain and dread of seeing their
misery, and of having them miserable, that led them to use means to
prevent it. This was not benevolence, but selfishness.
Let it be understood, then, that as both saints and sinners
constitutionally desire, not only their own happiness, but also the
happiness of others, they may alike rejoice in the happiness and
safety of others, and in converts to Christianity, and may alike grieve
at the danger and misery of those who are unconverted. I well
recollect, when far from home, and while an impenitent sinner, I
received a letter from my youngest brother, informing me that he was
converted to God. He, if he was converted, was, as I supposed, the
first and the only member of the family who then had a hope of
salvation. I was at the time, and both before and after, one of the most
careless sinners, and yet on receiving this intelligence, I actually wept
for joy and gratitude, that one of so prayer less a family was likely to be
saved. Indeed, I have repeatedly known sinners to manifest much
interest in the conversion of their friends, and express gratitude for
their conversion, although they had no religion themselves. These
desires have no moral character in themselves. In as far as they
control the will, the will yielding to impulse instead of the law of the
intelligence, this is selfishness.
4. They may agree in desiring the triumph of truth and
righteousness, and the suppression of vice and error, for the sake of
the bearings of these things on self and friends. These desires are
constitutional and natural to both, under certain circumstances. When
they do not influence the will, they have in themselves no moral
character; but when they influence the will, their selfishness takes on a
religious type. It then manifests zeal in promoting religion. But if
desire, and not the intelligence, controls the will, it is selfishness
notwithstanding.
5. Moral agents constitutionally approve of what is right and
disapprove of what is wrong. Of course, both saints and sinners may
both approve of and delight in goodness. I can recollect weeping at an
instance of what, at the time, I supposed to be goodness, while at the
same time, I was not religious myself. I have no doubt that wicked
men, not only often are conscious of strongly approving the goodness
of God, but that they also often take delight in contemplating it. This is
constitutional, both as it respects the intellectual approbation, and also
as it respects the feeling of delight. It is a great mistake to suppose
that sinners are never conscious of feelings of complacency and
delight in the goodness of God. The Bible represents sinners as
taking delight in drawing near to Him. "Yet they seek Me daily, and
delight to know My ways, as a nation that did righteousness, and
forsook not the ordinance of their God: they ask of Me the ordinances
of justice; they take delight in approaching to God" (Isaiah 58:2). "And
lo, Thou art unto them as a very lovely song of one that hath a
pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear Thy
words, but they do them not" (Ezek. 33:32). "For I delight in the law of
God after the inward man" (Romans 7:22).
6. Saints and sinners may alike not only intellectually approve, but
have feelings of deep complacency in, the characters of good men,
sometimes good men of their own time and of their acquaintance, but
more frequently good men either of a former age, or, if of their own
age, of a distant country. The reason is this: good men of their own
day and neighborhood are very apt to render them uneasy in their
sins; to annoy them by their faithful reproofs and rebukes. This
offends them, and overcomes their natural respect for goodness. But
who has not observed the fact, that good and bad men unite in
praising, admiring, and loving, so far as feeling is concerned good
men of by-gone days, or good men at a distance, whose life and
rebukes have annoyed the wicked in their own neighborhood? The
fact is, that moral agents, from the laws of their being necessarily
approve of goodness wherever they witness it. Multitudes of sinners
are conscious of this, and suppose that this is a virtuous feeling. It is
of no use to deny, that they sometimes have feelings of love and
gratitude to God, and of respect for, and complacency in good men.
They often have these feelings, and to represent them as always
having feelings of hatred and of opposition to God and to good men, is
sure either to offend them, or to lead them to deny the truths of
religion, if they are told that the Bible teaches this. Or, again, it may
lead them to think themselves Christians, because they are conscious
of such feelings as they are taught to believe are peculiar to
Christians. Or again, they may think that, although they are not
Christians, yet they are far from being totally depraved, inasmuch as
they have so many good desires and feelings. It should never be
forgotten, that saints and sinners may agree in their opinions and
intellectual views and judgments. Many professors of religion, it is to
be feared, have supposed religion to consist in desires and feelings,
and have entirely mistaken their own character. Indeed, nothing is
more common than to hear religion spoken of as consisting altogether
in mere feelings, desires, and emotions. Professors relate their
feelings, and suppose themselves to be giving an account of their
religion. It is infinitely important, that both professors of religion and
non-professors, should understand more than most of them do of their
mental constitution, and of the true nature of religion. Multitudes of
professors of religion have, it is to be feared, a hope founded
altogether upon desires and feelings that are purely constitutional, and
therefore common to both saints and sinners.
7. Saints and sinners agree in this, that they both disapprove of, and
are often disgusted with, and deeply abhor, sin. They cannot but
disapprove of sin. Necessity is laid upon every moral agent, whatever
his character may be, by the law of his being, to condemn and
disapprove of sin. And often the sensibility of sinners, as well as of
saints, is filled with deep disgust and loathing in view of sin. I know
that representations the direct opposite of these are often made.
Sinners are represented as universally having complacency in sin, as
having a constitutional craving for sin, as they have for food and drink.
But such representations are false and most injurious. They contradict
the sinner's consciousness, and lead him either to deny his total
depravity, or to deny the Bible, or to think himself regenerate. As was
shown when upon the subject of moral depravity, sinners do not love
sin for its own sake; yet they crave other things, and this leads to
prohibited indulgence, which indulgence is sin. But it is not the
sinfulness of the indulgence that was desired. That might have
produced disgust and loathing in the sensibility, if it had been
considered even at the moment of the indulgence. For example:
suppose a licentious man, a drunkard, a gambler, or any other wicked
man, engaged in his favorite indulgence, and suppose that the
sinfulness of this indulgence should be strongly set before his mind by
the Holy Spirit. He might be deeply ashamed and disgusted with
himself, and so much so as to feel a great contempt for himself, and
feel almost ready, were it possible, to spit in his own face. And yet,
unless this feeling becomes more powerful than the desire and feeling
which the will is seeking to indulge, the indulgence will be persevered
in, notwithstanding this disgust. If the feeling of disgust should for the
time overmatch the opposing desire, the indulgence will be, for the
time being, abandoned for the sake of gratifying or appeasing the
feeling of disgust. But this is not virtue. It is only a change in the form
of selfishness. Feeling still governs, and not the law of the
intelligence. The indulgence is only abandoned for the time being, to
gratify a stronger impulse of the sensibility. The will, will of course
return to the indulgence again, when the feelings of fear, disgust, or
loathing subside. This, no doubt, accounts for the multitudes of
spurious conversions sometimes witnessed. Sinners are convicted,
fears awakened, and disgust and loathing excited. These feelings for
the time become stronger than their desires for their former
indulgences, and consequently they abandon them for a time, in
obedience, not to the law of God or of their intelligence, but in
obedience to their fear, disgust, and shame. But when conviction
subsides, and the consequent feelings are no more, these spurious
converts "return like a dog to his vomit, and like a sow that was
washed to her wallowing in the mire" (2 Peter 2:22). It should be
distinctly understood, that all these feelings of which I have spoken,
and indeed any class or degree of mere feelings, may exist in the
sensibility; and further, that these or any other feelings may, in their
turn, control the will, and produce of course a corresponding outward
life, and yet the heart be and remain all the while in a selfish state, or
in a state of total depravity. Indeed, it is perfectly common to see the
impenitent sinner manifest much disgust and opposition to sin in
himself and in others, yet this is not principle in him; it is only the effect
of present feeling. The next day, or perhaps hour, he will repeat his
sin, or do that which, when beheld in others, enkindled his indignation.
8. Both saints and sinners approve of, and often delight in, justice. It
is common to see in courts of justice, and on various other occasions,
impenitent sinners manifest great complacency in the administration of
justice, and the greatest indignation at, and abhorrence of, injustice.
So strong is this feeling sometimes that it cannot be restrained, but will
burst forth like a smothered volcano, and carry desolation before it. It
is this natural love of justice, and abhorrence of injustice, common
alike to saints and sinners, to which popular tumults and bloodshed
are often to be ascribed. This is not virtue, but selfishness. It is the
will giving itself up to the gratification of a constitutional impulse. But
such feelings and such conduct are often supposed to be virtuous. It
should always be borne in mind that the love of justice, and the sense
of delight in it, and the feeling of opposition to injustice, are not only
not peculiar to good men, but that such feelings are no evidence
whatever of a regenerate heart. Thousands of instances might be
adduced as proofs and illustrations of this position. But such
manifestations are too common to need to be cited, to remind any one
of their existence.
9. The same remarks may be made in regard to truth. Both saints
and sinners have a constitutional respect for, approbation of, and
delight in truth. Who ever knew a sinner to approve of the character of
a liar? What sinner will not resent it, to be accused or even suspected
of lying? All men spontaneously manifest their respect for,
complacency in, and approbation of truth. This is constitutional; so
that even the greatest liars do not, and cannot, love lying for its own
sake. They lie to gratify, not a love for falsehood on its own account,
but to obtain some object which they desire more strongly than they
hate falsehood. Sinners, in spite of themselves, venerate, respect,
and fear a man of truth. They just as necessarily despise a liar. If
they are liars, they despise themselves for it, just as drunkards and
debauchees despise themselves for indulging their filthy lusts, and yet
continue in them.
10. Both saints and sinners not only approve of, and delight in good
men, when, as I have said, wicked men are not annoyed by them, but
they agree in reprobating, disapproving, and abhorring wicked men
and devils. Who ever heard of any other sentiment and feeling being
expressed either by good or bad men, than of abhorrence and
indignation toward the devil? Nobody ever approved, or can approve,
of his character; sinners can no more approve of it than holy angels
can. If he could approve of and delight in his own character, hell
would cease to be hell, and evil would become his good. But no moral
agent can, by any possibility, know wickedness and approve it. No
man, saint or sinner, can entertain any other sentiments and feelings
toward the devil, or wicked men, but those of disapprobation, distrust,
disrespect, and often of loathing and abhorrence. The intellectual
sentiment will be uniform. Disapprobation, distrust, condemnation, will
always necessarily possess the minds of all who know wicked men
and devils. And often, as occasions arise, wherein their characters
are clearly revealed, and under circumstances favorable to such a
result, the deepest feelings of disgust, of loathing, of indignation, and
abhorrence of their wickedness, will manifest themselves alike among
saints and sinners.
11. Saints and sinners may be equally honorable and fair in business
transactions, so far as the outward act is concerned. They have
different reasons for their conduct, but outwardly it may be the same.
This leads to the remark:
12. That selfishness in the sinner, and benevolence in the saint,
may, and often do, produce, in many respects, the same results or
manifestations. For example: benevolence in the saint, and
selfishness in the sinner, may beget the same class of desires, to wit,
as we have seen, desire for their own sanctification, and for that of
others, to be useful, and to have others so; desires for the conversion
of sinners, and many such like desires.
13. This leads to the remark, that, when the desires of an impenitent
person for these objects become strong enough to influence the will,
he may take the same outward course, substantially, that the saint
takes in obedience to his intelligence. That is, the sinner is
constrained by his feelings to do what the saint does from principle, or
from obedience to the law of his intelligence. In this, however,
although the outward manifestations be the same for the time being,
yet the sinner is entirely selfish, and the saint benevolent. The saint is
controlled by principle, and the sinner by impulse. In this case, time is
needed to distinguish between them. The sinner not having the root of
the matter in him, will return to his former course of life, in proportion
as his convictions of the truth and importance of religion subside, and
his former feelings return; while the saint will evince his heavenly birth,
by manifesting his sympathy with God, and the strength of principle
that has taken possession of his heart. That is, he will manifest that
his intelligence, and not his feelings, controls his will.
For want of these and such like discriminations, many have
stumbled. Hypocrites have held on to a false hope, and lived upon
mere constitutional desires and spasmodic turns of giving up the will,
during seasons of special excitement, to the control of these desires
and feelings. These spasms they call their waking up. But no sooner
does their excitement subside, than selfishness again assumes its
wonted forms. It is truly wonderful and appalling to see to what an
extent this is true. Because, in seasons of special excitement they feel
deeply, and are conscious of feeling, as they say, and acting, and of
being entirely sincere in following their impulses, they have the fullest
confidence in their good estate. They say they cannot doubt their
conversion. They felt so and so, and gave themselves up to their
feelings, and gave much time and money to promote the cause of
Christ. Now this is a deep delusion, and one of the most common in
Christendom, or at least one of the most common that is to be found
among what are called revival Christians. This class of deluded souls
do not see that they are, in such cases, governed by their feelings,
and that if their feelings were changed, their conduct would be so, of
course; that as soon as the excitement subsides, they will go back to
their former ways, as a thing of course. When the state of feeling that
now controls them has given place to their former feelings, they will of
course appear as they used to do. This is, in few words, the history of
thousands of professors of religion.
This has greatly stumbled the openly impenitent. Not knowing how
to account for what they often witness of this kind among professors of
religion, they are led to doubt whether there is any such thing as true
religion.
Again: many sinners have been deceived just in the way I have
pointed out, and have afterwards discovered that they had been
deluded, but could not understand how. They have come to the
conclusion that everybody is deluded, and that all professors are as
much deceived they are. This leads them to reject and despise all
religion.
Some exercises of impenitent sinners, and of which they are
conscious, have been denied for fear of denying total depravity. They
have been represented as necessarily hating God and all good men;
and this hatred has been represented as a feeling of malice and
enmity towards God. Many impenitent sinners are conscious of
having no such feelings; but, on the contrary, they are conscious of
having at times feelings of respect, veneration, awe, gratitude, and
affection towards God and men. To this class of sinners, it is a snare
and a stumbling-block to tell them, and insist, that they only hate God,
and Christians, and ministers, and revivals; and to represent their
moral depravity to be such, that they crave sin as they crave food, and
that they necessarily have none but feelings of mortal enmity against
God. Such representations either drive them into infidelity on the one
hand, or to think themselves Christians on the other. But those
theologians who hold the views of constitutional depravity of which we
have spoken, cannot, consistently with their theory, admit to these
sinners the real truth, and then show them conclusively that in all their
feelings which they call good, and in all their yielding to be influenced
by them, there is no virtue; that their desires and feelings have in
themselves no moral character, and that when they yield the will to
their control, it is only selfishness. The thing needed is a philosophy
and a theology that will admit and explain all the phenomena of
experience, and not deny human consciousness. A theology that
denies human consciousness is only a curse and a stumbling-block.
But such is the doctrine of universal constitutional moral depravity.
It is frequently true, that the feelings of sinners become exceedingly
rebellious and exasperated, even to the most intense opposition of
feeling toward God, and Christ, and ministers, and revivals, and
toward everything of good report. If this class of sinners are
converted, they are very apt to suppose, and to represent all sinners
as having just such feelings as they had. But this is a mistake, for
many sinners never had those feelings. Nevertheless, they are no
less selfish and guilty than the class who have the rebellious and
blasphemous feelings which I have mentioned. This is what they need
to know. They need to understand definitely what sin is, and what it is
not; that sin is selfishness; that selfishness is the yielding of the will to
the control of feeling, and that it matters not at all what the particular
class of feelings is, if feelings control the will, and not intelligence.
Admit their good feelings, as they call them, and take pains to show
them, that these feelings are merely constitutional, and have in
themselves no moral character.
The ideas of depravity and of regeneration, to which I have often
alluded, are fraught with great mischief in another respect. Great
numbers, it is to be feared, both of private professors of religion and of
ministers, have mistaken the class of feelings of which I have spoken,
as common among certain impenitent sinners, for religion. They have
heard the usual representations of the natural depravity of sinners,
and also have heard certain desires and feelings represented as
religion. They are conscious of these desires and feelings, and also,
sometimes, when they are very strong, of being influenced in their
conduct by them. They assume, therefore, that they are regenerate,
and elected, and heirs of salvation. These views lull them asleep.
The philosophy and theology that misrepresent moral depravity and
regeneration thus, must, if consistent, also misrepresent true religion;
and oh! the many thousands that have mistaken the mere
constitutional desires and feelings, and the selfish yielding of the will to
their control for true religion, and have gone to the bar of God with a lie
in their right hand!
Another great evil has arisen out of the false views I have been
exposing, namely:
Many true Christians have been much stumbled and kept in
bondage, and their comfort and their usefulness much abridged, by
finding themselves, from time to time, very languid and unfeeling.
Supposing religion to consist in feeling, if at any time the sensibility
becomes exhausted, and their feelings subside, they are immediately
thrown into unbelief and bondage. Satan reproaches them for their
want of feeling, and they have nothing to say, only to admit the truth of
his accusations. Having a false philosophy of religion, they judge of
the state of their hearts by the state of their feelings. They confound
their hearts with their feelings, and are in almost constant perplexity to
keep their hearts right, by which they mean their feelings, in a state of
great excitement.
Again: they are not only sometimes languid, and have no pious
feelings and desires, but at others they are conscious of classes of
emotions which they call sin. These they resist, but still blame
themselves for having them in their hearts, as they say. Thus they are
brought into bondage again, although they are certain that these
feelings are hated, and not at all indulged, by them.
Oh, how much all classes of persons need to have clearly defined
ideas of what really constitutes sin and holiness! A false philosophy of
the mind, especially of the will, and of moral depravity, has covered
the world with gross darkness on the subject of sin and holiness, of
regeneration, and of the evidences of regeneration, until the true
saints, on the one hand, are kept in a continual bondage to their false
notions; and on the other, the church swarms with unconverted
professors, and is cursed with many self-deceived ministers.
Please go back one page to get the next section.
FIRES OF REVIVAL
http://www.concentric.net/~fires/
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