Flavius Josephus

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PATRON-CLIENT DYNAMICS
IN FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS' VITA:
A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS.

Thesis submitted to the Department of Religious
Studies, University of Ottawa, October 1991, in
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts, Religious Studies.

Submitted by:
Michael Strangelove

Flavius Josephus

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ABSTRACT

Throughout history, Flavius Josephus has been the victim of character assassinations carried out by Jews, Christians and modern scholars alike. This thesis uses the methodology of social scientific analysis to compile a model of patron-client relations from the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political science, and ancient history. This eclectic model is then applied to Josephus' autobiography, the Vita, in an effort to arrive at a culturally sensitive understanding of the social personality of Josephus as a patron of the Galileans. Patron-client dynamics are uncovered in four groups of relational encounters; (1) Josephus, Poppea Sabina and Aliturus; (2) Josephus and John of Gischala; (3) Josephus and the Galileans; and (4) Josephus and Vespasian, Titus, Domitian and Epaphroditus. The results of this modelling process are contrasted against the results of the dominant historical methodology, with particular attention being given to the conclusions of Shaye J.D. Cohen's Josephus in Galilee and Rome: His Vita and Development as a Historian, (Leiden: Brill, 1979). It is demonstrated that patron-client relations are a significant factor within the Vita and the application of a model of patron-client relations serves to eliminate ethnocentric judgements that have been erroneously applied to both the text and its author.

PREFACE

This thesis has grown out of an earlier article, "Honour and Patronage in Josephus' Vita (1-103): An Analysis of Ancient Mediterranean Cultural Concerns and Their Role in Interpretation," (M. Strangelove, 1990, unpublished). The process of exploring Mediterranean honour, patronage and social prominence themes convinced me that the unique cultural concerns of the ancient Mediterranean that are embedded in the Vita are the key to its interpretation. A brief survey of the literature surrounding Josephus also revealed that a social-scientific commentary of the Vita is desperately needed. Thus this work as the beginning of of a larger commentary that departs from the tired agenda of Josephan studies. Here the focus is on the wealth of anthropological dynamics that Josephus has captured in his autobiography (indeed, where better can we be confronted with an alien society than through a text that tries to explain an alien self?).
If there is any insight in this work, if it has anything of value to add to the field, this is so largely because of the past six years that I have spent under the gentle and creative guidance of Professor Carl Kazmierski here at the University of Ottawa. The errors, over-generalizations and wild inaccuracies are my own unique contribution. I have also my ever loving wife, Natalie Strangelove, to thank for her constant encouragement, invaluable insights, and longsuffering patience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACTii
PREFACEiii
LIST OF DIAGRAMSvi
ABBREVIATIONSvii

PART ONE I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

A. THE ISSUES 1
B. THESIS STATEMENT 6

PART TWO II. METHODOLOGY

A. THE LIMITS OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM 9

B. THE BASIS OF CROSS-DISCIPLINARY METHODOLOGY13
1. Meaning and Texts14
2. Models15

C. THE CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF PATRON-CLIENT DYNAMICS
1. The History of a Concept20
2. Eisenstadt and Roniger's Model of Basic Characteristics22
3. An Expansion of Eisenstadt and Roniger's Model28
a. Generalized Exchange29
b. Power and Oppression31
c. Structure Versus Ideology35
d. The Role of Brokers36

D. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY43

PART THREE III. FOUR TEST CASES

A. JOSEPHUS, ALITURUS AND POPPEA SABINA46
1. Indications of Patronage in the Roman Embassy (V 13-16)47
2. Aliturus the Broker50
3. Poppea Sabina the Patron51
4. A Response to Intuitive Analysis54
5. Summary56

B. JOSEPHUS AND JOHN b. LEVI OF GISCHALA
1. Josephus and the Jerusalem Coalition of 66-67 C.E.60
2. Josephus and John as Faction Members63
3. Excursus: Shaye J.D. Cohen on Josephus and John66
4. Competition for the Loyalty of the Tiberians68
5. John Gains the Loyalty of Gabara69
6. Summary71

C. JOSEPHUS AND THE GALILEANS
1. Josephus Initiates the Patron-Client Relation74
2. Indications of the Galileans as Clients of Josephus 80
3. Summary84
D. JOSEPHUS AS THE CLIENT OF THE EMPERORS (V 414-430)88

IV. CONCLUSIONS91

APPENDIX I The Mediterranean Personality99
APPENDIX II Characteristics of Mediterranean Biography102
APPENDIX III Other Clients of Poppea Sabina104

BIBLIOGRAPHY106

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

1. Variable and Invariable Factors26
2. Factors that Mitigate Exploitation35
3. Brokerage in Antiquity42
4. Summary of Patron-Client Dynamics45
5. Patron-Client Dynamics Within the Embassy to Rome49
6. The Jerusalem-Galilee Networks62
7. Factors that Mitigated the Exploitation of the Galileans84
8. Cross-Cultural Comparison of Story Telling (Biography)102-103

ABBREVIATIONS

AJ Antiquitates Judaicae
ANRW Aufstieg und Niedergang der ršmischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase, Berlin- New York: de Gruyter, 1972-
BJ Bellum Judaicum
BTB Biblical Theology Bulletin
Compendia Compendia Rerum Judaicarum ad Novum Testamentum, Section Two, Vol. II V Vita

PART ONE
I. General Introduction

I. A. The Issues

Flavius Josephus, also known as Joseph ben Matthia, is widely recognized as our most important source for the history of the Jewish people from the time of Herod the Great to the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Born in Jerusalem c. 3738 C.E. during the first year of the reign of the Emperor Gaius Caligula, Josephus lived a life of considerable drama. At the age of twentyseven he was chosen to go as an ambassador to rescue some priests who had been sent to Rome on a "slight and trifling charge" (V 13). Upon return he was commissioned as a general to govern Galilee during the revolt of 6674 C.E. Josephus surrendered to the Roman general Vespasian at Jotapata and was taken with the Roman army to witness the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple. He then spent the rest of his years in Rome as a historiographer for the Imperial household. His extant works consist of the Jewish War, the Jewish Antiquities, an apologetic tract, Against Apion, and his autobiography, Life, also known as the Vita (V). The time and place of his death is unknown. He probably died sometime early in the second century C.E.
While his writings are the centre of renewed intense analysis and speculation, Josephus the man remains shrouded by the mists of time. He has been "ignored by his own people, almost canonized by the Christians, and vilified and exploited by modern historians." One recent example of the contempt which scholars have exhibited towards Josephus is seen in Shaye J.D. Cohen's statement, "it would have been an extraordinary feat for Josephus to record the unvarnished truth about anything." Indeed, it was upon reading Cohen's ethnocentric and highly sceptical analysis, Josephus in Galilee and Rome: His Vita and Development as a Historian, (Leiden: Brill, 1979) that I was drawn to investigate the question of Josephus' personality, which Cohen habitually vilifies. An example of Cohen's ethnocentric treatment of Josephus is seen in his use of the concept of vanity as an explanation of Josephus' behaviour towards John of Gischala (see below, II. B.3).
This study will seek to answer questions surrounding Josephus' personality through an analysis of his autobiography. Our analysis will use one of the primary social scripts of the ancient Mediterranean, patron-client relations, to answer the question - what was the central aspect of Josephus' social personality from the perspective of his culture? The main theme of V is concerned with a defense of Josephus' character as an honourable patron. Within the social context of this defense we come to understand the most important aspect of his character, as defined by his social environment.
The question of Josephus' character involves one of the more complex issues surrounding V, that of the literary unity of the work itself. Cohen claims that "no dominant theme can be discovered that would unite the autobiography's disparate elements." But is this apparent lack of literary unity due to Josephus' supposed literary ineptitude or is it due to the way in which ancient texts captured the anthropology of the first century Mediterranean personality? In Josephus, Cohen is clearly confused on the issue of Josephus' character. On the one hand he claims that Josephus "did not draw attention to his own character" yet only a few pages later Cohen turns around and states that "V's defense of Josephus' character is so strident that it must be an end in itself, not just an element in a self portrait." This confusion arises out of an intuitive use of the concept "personality." The question of Josephus' personality (character) appears to be treated by Cohen as if it were a simple and comparable phenomenon that consists of cultural universals. But what if Josephus' character is in fact a culturally-specific, social construct that must be measured and judged according to the terms of his culture? Within Josephus we find no indication that personality itself is a cultural construct and therefore must be judged according to the criteria of the culture in question.
It is unlikely that any analysis that overlooks a central cultural script could penetrate implicit (i.e., intuitively understood by its first readers) themes embedded within a text. If it is largely implicit and culturally specific concerns that provide
the framework of V, then questions of its literary unity and the personality of its author must begin with the modelling of the major aspects of Josephus' cultural situation. As patronage is the dominant mode of relationship in antiquity, it should come as no surprise that any analysis of V, an autobiography that is filled with sketches of various relationships, will miss the dominant literary-cultural theme of the text - patronage. This thesis will provide an indication of how V is indeed united through the constant but implicit cultural concerns of patron-client relations and how these relations in turn define Josephus' character in V.
Frequently, Josephus has been accused of flagrantly displaying sloppiness, confusion, ambition and vanity in V. Yet it is our contention that these accusations of literary ineptitude and personality flaws are in essence actually culturallydetermined value judgements. Judgements which arise when modern scholars apply anachronistic and culturally inappropriate criteria and standards to an ancient Mediterranean author. We will demonstrate how knowledge of the dynamics of patron-client relations serves to control and correct such anachronistic judgements.
Moehring has rightly observed that "Religious and political prejudices have coloured the understanding of Josephus." Yet it also must be said that academic and cultural biases have also led us to judge Josephus, not on his own, but on our terms. For example, the alien culture of Roman Palestine and the historians' own cultural transference must be carefully considered before it can be stated that "V's incoherence is so great that the general impression left with the reader is confusion and obfuscation." What Cohen and many other scholars fail to realize is that an ancient text such as V must necessarily appear as incoherent to us as does the alien cultural context that generated the work. To assume otherwise is to suggest that Josephus' social context was equivalent to our own.
While no one would disagree that Josephus' social context was different from that of contemporary experience, the question of just exactly how different it was has not yet been fully mapped out. Socialscientific analysis is build upon the understanding that the ancient world was radically different from our own social construction of reality. This thesis represents part of the larger enterprise of clearly delineating the degree of cultural separation that exists between the present and our Graeco-Roman past. It is the aim of this thesis to rescue Josephus from pervasive cultural transference and provide the researcher with the necessary anthropological framework from which to analyze the ancient Mediterranean text known to us as the Vita. The task that lies before us is comparable to what Bronislaw Malinowski saw as the final goal of ethnography, "to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world (sic)."

I. B. Thesis Statement

David B. Gowler has noted that characters in an ancient text can often seem "virtually incomprehensible" when they are read without a clear understanding of the "cultural processes" captured within the text. This thesis will demonstrate that V must be read with an explicit model of one of the main "cultural processes" embedded in the text - that of patron-client relations. We will proceed by delineating a model of patron-client dynamics and then this model will be applied against four groups of relational encounters that Josephus describes within V: (1) Josephus, Poppea Sabina and Aliturus; (2) Josephus and the Galileans; (3) Josephus and John of Gischala; and (4) Josephus and Vespasian, Titus, Domitian and Epaphroditus. The intentions, or purposes, behind using a model of patron client-dynamics in our analysis are as follows:
(1) first, and foremost, to arrive at a reading of the text that can be said to approximate the way in which it would have been understood by its first readers

(2) to determine if the model provides cross-cultural insights into Josephus social personality and to test the model itself
(3) to frame new questions and discover significant facts previously overlooked
(4) to provide a new way of answering some old questions.

Thus our thesis statement is that patron-client dynamics are a significant factor within V and the application of an appropriate model of this cultural script greatly increases our understanding of both the text and its author, Flavius Josephus. Through the application of a model of patron-client relations, it will be shown that Josephus interacted with Poppea Sabina, Aliturus, the Galileans, John of Gischala and the emperors from within the context of a patron-client social system. It also will be demonstrated that the script of patron-client relations plays a primary role in defining and explaining Josephus' social personality. Finally, it will be suggested, based on our application of the model to the above four test cases, that V is unified by the constant theme of patron-client relations.
This will be demonstrated along the following lines: first, the dominant historical method's inability to analyze the inherent Mediterranean cultural patterns of communication, characterization and interaction, which are embedded in V, will be discussed (II.A). Having demonstrated the need for a supplementary method of interpretation, a justification for the use of Mediterranean cultural anthropology and related disciplines will be given (II.B). Having prepared the broad methodological framework for a crosscultural and crossdisciplinary analysis, a model of the cultural dynamics of patronclient relations will be developed (II.C). This will provide the comprehensive methodology needed to proceed with a crossdisciplinary analysis.
Part Three will apply the model outlined in Part Two to the text of V in the demonstration of our thesis. Here the text's inherent cultural script of patron-client relations will be made explicit and its interpretive implications will be developed. Throughout the analysis it will be shown that a culturally sensitive reading both explains what was previously incomprehensible and challenges and corrects the culturallybiased conclusions of intuitive historical research.

PART TWO
II. METHODOLOGY

II. A. The Limits of Historical Criticism

The interpretation of the Vita usually takes the form of a complicated process that involves second guessing Josephus in an effort to discover what `really' happened in the events he records. This process applies the criteria of the modern historian to Josephus and measures him according to our standards of selfdescription and eyewitness reporting of events. A considerable amount of Josephan scholarship follows the methodology of historical research as it was developed in the 19th century. This methodology, which is still dominant in classical and biblical research, saw its primary aim as the description of "what really happened" in the past. This was realized by the historian's discovery of "new facts" and the elimination of error by the exercise of "Historical Criticism." Historical Criticism continues to mean the marshalling and interpretation of data in terms of the historian's imaginative faculties and individual genius.
Norman K. Gottwald has pointed out that the limitations of HistoricalCriticism have resulted in a "revolt" against the tyranny of narrow methods which, he claims, are bankrupt. As with biblical studies, a large portion of Josephan scholarship is hardly more than `commentaries on commentaries' characterized by the constant return to unresolved questions that are approached through implicit methodologies that have undergone little change. Seldom, if ever, have modern scholars sought to find the internal cultural logic of V which would render it perfectly reasonable and intelligible to its first century elite readers. It is this cultural logic which this thesis seeks to find, a logic which is very different and perhaps irreconcilable to our own cultural logic of modern existence.
The limited extend of Historical Criticism's ability to free itself of cultural (i.e., religious, political, academic and scientific) bias is slowly being recognized in the field of biblical research. Likewise, knowledge of new methods is only just beginning to come to the attention of scholars of antiquity. This general inability to free interpretation from gross ethnocentricity has its roots in Troeltsch's principle of similarity which is widely, if unknowingly, held we assume that the experience of the past and our own contemporary experience of reality is fundamentally similar. Historical research which proceeds under the principle of similarity assumes that the past can be intuitively understood because "we" and "they" are largely the same. If a historian does not make use of explicit models of Josephus' social world then she or he is probably operating with the principle of similarity and unknowingly using implicit social models of contemporary experience. According to Bengt Holmberg, by 1970 this, in combination with the failure of the form critical method, lead to a "fifty-year deficit on social history and sociological perspectives" in New Testament and related studies. Indeed, according to scholars of this persuasion, much of current and past historical research into the events surrounding the beginnings of Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism is so culturebound that our interpretation of the past often reveals more about ourselves than the objects of our inquiry.
Having noted the limitations of Historical Criticism, it still should be recognized that the enterprise of social scientific analysis does not ignore the fruits of past labour, but enters into a continuing conversation with more traditional critical scholarship. The continued engagement of Historical Criticism is seen in such works as Jerome H. Neyrey's An Ideology of Revolt: John's Christology in Social Scientific Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) and Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey's Calling Jesus Names: The Social Value of Labels in Matthew (Sonoma: California, 1988). Both of these works apply various models from cultural anthropology to texts that have undergone redaction criticism in preparation for the modelling process. Social scientific criticism is best used as a suppliment, and not a replacement of, Historical Criticism.
As will be explicated, the following interpretation of V is based upon the delineation of the great degree of existential difference which exists between us in our contemporary experience and Josephus in his own culturally defined experience. This will be effected through the explicit presentation and use of a patron-client model. Our analysis will go `behind' questions of "what really happened" and take the missed step of intuitive historical research. James D.G. Dunn identifies this missed step of interpretation as the first principle of exegesis the discovery of the "historical context of meaning". Discovering this context involves asking: what the writer intended his first readers to hear that also means what he could have expected his readers to understand by the language he used, given the way words and concepts were understood individually and in combination within the broader context of thought at that time and within the particular context of the situation in which or for which the text was written.
This is to say that, first and foremost, our task is to discover the inherent cultural meanings in V and ultimately understand the text from the perspective of its first elite Mediterranean readers. This "penultimate" step to cross-cultural understanding appears to be largely bypassed in the mad rush to separate "truth" from "propaganda" in V and leads to a scholarly construct of what we think happened in Josephus' life. Yet our scholarly constructs leave largely unanswered the question of how Josephus' readers would have perceived the events as he recorded them. Our primary concern here is with what Josephus was trying to communicate to his readers and what they would have been likely to understand. We therefore are freed from the pervasive methodological scepticism which dismisses as irrelevant everything that is judged as fiction and judges all as fiction until proven otherwise. As will be shown, this "guilty until proven innocent" approach to ancient texts is prone to missing much of the author's intended meanings.

II. B. The Basis of CrossDisciplinary Methodology

After reviewing the limits of Historical Criticism, Augustine Stock concluded his survey by raising the question:
can the method be improved, supplemented by other methods, or replaced by a better? Is there a method that anyone could apply to any text whatever without falling into the excesses of criticism without constraint.
Fortunately, the answer to his question is `yes' there is a way forward. This way is to be found in the developing field of socialscientific criticism. Social-scientific criticism combines conceptual models from sociology and anthropology and merges "previously isolated academic disciplines" into eclectic, crossdisciplinary methods and models.
As with any academic field, the socialscientific approach is multifaceted and diverse, yet this approach arises out of two basic axioms of interpretive methodology which together distinguish it from other fields. These basic axioms which are found throughout the socialscientific field are: (1) meaning within any text derives from the cultural system which produced the text/author; and (2) models descriptive of the text's "historical context of meaning" must be used to separate our culture's meanings from the text's inherent meanings. These two foundational propositions definitively shape this field's epistemology and methodology and they also form the basis of this analysis of V. The following two sections will delineate the relation between text and cultural meanings and then describe the role of models in uncovering embedded cultural meanings in a text.

II. B. 1. Meaning and Texts

When language is captured in the written word it also captures, or encodes, meanings specific to the socially constructed world from which both the author and the text arose;
If we ask of any form of communication the simple question what is being communicated? The answer is: information from the social system. The exchanges which are being communicated constitute the social system.
As meanings communicated within a text carry with them "information from the social system" of the text, then we must approach a text such as V through the social systems of its author and original audience. Clearly we can not simply look for the meaning of the text in the grammatical form of the words Josephus uses for it is the social context that gives significance to any of his words. Thus any analysis of a text must begin by mapping out the relevant social scripts surrounding the text's point of origin. Malina refers to these social scripts as the text's "domain of reference":
If interpretation of a written language of any sort takes place some domain of reference will be used by the reader. This domain of reference will be rooted in some model of society and of social interaction.
The question of what meanings are being communicated within V can only be answered by first discovering what the various social structures were that communicated meaning within the cultures that surrounded the production of V. Our analysis approaches the meanings within V through the most fundamental and pervasive social system ("domain of reference") of antiquity, patron-client relations. It will be shown that V mediates information specifically through the social system of patron-client relations.

II. B. 2. Models

Before launching into a description of the model we will be using in this analysis, it is necessary to be explicit about what is here meant by "model" - what it is, what it is not and what it does. The enterprise of modelling stands in contrast to what is often referred to as "intuitive" analysis - that is, historical analysis that proceeds from the assumption of similarity of experience (as described above II.A). The way around the trap of cultural transference (the process of wrongly attributing our own cultural systems to an alien text) begins with creation of an abstract representation of a phenomenon (a model), which, by its explicit presentation, prevents us from substituting our own experiences and common sense assumptions for the alien experiences and assumptions embedded in the text's presentation of the phenomenon in question. Modelling at this level is a process of controlled pattern matching.
A model provides us with a way of controlling (but not, of course, eliminating) cultural bias by the explicit representation of difference. Modelling recognizes and takes seriously the fact that "observation and description are always informed and directed by presuppositions". Models function to explicitly present the presuppositions of ourselves and the presuppositions of our object of study and thereby shed light on the difference between subject and object. T.F. Carney similarly describes the function of models as the process of extending consciousness:
Models bring hitherto unconscious levels of thought into awareness. They also enlarge our conscious control over the ways in which we handle data.
They extend consciousness by controlling the natural selectivity and culture-bound character of our perception. Carney's notion of modelling is comparable to James A. Boon's recognition that without "comparative analytical frameworks" every culture remains "impenetrable":
A "culture" can materialize only in counterdistinction to another culture ... before any culture can be experienced as a culture displacement from it must be possible (sic).
This notion of "extended consciousness" that models facilitate is similar to Victor Shklovsky's notion of defamiliarization or "making strange" which occurs when an old and familiar object or a linguistic and social convention is made to appear new and unfamiliar. This term and phenomenon is seen whenever an infant "makes strange" to a mother that has been away for too long and is now unfamiliar. A similar process can be made to occur with our familiar objects of academic study.
Models and the extended awareness they can bring are necessary when, through long association, our perception of a too familiar text becomes habitual and automatic. We see only what we are used to seeing. Modelling, like the linguist's process of "making strange", can be used as a technique of defamiliarization that strips away our routinized perception by the "deformation of a familiar, habitualized context" and thereby renews a "deadened perception of reality". Herein lies the difference between models and analogies or metaphors of the familiar - there is no element of control in the latter as they lack explicitness and testability, whereas the former is highly structured, systematically arranged, and instrumental in use.
Carney describes two major divisions of models, isomorphic and homomorphic. Isomorphic models are scaled, one-to-one replicas of a real world object, such as a map or a globe. Isomorphic models attempt to achieve the perfect scaled replication of all relationships involved in a phenomenon. In contrast to the one-to-one replication represented in isomorphic type, homomorphic models are abstractions of the thing modeled. A homomorphic model, the type we will be employing below, only delineates gross similarities, not the precise details of a real world object. Thus it is intrinsically selective in focus and provisional in nature. No legitimate attempt can be made to use a homomorphic model to provide the final answers to every question. What they can be used for is to make deductions about the behaviour of the real life phenomenon being modeled. It must always be kept in mind that the model presented below is only an abstract construct and not an exact representation of any one specific reality. The degree of abstractness of our model predetermines the degree of abstractness of our conclusions. There is a temptation that arises when using models to take conclusions farther then is warranted by either the model or the data.
The proof of our model of patron-client relations will rest in its ability to uncover the culturally influenced assumptions of past analysis of V and in its ability to explain the behaviours, relationships and social processes captured by Josephus' self-portrait. Thus, following Carney, our model is to been seen and used as a speculative instrument that allows us to frame an alternate view of Josephus' world and derive a new perspective from the text:
... the whole purpose of employing a model may be to check whether the novel view of reality which it provides adds to our understanding of that reality.
What will be shown is that Josephus has been misunderstood because he has been seen only from the perspective of our modern reality.
Finally, our model presented below will be sensitive to what Rene Lemarchand has identified as "perhaps the toughest issue in discussions of patron-client relationships," that is, how far above the "micro-level" of description (isolated ethnographic and diachronically specific analysis) can the concept be abstracted and still retain its analytical value? Taken to the correct level, an abstraction can illuminate a social landscape. Taken too far, an abstraction will twist the text's landscape out of proportion. As there exist no clear cut rules for the process of model abstraction, the best that we can do is to be entirely explicit about the factors involved within the model and then stand willing to modify the model according to the critical review of others in the field. The explicit presentation of the model will permit the testing, adjustment and validation of both the model and its conclusions.

II. C. The Fundamental Characteristics of Patron-Client Dynamics

II. C. 1. The History of a Concept.

The use of patronclient relations as an analytical concept has undergone significant maturation over the past fifty years. While, in the late forties and fifties, the concept was identified as a significant script, it was not until a decade later that its study moved beyond a marginal position in the social sciences. The early sociological and anthropological studies limited the existence of patronage to dyadic, interpersonal, semiinstitutionalized relations involving one patron and only a few clients. There were also pervasive evolutionary assumptions, particularly in political science theories, which suggested that the modernization of a society would lead to the disappearance of patronage. Even today it is not uncommon to see patron-client relations treated as though they are a deviant, or even `primitive' form of human interaction. Consider the implicit moralism of T.F. Carney's description of patronage as:
... a rudimentary and primitive type of human relationship ... (it) can turn any organizational form to its own ends ... It perverts the legal process, due process, the operation of the market, bureaucratic ethics ...
It is too tempting to view patronage as merely a subversive form of relationship when viewed from the North American ideal of "democracy."
The growth of conflict, exchange, symbolic interactionist, neoMarxist and network analysis models over the past thirty years has, according to Johnson and Dandeker, lead to two broad approaches to patronage as a tool for comparative analysis. The first approach interprets patronage as a historically specific structure limited to societies where kinship and tradition are disintegrating or where modernization and industrialization are beginning to take effect. The second approach regards patronage as a universal phenomenon existing in all times, cultures and classes. The model presented below will follow literature of compromise between these two conceptions and will treat patronage both as a particular kind of relationship and as a universally occurring system of relationships. This is to say, we will be looking at patronage both as a system of complex and hierarchically organized networks of relations and as an individual dyadic relationships.

II. C. 2. Eisenstadt and Roniger's Model of Basic Characteristics

Eisenstadt and Roniger have identified nine fundamental analytical characteristics of patronclient relations as patterns of interaction and exchange. The following core analytical characteristics of patron-client relations, as identified by Eisenstadt and Roniger, will be the foundation of our model:
1. Patronclient relations are usually particularistic and diffuse.

2. The interaction on which they are based is characterized by the simultaneous exchange of different types of resources, above all instrumental, economic, as well as political ones (support, loyalty, votes, protection) on the one hand and promises of solidarity and loyalty on the other.

3. The exchange of these resources is usually effected by a "packagedeal,"; i.e., neither resources can be exchanged separately but only in a combination that includes both types.

4. Ideally, a strong element of unconditionality and of longrange credit and obligations is built into these relations.

5. As a corollary there is a strong element of solidarity in these relations an element often couched in terms of interpersonal loyalty and attachment between patrons and clients even though these relations may be ambivalent. The element of solidarity may be strong ... (or) very weak, but to some degree it is to be found in all of them. Solidarity is often closely related to conceptions of personal identity, especially of personal honour and obligations ...

6. At the same time, the relations established are not fully legal or contractual; they are often opposed to the official laws of the country and are based more on informal although tightly binding understandings.

7. Despite their seemingly binding, longrange and, in their ideal portrayal, almost lifelong endurance, patronclient relations are entered into voluntarily, at least in principle, and can, officially at least, be abandoned voluntarily.

8. These relations are undertaken between individuals in a vertical fashion (the simplest kind is a strong dyadic one) rather than between organized corporate groups. They seem to undermine the horizontal group organization and solidarity of both clients and patrons, but especially of clients.

9. Last and not least, patronclient relations are based on very strong elements of inequality and power differences ... the crucial element of this inequality is the monopolization by the patrons of certain positions that are of vital importance to the clients; especially ... of the access to the means of production, major markets and centers of the society.
It should be kept in mind that this "topological" listing of parts does not fully capture the phenomenon itself. Patronage must be interpreted in the light of surrounding social processes and strategies which will determine the dynamics of the relationship, shaping its specific form and mitigating its significance in light of other forces at play in the wider context. As the patron-client relation is only one of a number of social scripts that can be engaged to achieve similar ends, it must be recognized that patronage is not always operative or primary in the course of social action. In particular, patron-client relations can compete with the social forces of kinship, neighbourhood solidarity and state support. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill rightly points out that the present state of research clearly indicates that patronage in the Roman world was not "a sharply defined relationship with a predictable set of services exchanged between men of a given social distance" but rather, "a varied, ill-defined and unpredictable set of exchanges unified by reference to values deeply embedded in Roman ideology." A model that has too rigid in its design will succumb to the trap of social determinism that plagues the social sciences. As Mary Douglas has observed:
A formidable list of textbook quotations shows that our students are given a stereotype of society consisting of well-trained sheepdogs picking their way through institutional mazes. Whereas we know that many social situations are fraught with ambiguity: each individual has latitude to misroute, redirect and even reconstrue.
Thus the model must not be reduced to a list of static elements but should be rendered as a descriptive account of the variable factors that interact within a complex social process. What we have above is an abstract model that outlines the general, typical characteristics of a certain type of human interaction (that is, patron-client relations). The complex phenomenon of patron-client relations constitutes a central aspect of the social institutions of the ancient (and modern) Mediterranean and serves to structure the flow of resources, the patterns of exchange and power relations and their legitimation. In keeping with the nature of models, it must be remembered that (a) not all aspects will be seen to operate in every instance of patronage; (b) that these abstract core characteristics are realized in an enormous variety of concrete forms as is evidenced by ethnographic data, and, (c) that some of these characteristics are seen to be invariable in their presence while others operate as variables. Invariable in the relationship is the existence of unequal status, generalized reciprocity and proximity between the actors. Variables encompass the following; initiative (either patron or client can take the initiative to establish the relation); the duration of the relation, which may be short or extended (even to the point of being inherited over generations); the scope of the relation, which may extend to all of the client's needs or to only one immediate need; and finally, the relation may also vary in intensity of commitment, loyalty and satisfaction (see Diagram 1).

Diagram 1

Variable and Invariable Factors

Eisenstadt and Roniger point out that a major feature of this type of social interaction and exchange is the existence of certain paradoxical elements within it. These contradictions are seen in the coexistence of conflicting aspects within the above model: (1) the combination of inequality and asymmetry of power with apparent mutual solidarity and interpersonal sentiments; (2) the combination of potential coercion and exploitation with voluntary relations and compelling mutual obligations; and (3) the combination of an emphasis on these obligations and solidarity with the illegal or semi-legal nature of these relations. This third element of the "legal or semi-legal" nature of patron-client relations does not apply to Josephus' context and is not seen to operate within V. This is because throughout the Roman empire patronage itself was the dominant and generalized form of institutionalized resource allocation:
Rome was a society in which public offices and official functions were mediated by the private personal ties of patronage ... it (is) entirely misconceived to maintain a distinction between the `formal power structures' of the state and the private bonds of patronage.
The patron was an integral part of the Roman state. It is important to note that Israel's status as a colony had the effect of turning the local Jewish aristocracy into clients of the Roman Empire and brokers of both Roman resources and political control:
In Judea as elsewhere, the local aristocracy was the municipal equivalent of the Roman senate - conservative, wealthy, hereditary, and above all loyal to the purposes of the Empire.
The recognition that patronage generates opposing social forces (coercion yet obligation, asymmetry of power yet solidarity) safeguards our model from the defect of "organicist" models that assume society is a highly cohesive system of harmonious interdependence. In the context of a patron-client relation both coercion and voluntary compliance can coexist. As will be seen in V, patronage generates conflict and is itself not a necessarily stable relation.
Our analysis will begin with this abstract model, which serves to indicate the existence of patron-client dynamics within V. Then we will use comparative data to suggest possible specific meanings and nuances within the text. But before applying the model we would do well to explicate some of the more important features of the above core characteristics.

II. C. 3. An Expansion of Eisenstadt and Roniger's Model

The above outline of Eisenstadt and Roniger's core characteristics needs to be supplemented with a survey of related factors surrounding patron-client dynamics in order to broaden the analytical scope of the model. The following section expands upon the factors of generalized exchange; power and oppression; structure versus ideology; and the role of brokers.

II. C. 3.a. Generalized Exchange

The most significant and fundamental aspect of patron-client relations is expressed by the exchange of resources between social actors that takes place within this script. This exchange is not merely a simple market-like individualistic exchange as it combines specific material exchange with what has been called generalized exchange (i.e., sharing, hospitality, gifts, favours, help, generosity). Generalized exchange, the simultaneous exchange of different types of material and immaterial resources, occurs when the expectation of direct material return is not explicit and, indeed, may never occur at all:
The material side of the transaction is repressed by the social: reckoning of debts outstanding cannot be overt and is typically left out of the account ... it usually works out that the time and worth of reciprocation are not alone conditional on what was given by the donor, but also upon what he will need and when, and likewise what the recipient can afford and when.
It is the nature and function of generalized exchange within a patron-client relation that will serve to explain why Poppea Sabina would do a favour for Josephus and give him gifts while Josephus himself appears to give nothing in return (see below, III.A.3). The notion that Poppea would require or even expect immediate reciprocation for the favour and gifts is simply ethnocentric. While the V is silent about what Josephus may have given in return, the role of patronage itself provides a clue as to Poppea's motives for favouring Josephus: "the patron increases his prestige through the possession of clients, while the client participates in the glory of the patron". Josephus, as one more client, was a `resource' to Poppea (see below, III A).
Whereas a simple market exchange (the daily buying and selling of goods, for example) is typically non-utilitarian, the generalized exchange that takes place within patron-client relations is a highly structured form of reciprocity. Generalized exchange has a latent purpose of establishing solidarity, obligation and trust in society:
The exchange of favours also serves as a means of maintaining a dyadic alliance and thus of achieving ... the binding together of two allies who can count on each other's help in time of need. Thus the exchange of favours allows each ally to demonstrate his interest in the alliance and his willingness to make sacrifices for his ally.
The typically public display of such an exchange of favours reinforces the socially binding obligations of the relationship, it helps to attract more allies into the alliance and it serves to notify enemies of the scope of the alliance. Such generalized exchange often appears as favouritism and the giving of favours and gifts within the world of Josephus. Whereas horizontal dyadic relations between social equals involves an exchange of favours of more or less equal worth, vertical dyadic relations (i.e., patron-client relations) involve the exchange of material for immaterial goods and favours. Generalized exchange was in the interest of the patron for it maintained client indebtedness and ensured a high measure of personalized, local control. Patronage is the institutionalized form of generalized exchange and social control.
The material-for-immaterial characteristic of generalized exchange within the patron-client context directly reflects the extreme scarcity of the typical environment of the peasant life (Roman Galilean or otherwise). The average peasant has little or nothing of material value to give a member of the elite but may have something of significant social value; support, loyalty, praise. This harsh material reality of the peasant life also leads to another important aspect of the patron-client exchange - the peasant/client's needs tend to be critical while the needs of elite patron tend to be marginal. This contrast is readily
apparent in V's portrayal of the interaction between Josephus and the Galileans (see below, section III.C).

II. C. 3.b. Power and Oppression

If a model of patronclient dynamics merely stated that patrons have power and clients have none it would be guilty of grossly oversimplifying complex social relations. J. Davis sees the "crude material bases of power", which patrons hold, as being "cloaked, softened, converted to moral agreement, (and) transformed into social facts" by the phenomenon of patronage. A patron's use of power is usually limited by the moral restraints of friendship, real or fictitious kinship or spiritual kinship that are seen to operate within patron-client relations. Here Davis highlights an important aspect of patronage within Eisenstadt and Roniger's core characteristics; that of the role played by moral pressure "the pressures of acceptance, deference, (and) friendliness" which clients and society exert upon a patron. The inequality of power and access to resources is not (usually) absolute along with moral pressure it is also mitigated by the following factors:
(1) Clients themselves are a voluntary yet necessary resource of patrons and as such they prevent patrons from acting with complete autonomy within a social system:
Patronage tends to operate as a competitive and pluralistic system in which patrons are dependent on maintaining a high level of client support in a situation where clients are neither owned nor controlled. That is to say, client choice is a significant dynamic in the system and clients constitute a major resource within it.

As a result of the conflicting forces of client choice and inter-patron competition, the concept of loyalty or fides/¹_st__ functions to hold the whole system together. The dynamics of client loyalty and choice as well as competition for clients among patrons will be seen quite clearly within V's portrayal of Josephus and John of Gischala's conflicts over clients in Galilee (see section III.B).
(2) In a society where a clientelistic model is predominant, elites also lacked solidarity as a class. The Roman elite, in particular, did not constitute a unified class but were divided into competing factions. The same can be said of the Jewish elite of Roman Palestine. This lack of elite solidarity encouraged factional competition for clients within Roman Galilee during the revolt (see section III.B.4).
As to whether or not clients are ultimately exploited by patrons, Johnson and Dandeker have concluded that the competing forces of patron competition, client choice and the constant reciprocal exchange of vital resources within the patronage systems of antiquity together serve to mitigate exploitative relationships within such networks. Their systemic analysis is also confirmed on another level within James Scott's analytical inquiry into how patron-client structures of deference acquire or lose their moral force. Scott summarizes the agrarian peasant's perspective of the relationship as follows:
In understanding the peasant's view of the patron-client relationship, we do well to avoid seeing the peasant as either a fickle, cost-counting bourgeois, with but fewer alternatives, or as a serf whose loyalty knows no bounds. We do far better to view the peasant as a cultivator who faces a set of continuing existential dilemmas over his economic and physical security which he is often poorly equipped to solve by himself or with other peasants. To the extent that someone of high status is willing to assist and protect him, provided the cost is not prohibitive, a relationship of deference may develop that grows in its resilience and closeness as expectations about mutuality and assistance are met. The patron validates his friendship by helping the peasant at times of crisis. It is on that basis that trust and confidence grows; friendship and favour are, for the client, synonymous. When a relationship of a patronage fails to protect the peasant, it not only leaves him worse off but it also represents a betrayal of the trust he had placed in a powerful friend.
Power and oppression needs to be evaluated on the terms that the system operates and from the perspective of the participants. What we would undoubtable experience as intolerable, the peasant may well describe as quite equitable where protection, deference and mutuality exist. Scott also notes that the "comparative bargaining strength" of peasant-clients is relative to the existence of alternative sources for resources (kin, neighbours, the law) and to the clients ability to repay (reciprocate) the supplier-patron. Furthermore, If there is a high demand for client labour in the midst of inter-patron conflict, then peasants usually experience a more favourable balance of exchange then would otherwise be possible in the face of elite solidarity. The dynamics that serve to mitigate exploitation are brought together in the following diagram:

Diagram 2
Factors that Mitigate Exploitation

______________________________________________________________________________
_ SPECIFIC TO PATRONS _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ _ _ _
_ Moral _ High Demand _ Inter-Patron _
_ Pressure _ For Labour _ Conflict _
_ _ _ _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ SPECIFIC TO CLIENTS _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ _ _ _
_ Client _ Alternative Sources _ Ability to _
_ Choice _ of Resources _ Repay _
_ _ _ _
______________________________________________________________________________

See Diagram 7 - Factors that Mitigated the Exploitation of the Galileans (section III.C.2) for a summary of how these factors are represented in V.

II. C. 3.c. Structure Versus Ideology

A major difficulty in analyzing a patron-client relation lies in "decoding the hidden meanings and rationalizations" that lie behind the actual function of the relationships described (in this case by Josephus). While the structure of the dependency relationship may be rooted in oppression there may nonetheless exist ideological justifications in the minds of all participants, justifications which include a myth of mutual benefit. The ideological framework of the social values that surround patronage creates a social logic that may lead to clients claiming contentment to avoid retribution while patrons will often exaggerate the extent of their benevolence. Thus an analysis must try to determine the difference between actual benefits and perceived benefits of the relation. Patronage must be analyzed both from the perspective of its structural and ideological implications.

II. C. 3.d. The Role of Brokers

One aspect of patron-client relations that is not evident within Eisenstadt and Roniger's core characteristics is that of the role of brokers. Brokers are a class of
individuals who mediate contact between clients and patrons and their resources. Malina relies heavily upon Jeremy Boissevain's model of social brokerage in his essay "Patron and Client: The Analogy Behind Synoptic Theology". Yet Boissevain's model is based upon modern concepts of social networking; concepts such as innovation, personal profit entrepreneurism, competition, careers, and risk taking. His "broker" is one who is "a professional manipulator of people and information who brings about communication for profit". Yet one cannot use these modern social concepts without considering the diachronic specificity of the model. How do these concepts differ in the first century Mediterranean world and how would any cultural difference effect first century social brokerage? Boissevain's definition of social brokerage will remain of limited use until these surrounding social scripts (innovation, profit, etc.,) are situated within a cross-cultural model.
With the above limitations in mind, a minimal outline of what a broker is and does can be taken from Boissevain's modern model and applied to V with significant results. As noted above, the primary characteristic of a broker is that he or she puts potential clients in contact with (usually elite class) individuals who control some vital resource(s). While patrons controlled first order resources - land, jobs, money, specialized knowledge; brokers controlled second order resources - strategic contact to people who in turn controlled vital (first order) resources. In some cases brokers may have mediated between patrons and clients who have never actually met.
Yet there is more to brokers than the type of resource they mediate for not all brokers act as channels of power. With reference to the mediation of power, Richard N. Adams has identified two distinct kinds of intermediaries; cultural brokers and power brokers. The cultural broker is an individual from one level of society who lives or operates among individuals of another (usually higher) social level. This kind of broker has influence within the "alien" social level only as a result of his own skill and personal influence. The cultural broker's influence within one social level is not due to any power that he may have at another level. An example of a cultural broker in the primarily two tiered social system of antiquity would be a peasant who through some good fortune has been befriended by a member of the local elite. This peasant would thus gain influence outside of his social level that is not based upon any power he may wield within his village. His ability to broker resources between these two levels rests solely upon his ability to influence someone among the elite.
Power brokers are able to wield power at both levels and their power in one level of society depends upon their influence and position within the other level. This typically means that the power broker controls one type of resource at the level of peasant society by virtue of his having access to derivative power from the elite level. Yet, his power in each level depends upon his maintaining control over resources in both social levels of the peasantry and the elite alike.
One example of power brokers in antiquity is the Pharisees as portrayed in the synoptic gospels. As the Pharisees had a large popular following (i.e., a large network of clients) they were able to wield power as a faction among the Jerusalem aristocracy and mediate resources (cultic knowledge, healing) from the Temple to the surrounding Jewish peasantry. Their influence as an elite faction depended upon their influence as popular leaders.
The key difference between these two kinds of brokers is that the cultural broker plays an insignificant role in mediating elite control whereas power brokers play a major role in strengthening the elite power structure and tend to hold an important place in the region within which they work (see Diagram 3).
Members of the first century Mediterranean elite were surrounded by a network of individuals who controlled access to their person and their resources. These social brokers were frequently referred to in the language of friendship and kinship within this script. Eric R. Wolf's model of what he calls "instrumental friendship" is similar to what we have described as brokers:
In instrumental friendship each member of the dyad acts as a potential link to other persons outside of the dyad.
Brokerage, particularly culture brokerage, often takes the form of an "instrumental" friendship that gives the actors access to persons outside of their normal social domain.
The Judaean ruling class functioned as power brokers between the centre of the empire, Rome, and its periphery, the Jewish peasantry. Martin Goodman notes this dynamic when he points out that, for the ruling class:
the power to influence Rome brought prestige from the Jews, just as the power to influence the Jews brought recognition from the procurator. The two sources of power fed on each other.
The ruling class needed both the support of the peasantry and the procurator to maintain their social status. Ruling factions such as the Sadducees disappeared after the unsuccessful revolt not because the religious character of Judaism changed with the loss of the Temple but because this and other elite factions lost the power to influence the Jewish peasantry in the course of the revolt. As a direct result of this faction's loss of influence over the peasantry the Romans could no longer use the "client-less" Sadducees as mediators of Imperial control. The Sadducees lost their place in the imperial-colonial network of the Roman empire.
Within a large network of patron-client relations most patrons also function as power brokers and clients within an ascending hierarchy of status that ends in independent source of all patronage - the deity. In the complex networks of antiquity an individual could play all three main roles of this model to different groups or domains. For example, some of the Judaean ruling class were clients of the Roman aristocracy; as representative of the Jews they were also power brokers between Rome and Jerusalem, and as mediators of Temple-based and factional resources they were patrons of various Jews. The primary distinguishing feature between those who act as patrons and those who act as brokers in any given situation is that patrons have their own general fund of assets to convert into influence while brokers mediate resources that are not their own.

Diagram 3

Brokerage in Antiquity

II. D. Summary of Methodology

The above abstract model provides a simplified representation of the multiplicity of complex phenomena denoted by patron-client relations. It allows us to identify sections and themes of V where patron-client dynamics are dominant in the social action. Eisenstadt and Roniger note that when patron-client relations operate as the "central mode of regulation of the flow of resources and process of interpersonal and institutional exchange and interaction in a society or a sector thereof" it is then that the full social "implications and repercussions" of this complex social phenomenon are most readily apparent. That patronage stands at the nexus of vital resources will be seen most clearly in our analysis of V. Whenever the context is centred upon access to resources we will see that patron-client relations are clearly dominant within the text. It will be seen in the analysis below that this is precisely what happens in V in the course of action that occurs between Josephus, Aliturus, Poppea Sabina, the Galileans, John of Gischala and the emperors, Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. The dynamics of patron-client relations determine the flow of resources and the character of interpersonal interaction within V. The very centrality of this script within Josephus' world serves as the key to understanding the flow of action within the episodes before us (see below, Part III).
The significance of patron-client relations, and its importance for the analysis of V, arises out of its character as an irreducible social relationship. As J. Davis has noted in his study of comparative Mediterranean social anthropology:
patronage is a sui generis political form. Its essence is an act of submission involving a superior and an inferior. Its purpose is usually to acquire access to resources.
It is not merely an extension of friendship or kinship. Failure to "see" patron-client dynamics in V and account for them within one's analysis would be as grave an error as the failure to account for the dynamics of kinship, hospitality, health care systems, witchcraft accusations, deviance labelling or honour and shame within the text. The importance of Davis' observation must not be underestimated and is echoed by Eisenstadt and Roniger:
There is a growing recognition that the phenomena subsumed under the umbrella of patron-client or clientelistic relations are not only ... marginal addenda to more fully structured or organized social relations but may constitute ... a central aspect of the institutional patterns of these societies.
The following diagram summarizes the main aspects of our model.

Diagram 4
Summary of Patron-Client Dynamics

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____ _____
_____ C E N T R E O F S O C I E T Y _____
_____ _____
_____ D O M A I N O F V I T A L R E S O U R C E S _____
_____ _____
_____ INTER-PATRON CONFLICT _____
_____ UNDERMINES ELITE SOLIDARITY _____
_____ _____
_____ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ INTER-FACTIONAL COMPETITION FOR PEASANT SURPLUS _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _____
_____ _ E L I T E _ _ E L I T E _ _____
_____ _ _ <<<<ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ CONFLICT ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ>>>> _ _ _____
_____ _ P A T R O N _ _ P A T R O N _ _____
_____ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ COMPETITION FOR LOYALTY OF CLIENT GROUPS _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _____
_____ _____
_________________________________________ G ______________________________________ C __________
_________________________________________ E ______________________________________ P O __________
_________________________________________ N ______________________________________ O A E __________
_________________________________________ E ______________________________________ W N R __________
_________________________________________ R ______________________________________ E D C __________
_________________________________________ A ______________________________________ R I __________
_________________________________________ L ______________________________________ O __________
_________________________________________ I ______________________________________ N __________
_________________________________________ Z ______________________________________ __________
_________________________________________ E ______________________________________ MITIGATED BY __________
_________________________________________ D ______________________________________ MUTUAL __________
_________________________________________ ______________________________________ __________
_______________________________ COLONIAL ELITE __________________________ S O __________
_______________________________ BROKER IMPERIAL RESOURCES __________________________ O B __________
_________________________________________ ______________________________________ C L L __________
_________________________________________ E ______________________________________ H I I __________
_________________________________________ X ______________________________________ O D G __________
_________________________________________ C ______________________________________ I A A __________
_________________________________________ H ______________________________________ C R T __________
_________________________________________ A ______________________________________ E I I __________
_________________________________________ N ______________________________________ T O __________
_________________________________________ G ______________________________________ Y N __________
_________________________________________ E ______________________________________ __________
_________________________________________ ______________________________________ __________
_____ _____
_____ P E R I P H E R Y O F S O C I E T Y _____
_____ _____
_____ D O M A I N O F V I T A L N E E D _____
_____ _____
_____ _____
_____ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _____
_____ _ CLIENT _ _ CLIENT _ _____
_____ _ _ LOYALTIES TO PATRONS _ _ _____
_____ _ CLIENT-GROUP _ UNDERMINE PEASANT SOLIDARITY _ CLIENT-GROUP _ _____
_____ _ _ _ _ _____
_____ _ VILLAGE _ <<<<ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ CONFLICT ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ>>>> _ VILLAGE _ _____
_____ _ _ _ _ _____
_____ _ CITY _ COMPETITION FOR BEST SOURCES OF NON-MARKET RESOURCES _ CITY _ _____
_____ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _____
_____ _____
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

PART THREE
III. Four Test Cases

III. A. Josephus, Aliturus and Poppea Sabina

Poppea Sabina, Nero's empress, has long been regarded as a Godfearer (TE_sE§__) of the Jewish religion and proof of both the extent of the diaspora and the near triumph of Judaism over the Roman Empire. But academic fashions change and now both these concepts of the political and religious neartriumph of Judaism and the existence of religious converts in Nero's court can no longer provide an explanation for the intriguing role that Poppea has played in the history of Roman Palestine and the life of Josephus. What has not yet been done is to look at the events surrounding Poppea through the lens of her cultural context ancient Mediterranean society and see her in the role that all members of the elite class were cast the role of patron, the possessor of clients.
When examining an event that involves a member of the Roman upper classes it must be kept in mind that patronage was central to the way these individuals desired to present themselves to the world:
the Roman noble felt himself almost naked without an entourage of dependents, which he expanded to the best of his ability, and who acted as the visible symbol of his social standing.
Knowing this enables us to draw some conclusions on the social motivations behind their actions in the context of patron-client relations. Poppea Sabina's interaction with Josephus is one such situation. An awareness of the dynamics of patronclient interaction significantly alters our understanding of what Josephus was trying to communicate in the narratives that feature Poppea. In this section we will apply the model of patron-client relations to Josephus' encounter with Poppea Sabina and compare the results of this modelling process to the conclusions reached by others through their approach to the text. This section will demonstrate the necessity of the patronclient model for a crosscultural understanding of ancient texts which carry implicit and explicit alien social concerns.

III. A. 1. Indications of Patronage in the Roman Embassy (V 1316)

When Josephus was twentysix (63 C.E.) he was selected to travel to Rome to secure the release of two priests who had been sent there "to render an account to Caesar" (V 13). These priests must have been rich enough to deserve a trial in Rome rather than in the provinces. This type of arrest and rescue was "evidently common" by this time and was a result of endemic and violent factional struggle within the Jewish aristocracy.
After surviving a shipwreck in the Adriatic Josephus then:
formed a friendship with Aliturus, an actor who was a special favourite of Nero and of Jewish origin. Through him I was introduced to Poppea, Caesar's consort, and took the earliest opportunity of soliciting her aid to secure the liberation of the priests. Having, besides this favour, received large gifts from Poppea, I returned to my own country (V 16).
When this passage is read in light of our model we can see four implicit indications of patron-client relations embedded within the text. These indications are: (1) a friendship is formed; (2) this friend provides an introduction to the Imperial household; (3) aid is sought; (4) a favour and gifts are given. Expressed in terms of patron-client relations, this episode portrays a prospective client with a vital need who (1) therefore approaches a broker who in turn (2) mediates contact with a holder of first order resources. This introduction sets the stage for the prospective client to attempt to initiate a vertical dyadic contract (patron-client relation) by (3) asking for something otherwise inaccessible. The client successfully engages the patron and (4) there is a flow of generalized reciprocity (which, to modern eyes, looks like Josephus received something for nothing). These elements of the episode and the model are compared below in Diagram 5.

Diagram 5
Patron-Client Dynamics Within the Embassy to Rome

________________________________________________________________
_ TEXT _ MODEL _ CONFIRMATION _
________________________________________________________________
_ _ _ _
_ Goal: Liberation _ Vital Need _ Josephus/Client _
_ of Priests _ _ _ Lower Status _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ \_/ _ \_/ _ \_/ _
_ Friendship with _ Broker Contacted _ Strategic _
_ Aliturus _ _ _ Contact _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ \_/ _ _ _
_ \_/ _ Broker Mediates _ \_/ _
_ Introduction to _ Contact Between _ Proximity _
_ Poppea Sabina _ Potential Client _ Established _
_ _ _ and _ _ _
_ _ _ Potential Patron _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ \_/ _ \_/ _ \_/ _
_ Aid _ Non Market- _ Poppea/Patron _
_ Solicited _ Accessible Resource _ Higher Status _
_ _ _ Requested _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ \_/ _ \_/ _ \_/ _
_ Favour and Gifts _ Material-for- _ Generalized _
_ Granted _ Immaterial Exchange _ Reciprocity _
_ _ _ _
________________________________________________________________

Note that this episode has all three invariable factors of the model; unequal status, proximity and generalized reciprocity. Now we will take a closer look at the players in this episode and analyze how their roles are in fact indicative of patron-client relations.

III. A. 2. Aliturus the Broker

Josephus had a very specific task before him, to gain entrance into Nero's court and there petition for the release of two priests. Thus, upon his arrival in Italy, Josephus' first move was to form a friendship with one of the Emperor's friends, Aliturus, "a special favourite of Nero" (V 16). This is a clear indication that he began to engage the social institution of patronage.
In these circumstances the usual way to approach the Emperor was through his `handlers' who were themselves clients of the Imperial household. These brokers mediated contact with their powerful patrons by selectively granting or denying petitioners an audience with the patron:
Access to the Emperor was through his inner court, and this his flunkies controlled. So one cannot assume who is powerful at any given point. One had to find out. Power might lodge with improbable officials, if these were well placed within the communications network.
Clearly, Josephus was in the right place at the right time when he met Aliturus, who was well placed in the communication network of the Imperial household.
Josephus describes Aliturus as a broker when he notes his position as a "special favourite of Nero" (V 16) who introduces him to Poppea. Aliturus was not merely one of Nero's many clients but a special favourite. This would suggest to a Mediterranean reader that Aliturus was in a position to mediate access to Nero's court. It is also culturally significant that Josephus tells his readers he formed a friendship with Aliturus. As patronage was a dominate mode of interaction it was thus the power and influence of one's friends that brought success in the GraecoRoman world: "In the struggle for life success depends in reality upon the ability ... to attract the favour of the powerful". This was typically done indirectly through ones friends. Of course, what better way to gain a favour than through a special favourite of the Imperial household. Here Josephus is explicitly telling his readers that he had success because he had an influential friend.
Friendship in the ancient Mediterranean always involved a reciprocal exchange of goods and/or services. We are not told what Josephus did for Aliturus but it is very probable that the introduction to Poppea was part of a reciprocal exchange which occurred as a result of their friendship. Aliturus' Jewish background may well have been the key factor which allowed Josephus to engage him first as a friend and then as a broker to Poppea.

III. A. 3. Poppea Sabina the Patron

We have already established that as a member of the Roman nobility, Poppea Sabina's social personality was cast in terms of a patron. As Nero's Empress, this would have been both how she was perceived and would have wanted to be perceived. Thus there is no mystery as to why Josephus would have approached her, or why she would entertain an audience with him.
That Poppea would have seen a colonial elite such as Josephus as a desirable client is not beyond speculation. It is significant that under the principate the emperor and his household took over the role of exercising personal patronage outside of Rome. Furthermore, the position of Imperial women required the support of a broad base of clients. There is also an abundance of evidence which attest to the granting of offices, honours and verdicts by the wives of Emperors. The granting of such posts is a clear manifestation of patronage. Through such favours Poppea created a group of clients who were in her debt and from whom she could require service at any point in the future. This was the essential function of patronage in Josephus' world.
As with any member of the aristocracy, both Poppea's power and prestige increased with each new client she gained. Josephus represented an opportunity to gain yet one more client. Furthermore, by the time of Josephus' visit she already had a number of clients in Roman Palestine (see Appendix III - Other Clients of Poppea Sabina).
Yet one may ask why Poppea should give gifts to Josephus while Josephus does not mention what he did in return for Poppea. Again, this can be explained with reference to patronage. As the exchange that occurs within a patron-client relation is generalized reciprocity, Josephus was not obligated to return value for value: "the patron's economic beneficia were often repaid by increased social prestige". Thus it would be ethnocentric to assume that Josephus' mention of the gifts was merely a function of vanity and unrealistic. Furthermore, the act of generous gift giving had significant social consequences for both patron and client. Josephus was obligated by the gifts to publicize Poppea's favour and gifts. This would have served to increase her honour and prestige among the Jewish elite. Also, public knowledge of the gifts would have increased Josephus' prestige as a client of a powerful patron who came to the aid of Jewish priests. Both patron and client gain social status.

III. A. 4. A Response to Intuitive Analysis

Poppea's grant of the release of the two priests is usually explained on the basis that she was a `Judaizer,' or a `friend of Judaism'. E. Mary Smallwood has effectively dismissed any such explanations but then is only able to explain Poppea's release of the priests as an isolated act of kindness:
Poppea may have secured the release of the priests merely on the grounds that they had already been in custody for the last four years, which was quite long enough.
Yet our analysis suggests that much more was at work then simply kindness. In Smallwood's explanation the concept of "kindness" is clearly being used ethnocentrically. It must be kept in mind that nothing was done by the elite without the expectation of future reciprocity and there could be no baser action than ingratitude and failure to reciprocate. Therefore we cannot simply compare the favour of an elite Roman to an act of modern kindness.
In contrast to our social-scientific analysis of the Embassy to Rome stands Loius H. Feldman's interpretation of what the gifts from Poppea signified:
We may wonder why the Emperor should have given Josephus gifts when it was Josephus who sought a favour from him. The only answer that makes sense is that Josephus promised to try to defuse the revolution that was starting in Judea. The mention of the gifts would be self incriminating, and we may guess that Josephus had to admit receiving them because the matter was so well known.
In the light of the role of a Roman patron it is no longer mystifying that Josephus should receive gifts from a member of the Imperial household. Neither can the Jewish revolt of 66 C.E. be used as an explanation as it was still at least two years away (Poppea died in 65 C.E.). In the absence of an explicit model of patron-client relations, the analysis is reduced to speculation and ethnocentric judgements (i.e., gifts from a high status patron as "incriminating"). Feldman also assumes that it would be incriminating for Josephus to be seen cooperating with the Romans. But the Jewish aristocracy had long ago been compromised and willingly mediated Imperial control over the colony of Roman Palestine:
Control of a subject society has often been exercised through an already-existing indigenous class or dominant aristocracy. The imperial regime compromised members of such a society by giving them a serious economic stake in the imperial system of domination.

Thus Josephus had nothing to hide as a client of Poppea. Quite to the contrary, it may have been her patronage, and Josephus' subsequent gain of social status, which made it possible for him to be found in the company of the Jerusalem elite and gain an appointment as general at the outbreak of the rebellion a few years later. The embassy cannot be rendered understandable without first seeing it from the perspective of its author. The only way this embassy to Rome can be made to make any sense is when it is read in the light of its implicit cultural concern - patronage.

III. A. 5. Summary

When we read the account of the Roman Embassy from the perspective of the GraecoRoman cultural script of patron-client relations, one can see that Josephus followed the characteristic pattern of engaging a patron. He first locates a broker of the Imperial household Aliturus and engages his friendship, probably on the basis of their common ethnicity. The purpose of this friendship was to gain an introduction to Poppea who was already known to have other Jewish clients. Poppea then bestows a favour upon Josephus, thus making him one more of her clients. The Empress, in keeping with the characteristic behaviour of a powerful patron, also gives "large gifts" to Josephus. These "gifts" further strengthened her support among the Jewish aristocracy by effectively giving Josephus the resources to build his own group of clients whose loyalty would then be indirectly secured by Poppea. This redistribution of resources from centre to periphery is the main aspect and function of patronage as a networked system and takes P.A. Brunt's explanation of imperial-colonial elite "affinity" within the Roman empire one step further:
At every stage in Rome's history the aristocrats who ruled at Rome found it most natural to support men like themselves elsewhere. Community of interests and sentiments made it easier to admit them into their own circle.
Josephus returns to Jerusalem having secured the liberation of the priests and having gained a powerful patron (a most important resource) and increased social status among his peers. The social significance of such Imperial patronage in Josephus' career should not be underestimated. Consider that Agrippa I rose from destitution to greatness entirely through personal contacts in Italy. The ex-High Priest Jonathan b. Ananus likewise used a friendship with a member of Claudius' Imperial household to strengthen his position within the Judaean political landscape.
There is insufficient reason to dismiss Josephus' embassy to Rome as a mere invention when the episode demonstrates such first hand knowledge of how access to the Imperial court was gained. The account is certainly plausible according to both the known behaviour of Poppea Sabina (and elite Roman patrons in general) and it also fits the social pattern that such an embassy could be expected to follow. In approaching Poppea through Aliturus, Josephus followed the most culturally logical course of action. Consider Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's question as to how important patronage was for political success:
How effectively could any individual or group gain access to the resources controlled by the Roman state (of whatever sort, judgement, privilege, status, power, money) except through personal links of patronage?
Josephus' account makes too much `sociological sense' to be dismissed in the absence of strong warrants.
This analysis of Poppea Sabina allows us to see her in the light of cultural categories relevant to her social climate and thereby reach a fuller understanding of her role within the life and writings of Josephus. Josephus' description of her reflects the social personalities that were significant to him; patrons, brokers, friends, and it reflects the significant social scripts of his environment; friendship, introductions and favours. Yet she continues to be interpreted in categories that are significant to modern historians, her religious affiliation and its significance for the rise of early Christianity. Clearly, the latter treatment reflects the agenda of modern scholars and ignores what Josephus considered to be of first importance. When the alien social concerns which are reflected in ancient texts are overlooked then there is a tendency to dismiss as invention anything which fails to conform to our own experience.

III. B. Josephus and John b. Levi of Gischala

III. B. 1. Josephus and the Jerusalem Coalition of 66-67 C.E.

Around October of 66 C.E., less than three years after his successful embassy to Rome, Josephus was appointed by the "leading men" of Jerusalem as the emissary in Galilee of the provisional government (V 28-29). Before we apply the model of patron-client relations to Josephus' account of his interaction with John b. Levi of Gischala (hereafter simply "John") it is necessary to locate both Josephus and John within a larger framework of the relevant factions that were part of the coalition government. Only when we see how Josephus and John are located in relationship to the factions of the Jerusalem coalition is it then possible to understand their behaviour towards each other as depicted in V.
The head of the Jerusalem coalition was Ananus b. Ananaus and within this coalition there were two factions that competed for control of Galilee through Josephus and John. Diagram 6 depicts the networks that led from the loose coalition in Jerusalem to Josephus and John in Galilee. Its structure is explained as follows: Eleazar b. Ananias was the leader of the faction that controlled northern Galilee through John. A leading Pharisee, Simon b. Gamaliel (V 190-2) was a close friend of John's and supported Eleazar's faction by sending a deputation from Jerusalem to replace Josephus with John as commander of Galilee. When Josephus was first sent to Galilee to assess the situation on behalf of the coalition, Eleazar's faction sent Joazar and Judas to represent their interests and ensure that John was placed firmly in control of northern Galilee. This Joazar was probably the same Joazar (or Joesdrus) b. Nomicos who later returned to Galilee as a member of the deputation to remove Josephus. John was later to become the leader of Jerusalem for a year when Galilee finally fell to the Romans in 68 C.E.
The power of Eleazar b. Ananias's faction was checked by the faction led by Jesus b. Gamalas, who had been High Priest in 63-64 C.E. Josephus describes Jesus b. Gamalas as a close friend who warned him of the plot to remove him from Galilee (V 204). Both Josephus and John were able to gain and maintain their positions in Galilee as a result of their friendships with members of the Jerusalem aristocracy. The tensions of uneasy cooperation and outright competition between Josephus and John is evident within V and arise out of their membership in competing elite factions that were ambitious for complete control over Galilee. Given this context of the factional network between Jerusalem and Galilee we are now in a position to analyze Josephus' interaction with John from the perspective of patron-client relations.

Diagram 6
The Jerusalem-Galilee Networks

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
_ _
_ _________________________ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ JERUSALEM COALITION _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ Ananus b. Ananaus _ _
_ _ (Coalition Leader) _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _________________________ _
_ _ _
_ _______________________________________________________________ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ Inter-Faction Conflict _ _
_ _ <--------------------------------> _ _
_ Eleazar b. Ananias Jesus b. Gamalas _
_ (Faction Leader) (Faction Leader) _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ _
_ _ Joazar and Judas were likely sent _ _ _
_ Simon b. Gamaliel with Josephus by Eleazar's faction _ _ _
_ (Faction Member) to ensure that John maintained _ _ _
_ _ control of Northern Galilee _ _ _
_ ____________ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ Inter-Patron Conflict _ _ _
_ John of Gischala _ <-------------------------------> _ Josephus _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ Joazar was later part _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ of the Deputation _ _ _
_ _ _ _ Ñ Ñ Ñ Ñ Ñ Ñ Ñ Joazar and Judas _ _
_ Gischala _ _ _
_ _ _ _ ______________________ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ Brigands 70 Galilean Leaders _
_ _ _ _ (Mercenaries) _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ÑÑÑ_ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ _
_ _ _ Jerusalem Deputation _ _ _
_ _ _ to Remove Josephus from Galilee _ The Galileans _
_ _ _ (Sent by Simon b. Gamaliel) _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ Joazar (or Joesdrus) b. Nomicos _ _ _
_ _ _ Ananias b. Sadok Simon _ _ _
_ _ _ Judas b. Jonathan _ _ _
_ _ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _______________________________ __________________________________ _
_ _ _ Inter-Client _ _ _
_ _ CONTROL OF NORTHERN GALILEE _ Conflict _ CONTROL OF SOUTHERN GALILEE _ _
_ _ _ <--------------> _ _ _
_ _______________________________ __________________________________ _
_ _
_________________________________________________________________________________________________

III. B. 2. Josephus and John as Faction Members

John of Gischala is introduced to the reader as a leader (or one of the leading citizens) of the Jewish town of Gischala. John tried to restrain the elation of the citizens over the news of the revolt from Rome and urged them to "maintain their allegiance (¹_st__)" to Rome (V 43). His moderate stance did not last, for the surrounding Greek cities sacked the town, forcing him to respond by arming "all his followers", and then attack and defeat their neighbouring enemies (V 44). From the start of V, Josephus' readers are introduced to John as a leader of Gischala in northern Galilee who has an armed following.
Right from the first time Josephus and John met we can see the dynamics of the competing Jerusalem factions affecting the action within V. Shortly after arriving in Galilee, Josephus went with Joazar and Judas to meet John in Gischala. That Josephus would trouble himself to meet with John further indicates that John was a significant local leader. Josephus gives the following account of their first meeting:
I soon discovered that he (John) was eager for revolution and ambitious of obtaining command. For he requested me to authorize him to lay hands on the imperial corn stored in the villages of Upper Galilee, professing a desire to expend the proceeds on the repair of the walls of his native town. Detecting his ultimate design and present intentions, I declined his request; as the authority entrusted to me by the Jerusalem authorities extended to that district, I intended to reserve the corn either for the Romans or for my own use. Unsuccessful with me he turned to my colleagues (Joazar and Judas), who were blind to coming events and quite open to receive money. These he bribed to vote that all the corn stored in his province should be delivered to him. Unsupported and out-voted by the other two, I held my peace (V 70-73).
This episode must be read within the context of the uneasy alliance between the factions of Jesus and Eleazar. Josephus is never explicit about the existence of these two factions and this is probably due to the fact that he wanted to distance himself from John in the eyes of his Roman readers. This is understandable since John ended up being taken prisoner to Rome by Titus for life imprisonment as leader of the rebel forces at the fall of Jerusalem.
Given the factional context of this episode we are now able to see that its subtext reads as follows: Jesus' faction manoeuvred to have Josephus put in place as commander of Galilee, or at least southern Galilee, (this much we can assume), but as a countermeasure, Eleazar's faction had Joazar and Judas sent with Josephus to ensure that their man in Galilee, John, was able to maintain control of northern (Upper) Galilee. This scenario is confirmed in Joazar and Judas' support of John over the issue of who would control the imperial corn of Upper Galilee. It is obvious that whoever controlled the stores of imperial corn thus gained the ability to build and maintain support within that region. Goodman notes that once Joazar and Judas confirmed John's position in Upper Galilee, they returned to Jerusalem. Their abrupt departure at this point in the action leads one to wonder if they had not been sent by Eleazar's faction for this very reason - to ensure that John gained control of the imperial stores and thereby maintained his (and therefore, Eleazar's) position in Upper Galilee.
With the resource of the imperial corn behind him and the control of Upper Galilee that it gave, John was now firmly in position to further strengthen himself and his faction by selling off the oil of Gischala to Caesarea Philippi at an enormous profit (V 74-76). Josephus was unwilling to prevent John from gaining yet more power through the sale of Gishcala's oil out of fear of being stoned by the mob if he interfered (V 76). This is the first, albeit by itself weak, indication of John's patronage of the people of Gischala and their support for him over against Josephus. The people of Gischala would have supported John in the sale of oil as they knew the profits would have given their patron yet more resources to distribute among his clients. In light of what follows, these two episodes show two elite rulers manoeuvring for control over key resources of Upper Galilee. Whoever gains control of the resources attains a position to engage the Jews as clients and, indirectly, as supporters of one or the other factions of the Jerusalem coalition. Through the support of Eleazar's faction, as mediated by Joazar and Judas, John acquired control of the resources and Jews of Upper Galilee. After this point, Josephus is never able to exercise any authority in Upper Galilee. As will be seen below, the issue of patronage and resources are inextricable intertwined within V.

III. B. 3. Excursus: Shaye J.D. Cohen on Josephus and John

Shaye J.D. Cohen overstates the case when he says that Josephus and John were on good terms. The best that can be said about their relationship as it is portrayed in V is that is was framed by their respective factions' uneasy alliance under Ananus. Contrary to Cohen, Goodman notes that because Josephus and John were technically allies in the coalition, Josephus therefore,
accordingly delegated power to Eleazar's supporters in Galilee as appropriate. But he did not trust them, and much of his energy was directed to preventing them from supplanting him from his post ... Josephus' attitude towards John and the rest of Eleazar's faction was ambivalent, since they were technically in coalition with his own political associates.
Cohen consistently misses the systemic level of analysis and typically reduces his explanations to a personalistic level. We see this happen when Cohen explains the tension between Josephus and John as the result of resentment on the part of John and a personality flaw on the part of Josephus:
Enduring cooperation between the two leaders was impossible. John resented the intrusion of a rival into his domain and Josephus was too vain to accept anyone as an associate.
John's lack of willingness to cooperate with Josephus is certainly more than a matter of mere resentment - he had to promote the interests of his faction. As to the charge of vanity, this is simply an abusive ad hominem parading as an explanation. Neither Josephus nor John were in a position to accept the other as a full "associate" within the context of rival factions in an uneasy alliance. Furthermore, as Cohen's analysis does not adequately take into account Josephus and John's membership in the Jerusalem coalition he is therefore "uncertain" why John needed Josephus' cooperation for the sale of Gischala's oil. Cooperation, even if unwilling, would have been essential in light of the alliance.

III. B. 4. Competition for the Loyalty of the Tiberians

The next time Josephus and John met was in Tiberias were John had travelled to the hot baths on account of his health (V 85). With Josephus meanwhile in the village of Cana (V 86), John took advantage of his absence to try to sway the allegiance of the Tiberians from Josephus to himself:
On his arrival at Tiberias, John attempted to induce the inhabitants to abandon their loyalty to me and attach themselves to him; and there were many who, ever craving for revolution, by temperament addicted to change and delighting in sedition, gladly responded to his invitation (V 87).
Josephus was warned of John's intrigue by Silas, whom Josephus had earlier appointed as governor of Tiberias (V 89). On hearing of John's plot, Josephus marched with two hundred men to Tiberias to confront John and try to regain control of the city's inhabitants:
I urged them not to be so hasty in revolting; such fickleness would be a blot on their character, and they would justly be suspect by a future governor, as likely to prove equally disloyal to him (V 93).
This episode ends with Josephus running for his life from Tiberias when John sent men to kill him. When the clients of Josephus heard of John's attempt on their patron's life, they rallied to Josephus' aid and threatened to sack Tiberias. This in turn caused John to retreat from Tiberias back to Gischala and Josephus and John were once again in a stalemate over the control of Galilee (V 94-103).
In this episode we see one member of an elite faction, John, trying to out-manoeuvre a member of another elite faction, Josephus, for the loyalty of a group of clients - the Tiberians. Since they are explicitly fighting for the loyalty of the Tiberians we can reasonably conclude that the issue at stake in the minds of the actors is the matter of who is going to be the patron of this group of clients and mediate the resources of their respective factions to the client-group. This is most clearly seen in Josephus' speech to the Tiberians (above, V 93) where he reminded them that disloyalty to one patron will put them at a disadvantage under their new patron, who will then suspect the quality of their loyalty and be less likely to govern in their interests. This interpretation of the subtext of Josephus' appeal is entirely probable when one remembers that loyalty is one of the few things the peasants had to offer the ruling class. Josephus has rightly identified the very dangerous position that the Tiberians were placing themselves in by withdrawing their loyalty from his client, Silas, the governor of Tiberias. They threatened to seriously devalue their primary resource - loyalty.

III. B. 5. John Gains the Loyalty of Gabara

After relating the episode of John and the Tiberians, Josephus describes two unrelated events and then appears to return to V 84 - the start of the above episode. Just as the episode of John and the Tiberians begins with an account of how Josephus' popularity with his Galilean clients aroused the envy of John (V 84-85), so does this next account begin with a similar cause and effect explanation: John saw the popularity of Josephus among his Galilean clients, perceives this to be a threat - "believing that my success involved his own ruin" (V 122) - and responds by trying to undermine the loyalty of Josephus' clients. That John should see the popularity of Josephus as a threat to his position reflects the dynamics of intense competition between two patrons for the loyalty of a fickle population of clients. This parallel preface probably indicates that Josephus is here returning to the story line of V 84 and now adding some more details: not only did John move against Josephus in Tiberias, but he also tried to attract the loyalty of the inhabitants of Sepphoris and Gabara.
Hoping to check my good fortune by inspiring hatred in me in those under my command, he tried to induce the inhabitants of Tiberias, Sepphoris, and Gabara -the three chief cities in Galilee - to abandon their loyalty to me and go over to him, asserting that they would find him a better general than I was. Sepphoris, in pursuance of their policy of submission to Rome, lent no ear to either of us and rejected these overtures. Tiberias, while declining the suggestion of revolt, consented to befriend him. Gabara, at the instigation of Simon, a leading citizen and a friend and associate of John, went over to his side. The people of Gabara, it is true, did not openly admit their defection; their dread of the Galileans, of whose devotion to me they had frequent experience, was too great a deterrent. But they secretly laid their plots and watched for a favourable opportunity for their execution (V 123-25).
Here again we see that the issues are loyalty and patronage. Who is the best possible patron to be loyal to in the midst of the revolt? John's success in Gabara due to his friendship with the leading citizen, Simon, is yet one more indication of how factional networks grew and were maintained through personal contacts between members of the ruling class. With this context of struggle for loyalty (i.e., that which clients owe to patrons) it is significant that the question is phrased by Josephus as who will be the best st_at____. That the issue is a public appointment mediated from Jerusalem is further indication that we are looking at patron-client relations in these texts. David Braund has noted that the public offices of a Roman governor or general in the field "tended to generate patronage". V appears to indicate that the relation between public office and patronage was no less true for Roman Palestine than it was for Italy. The very cities that rejected either John or Josephus are also those cities that looked to Rome and not Jerusalem for resources. We also see in this passage the role that clients play in a situation of competing patrons. The citizens of Gabara were constrained in their support of John by the clients of Josephus - the Galileans. John was correct to fear the growing popularity of Josephus for it minimized his own ability to gain new clients and penetrate Lower Galilee.

III. B. 6. Summary

The main indications that John interacted with the citizens of Gischala and Josephus from within the script of patron-client relations are as follows: (1) John was a member of an elite faction and through his faction's support was able to gain control of the imperial corn stores of Upper Galilee, an area which Josephus refers to as "his (John's) province"; (2) John has the support of the citizens of Gischala, who offer him a variety of services, including protection from Josephus and the Galileans and assistance in trying to undermine or even kill Josephus; (3) John clearly attempts to undermine the loyalty of Josephus' clients in strategic areas - Tiberias, Sepphoris and Gabara; and (4) the clients of John and the clients of Josephus engage in conflict with each other as distinct groups loyal to different patrons (V 123-25).
John is clearly a high status elite ruler while his followers are Jewish peasants. The fight over loyalties takes place with close proximity between patrons and clients and there is an implicit flow of generalized reciprocity between John, the controller of imperial stores and the successful trader in oil and the people of Gischala, who give loyalty and support and labour to John in his fight against Josephus. Through the above episodes the picture that emerges is one of patrons who belong to rival factions in an elite alliance who therefore compete at the local level for resources and loyalty - the two key elements required for them to maintain their position as patrons within an arena of intense local and national conflict. It is indicative of this scenario of competing patrons that the last mention of John in V describes how Josephus, with the aid of his Galilean clients, successfully undermines the loyalty of John's clients and forces him to retreat and remain in his native town, Gischala (V 368-372). The picture of patron-client relations that emerges in V's account of the conflict between patronage networks in Judaea remarkably conforms to Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's description of patronage within the larger setting of Roman society:
The secret of the game is the manipulation of scarce resources ... The ruling nobility, priests, magistrates, judges, legal counsel, and generals rolled into one, stood astride all the major lines of communication with the centre of state power and the resources it had to distribute ... It was the inaccessibility of the centre except through personal links that generated the power of patronage ... the important feature is that links between communities and the Roman state are mediated through individuals; and in fact the more formal links are supplemented by numerous informal patronal links between members of the local elites and members of the Roman elite.
Josephus began the story of John from the perspective of patron-client relations and ended it within the same cultural script. The following section on the Galileans as clients of Josephus will further highlight aspects of Josephus and John as competing patrons.

III. C. Josephus and the Galileans

III. C. 1. Josephus Initiates the Patron-Client Relation

After describing how John outmanoeuvred Josephus in Gischala over the corn and oil, Josephus then immediately relates how he engaged the Galileans as his clients (V 77-84). He does this through two means, first, by paying off the local brigands so they would refrain from attacking "either the Romans or their neighbours" (V 78). These __sta_, brigands, were not revolutionaries, as the type of social banditry that Josephus describes is in fact a form of pre-political rebellion common to peasant societies.
There is no basis for Cohen's unsupported assumption that these bandits were "experienced, fulltime fighters who did not have to return to their farms for a livelihood". Social bandits in peasant societies frequently lived within their own villages and were often only part-time bandits:
Bandits seem to have enjoyed considerable support in their local communities, a fact recognized by the Roman lawyers who realized that such support was essential for the bandits to survive and enjoined local officials to do the best they could to erode popular support for bandits and ensure support for agents of law and order.
Whether the bandits that Josephus was faced with were from villages on the periphery of Galilee or from within Galilee would have had little bearing on how Josephus would have engaged them as clients. What is significant is that this episode of V reflects the frequent observation of anthropologists and social scientists; brigands and powerholders, and even local villagers, are often found intimately tied to each other. The situation in antiquity, as reflected in Hopwood's observation (above) remained more or less the same for nineteen hundred years, as is seen in Henk Driessen's portrait of brigandage in nineteenth-century Andalusia, Spain:
A municipal secretary sold false transfer-guides to cattle-thieves, a municipal night-watchman concealed bandits in his house, judges refused to try brigands arrested by the Civil Guard, victims and eye-witnesses often refused to give notice of crimes.
What is obvious is that Josephus used patronage as a means of moving from the centre and controlling the periphery through a typical two-stage operation that involved creating a patronage network between the local elite rulers and Jerusalem, and then engaging the peasants and bandits alike, granting protection to all groups "in return for the specialisms each was capable of".
The dynamics of social banditry in the Mediterranean indicates that Josephus' solution of engaging the bandits as a way of controlling them and keeping the peace should not be seen as a particularly "brilliant solution". To the contrary, it was a rather common for elite rulers and patrons to engage groups of bandits as their clients and use these bandits to protect their own territory and harass rival patrons. Once again, Cohen's insufficient understanding of the social scripts of Josephus' world lead him to wrongly explain Josephus' behaviour has the result of a perceived personality flaw - vanity:
Josephus may have been vain enough to instruct his lestai to do nothing without his command, not even to harass the Romans.
While Cohen does note the obvious, "Josephus tried to set himself up as the intermediary between the populace and the brigands and to gain the loyalty of both" yet in the absence of an explicit model of patron-client relations he is consistently unable to extract the significance of what it meant to be an intermediary and to engage a group's loyalty. Within the context of a patron-client relation, Josephus' expectation of a reasonable degree of loyalty and service from his bandit-clients can hardly be the basis for an accusation of vanity, nor can his action of doing so be seen as all that extraordinary.
The second way Josephus engaged the Galileans as clients was by simply engaging their leaders as "friends" and assistants in the administration of Lower Galilee:
Wishing, moreover, under the guise of friendliness, to retain the Galilean authorities, some seventy in all, as hostages for the loyalty of the district, I made them my friends and companions in travel, took them as assessors to cases which I tried, and obtained their approbation of the sentences which I pronounced; endeavouring not to fail in justice through precipitate action and in these matters to keep clear of all bribery (V 79).
Josephus needed the support of the Galileans of Lower Galilee in order to secure the area against John. This he did, first, by using his position and status to negotiate a dyadic contract between himself and the bandits on their behalf thus supplying them with a vital, non-market accessible resource - protection. Secondly, Josephus then initiated a patron-client relation with the local leaders of the Jewish peasantry. The euphemism "hostages for the loyalty of the district" indicates that this one level of Josephus' clients (the Galilean leaders) would be a guarantee of the loyalty of his clients' clients, the Galilean peasantry. From this point on in V Josephus' primary descriptive characteristic of the Galileans is that they were his loyal clients.
Cohen claims that the local Galilean leaders "resented the intrusion of outsiders into their domain" but Josephus was not merely an "outsider" but a representative of the Jerusalem coalition. It is probably not assuming too much to suggest that the local aristocracy were well informed of the Jerusalem political scene and were anxious to align themselves with whichever faction they thought was going to gain dominance once things returned to normal. Within V there is no indication of any such resentment on their behalf. Quite to the contrary, V gives one the impression that the local aristocracy were very quick to chose sides and support either John or Josephus. While Cohen is at a loss to discover why the Galilean aristocracy would have supported Josephus, we can be certain that he was perceived not as an intruding rival authority but as a mediator of the potential resources of both the coalition and his own faction. Support for a well placed member of the Jerusalem aristocracy would have come naturally to the resource-starved, Galilean leaders. When read from the perspective of local cultural concerns, Josephus' introduction of John, the citizens of Gischala, the brigand-mercenaries, the Galilean aristocracy and the Galileans (V 70-84) exhibits the constant theme of patron-client relations. The plot's cultural dynamics can be represented as follows:
(1) The character (honour) of John (V 70)
(2) Factional contest over resources (control) of Upper Galilee (V 71-76)
(3) The citizens of Gischala introduced as John's loyal clients (V 76)
(4) Brigands controlled and engaged as clients (V 77)
(5) Galilean aristocracy engaged as clients (V 79)
(6) The loyalty of the Galilean peasantry gained (V 79)
(7) Josephus' character (honour) as a patron (V 80-83)
(8) The loyalty and affection of Josephus' clients (V 84)
(9) The beginning of patron competition for clients' loyalty (V 85-87)
I cite this as an example of how a text must be mapped out in terms of its cultural concerns as a preliminary step to understanding its flow of action and central themes.
After describing John's dishonour; "he was eager for revolution and ambitious of obtaining command" (V 70) and how John managed to engage the citizens of Gischala and how they subsequently supported John against Josephus (V 70-76), Josephus then gives a parallel account of how he engaged the Galileans and their leaders (V 77-79). He then describes his own honour as a patron (V 80-83); he did not violate the honour of his clients through their women, he did not pervert justice through accepting bribes (as John did), he extended mercy to John, his enemy/inferior; and he was honoured by God through the deity's protection. Josephus' description of himself as the ideal honourable patron stands in obvious contrast to the earlier account of John's lack of honour. He concludes this parallel account with a description of the extent of his client's loyalty and affection towards him and how this loyalty threatened John (V 84-86). Undoubtable, this section is addressing cultural concerns of great importance to Josephus' elite readers. Having now examined how Josephus initiated a patron-client relationship between the Galileans and their leaders in Lower Galilee, we will continue to apply our model to the rest of Josephus' account of his relationship with the Galileans in V 87-392.

III. C. 2. Indications of the Galileans as Clients of Josephus

The primary indication that the Galileans behaved towards Josephus as his clients is seen in the way they consistently came to Josephus' aid when he was threatened by an enemy or attacked by a rival patron, John, and/or his clients. We see this in the following instances:
(1) V 97-100: The Galileans offer to sack Tiberias when they prove disloyal to Josephus and some of the Tiberians desert to John.
(2) V 102-103: The Galileans offer to kill John and his supporters, the citizens of Gischala, when they discover that John tried to kill Josephus.
(3) V 104-111: A large number of armed Galileans accompany Josephus when he went to Sepphoris to confront Jesus, the brigand chief.
(4) V 124-25: The Galileans prevented the citizens of Gabara from openly defecting to John.
(5) V 368-372: Josephus uses the Galileans to undermine John's own supporters.
(6) V 373-89: The Galileans almost sack Sepphoris and Tiberias when these cities try to invite the Romans into their midst.
All of these episodes reflect a group of clients' support for their patron.
The second indication that Josephus was the patron of the Galileans is seen in their attitude towards Josephus as a supplier of a vital, non market-accessible resource -protection from the brigands. When Josephus decided to quit Galilee in the face of John's intrigues and attempts on his life, the Galileans responded by gathering together before Josephus and then imploring him "not to abandon them to their enemies nor, by my departure, leave their country exposed to the insolence of their foes" (V 210). The very service Josephus renders for the Galileans when he describes how he engaged them as clients, protection from brigands (V 77-78), is in turn the reason later cited for the Galileans' not wanting to see the departure of their patron; "being convinced that while I remained at my post no harm would befall them" (207).
The final indication that Josephus and the Galileans interacted from within the context of a patron-client relationship is seen in the support Josephus received from the Galileans when he was faced with the Jerusalem deputation that John arranged to have sent to Galilee to see to his removal (V 189-335). It is indicative of the role of client support in a factional struggle between patrons that the deputation was to approach the Galileans in an effort to undermine their loyalty to Josephus (V 198). Since the deputation did not have the full support of the Jerusalem coalition they therefore had to resort to attempting to undermine Josephus' client base. A loss of a large client base would render him inconsequential to the coalition. Josephus indicates that the deputation was completely unable to undermine the loyalty of his supporters (V 230-33; 252-53). Quite the opposite, they wanted to kill John and the Jerusalem deputation for their intrigues (V 305-308; 362).
At the height of the conflict between Josephus and the deputation the Galileans praise Josephus as their benefactor and saviour (V 244; 259). Josephus relates how, in front of the deputation, the Galileans,
bore testimony to my past conduct and exhorted me upon my course in future; and they all swore that the honour of their womenfolk had been preserved and that they had never received a single injury from me (V 259).
Josephus leaves no doubt in the minds of his readers as to who held the loyalty of the Galileans in Lower Galilee. The conflict between Josephus and the deputation ended with their humiliation at the hands of Josephus and they were sent back to Jerusalem under an armed escort (V 331-32).
In section II.C.3.a (above), the issue of power and oppression within a patron-client context was raised and the factors that serve to mitigate the exploitation of clients by their patron(s) were outlined. Our analysis would remain incomplete if the legitimacy of the main patron-client relationship was not brought under investigation:
Patron-client exchange falls somewhere on the continuum between personal bonds joining equals and purely coercive bonds. Determining exactly where between these two poles a paticular patron-client system should be placed, or in which direction it is moving, becomes an important empirical question in any attempt to gauge its legitimacy.

Using Josephus' account of the relationship within V, and recognizing the limitations of analyzing only his side of the story (the only "side" we have), we are now in a position to pass tentative judgement on the quality of the central patron-client relationship of V. The response of the Galileans to Josephus' decision to terminate the relationship and abandon his clients to their enemies (the brigands and the clients of the rival patron, John) was to send "messengers throughout Galilee to announce my intended departure" (V 207). The Galileans, including the "women and children" (210), then gathered together in front of their patron, Josephus and:
flung themselves on their on their faces and with tears implored me not to abandon them to their enemies nor, by my departure, leave their country exposed to the insolence of their foes (V 210).
The pressure of the crowd and an encouraging dream the night before (V 208) serve to change Josephus' mind and he decides to remain in Galilee. This episode is certainly an example of Josephus giving in to moral pressure from the community that would have him maintain an obviously beneficial (for the Galileans) relationship.
But if the Galileans were in such desperate need of Josephus' protection services, what then prevented him from abusing his power over his needy clients? Josephus' power proved to be limited by at least four factors: (1) the high demand for labour that arouse out of his need for a personal army; (2) the inter-patron conflict within Galilee and Jerusalem that turned client-groups into a limited and valuable resource; (3) the high level of client choice that appears to have been active, judging by the repeated attempts of John to gain recruits from among Josephus' own clients, and (4) the ability of the Galileans to repay Josephus, and thus strike an equitable balance of exchange, by providing their patron with physical protection from both John, the Jerusalem deputation and the Romans. The one unknown factor is whether the Galileans had any viable, alternative source of protection from their enemies. As Josephus appears to have had little difficulty in engaging and maintaining the Galileans as clients in a highly competitive environment, we may speculate that he was perceived by the Galileans as their best source of protection and vital resources. These mitigating factors of the relationship between Josephus and the Galileans are summarized in the following diagram.

Diagram 7

Factors that Mitigated the Exploitation of the Galileans

______________________________________________________________________________
_ MORAL __ Josephus was dissuaded from prematurely _
_ PRESSURE __ ending his relationship with the Galileans _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ HIGH DEMAND __ Josephus was in great need of a large _
_ FOR LABOUR __ client base to serve as a personal army _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ INTER-PATRON __ Josephus' need for a loyal client base was _
_ CONFLICT __ heightened by intense factional conflict _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ CLIENT __ The Galileans appear to have had the option _
_ CHOICE __ of turning to John or the Jerusalem deputation _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ ABILITY __ The Galileans repaid Josephus' protection _
_ TO REPAY __ by protecting Josephus from his enemies _
______________________________________________________________________________
_ ALTERNATIVE __ Neither Josephus nor the Galileans appear to _
_ SOURCES OF __ have had a viable alternative support group _
_ RESOURCES __ _
______________________________________________________________________________

III. C. 3. Summary

The conflict between the coalition factions of Eleazar and Jesus over the control of Lower Galilee was fought over the control of the Galileans as a client base and was largely waged through the local patrons of John and Josephus. The very fact that there was a factional conflict over the control of Galilee is a indication of the probability of inter-patron conflict between Josephus and John over clients in that area. Success in political life required the use of a network of obligations and such networks run throughout Josephus' account of the political struggles of Judaea. Sean Freyne's comment that,
There is little doubt that in establishing himself with the Galileans over against native `big men', such as John of Gischala or Justus of Tiberias, Josephus exploited to the full his Jerusalem and priestly connections.
overlooks the factional and patronage networks that operated between Josephus, John, Jerusalem and Galilee. John was not merely a politically isolated, local "big man" in contrast to a well connected Josephus.
We have seen that Josephus acted as a patron of the brigand/mercenaries, the Galilean aristocracy, and __ Ga___a___ themselves. Within V the only lapse in the loyalty of the Galileans was when a rumour had been spread "throughout Galilee" that Josephus was going to "betray the country to the Romans" (V 132). Yet this is a highly understandable reaction on the part of the Galileans and does not detract from the overall weight of the argument. Josephus refuted the rumour and remained the patron of the Galileans (V 143-44).
In Galilee, Josephus was involved in an inter-patron and inter-factional struggle over client loyalty that remained at a general stalemate until the arrival of the Romans and the capture of Josephus. Between Jerusalem and Galilee, between faction leader, Jesus b. Gamalas and the Galileans, there existed a network of elite friendships and dependant relationships of social unequals which served to mediate vital resources in both directions. Wallace-Hadrill notes that the key justification for describing the type of network that we see in V as a whole in terms of a patronage network is:
that it involves exchanges between those closer to the centre of power and those more distant from it, and has the effect of mediating state resources through personal relationships.
That the Jerusalem coalition and Josephus were able to put themselves in a position of leadership over Galilee is seen by Freyne as merely an extension of the council's religious authority to "other spheres of life". But their control over Galilee was less likely a function of religious authority than a function of centre-to-periphery networks that certainly predated the revolt. When the revolt occurred, Galilee simply continued to look to Jerusalem for patronage-based flow of resources and Jerusalem simply stepped into the areas of control that Rome left empty, particularly those surrounding the collection of peasant surplus. Freyne artificially divorces "religious authority" from power over other areas of the social structure of the Galilean peasantry and concludes that Josephus was able to control the Galileans because they "remained attached to that city (Jerusalem) as the symbolic centre of their beliefs". Yet what if Jerusalem was not merely a "symbolic" but a material centre that made the marginal survival of the Galilean peasantry possible in an otherwise hostile and uncertain existence?

III. D. Josephus as the Client of the Emperors (V 414-430)

The final section of V is a long litany of the favours that the emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian bestowed upon Josephus:
(1) Vespasian arranged for a virgin-wife for him (414).
(2) Titus protected him from both the Jews and the Roman soldiers on the field of battle (416-17).
(3) Titus offered Josephus booty from the "wreck of my country" (417).
(4) Titus gave Josephus a gift of some sacred books (418).
(5) Josephus was granted the freedom of some of his countrymen, his brother and fifty friends, and was permitted to liberate all of his friends and relatives from the Temple by Titus (419).
(6) Josephus was granted the release of three of his acquaintances who were being crucified by Titus (420).
(7) Titus gave Josephus a better grant of land in a plain near Jerusalem (422).
(8) Vespasian gave Josephus lodging in his old house and granted him both Roman citizenship and a pension (V 423).
(9) Vespasian punished Josephus' accusers and gave Josephus a large tract of land in Judaea (424-25).
(10) Domitian also continued to protected Josephus from his accusers and exempted his property in Judaea from taxation.
(11) Even Domitia, Domitian's wife, "never ceased conferring favours upon me (429).
While this litany of favours certainly does stretch Josephus' credibility, it is significant that a false claim to Roman citizenship carried with it a severe punishment, so we must consider just how far Josephus would have exaggerated the patronage of the emperors, at least on this count, in the face of potential punishment for such exaggeration. Josephus' claims to imperial benefactions must be measured against the general pattern of imperial patronage of literary figures. His claims reflect Fergus Millar's point that "literary and scholastic pursuits provided by far the best and most direct means of access to imperial favours". If our sources (and they are numerous) are to be believed, the type of imperial patronage that Josephus makes claim to could potentially include simply enormous benefits; piles of money, ranks, property, immunities (from taxation and persecution/prosecution), citizenship, and "protection and succour in innumerable situations in ordinary life". Josephus appears to have experienced the full range of benefits, extraordinary and mundane.
Josephus' list of imperial benefactions do not appear to be randomly chosen. Quite to the contrary, his emphasis on the salvation of kin, land ownership, and imperial favour conforms to Millar's conclusion that "the pattern of beneficia which the emperors distributed accurately reflects the values of the society over which they ruled". Furthermore, that as a writer Josephus should claim to find a place within Roman society is not beyond credibility. Peter White's observation about the social opportunities for poets in Roman society is very likely true for historiographers as well: "men with literary abilities found openings in Roman society that other men did not, both in private and in public life".
At the close of V Josephus appears to name yet one more patron, Epaphroditus, for whom he appears to have written AJ and V:
Having now, most excellent Epaphroditus, rendered you a complete account of our antiquities, I shall here for the present conclude my narrative (V 430).
Richard Laqueur sees in this attribution a switch from Flavian patronage to the patronage of Epaphroditus as a result of a loss of favour with Domitian (Der jźedische Historiker Flavius Josephus, Stuttgart, 1920). But from the perspective of patronclient dynamics, I am inclined to think that as we can only guess who Epaphroditus may have been, we are thus left with insignificant data to apply any model. There is no justification for referring to Epaphroditus as the sole or primary patron of Josephus' works when Josephus himself describes the emperors as his patrons, by virtue of their beneficia. Laqueur appears to make a rather common mistake of assuming that a writer (or anyone) could have only one patron at a time. It is entirely possible that Epaphroditus was a client of one or more of the emperors and Josephus was a client of both. At any rate, given the known complexity and patterns of literary patronage and the paucity of data, it is certainly misguided to read a switch in the patronage of Josephus from the emperors to Epaphroditus and treat such a supposed switch as a warrant for other conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This survey of patron-client relations in Josephus' Vita confirms an observation made by Eisenstadt and Roniger regarding the internal characteristics of societies where patron-client relations predominate. In their attempt to control Upper and Lower Galilee, both Josephus and John were dependent on local support. This reflects Eisenstadt and Roniger's observation that elites were not able to autonomously penetrate the periphery administratively:
Social actors show, in these societies in which the clientelistic model is predominant, a relatively low degree of autonomous access to the major resources needed to implement their goals, and to the control, in the broader settings, of their own resources.
V indicates that Josephus and John exerted a considerable amount of energy to gain and maintain the support of a client base in their efforts to seize hold of the stores of peasant surplus. They were clearly unable to simply do as they pleased as elite members of society. To the contrary, and in confirmation of Eisenstadt and Roniger, they required a degree of local consent to gain access to resources and they appear to have been held accountable in their use of the peasant surplus (at least in the context of a revolt).
In his analysis of Gallic patronage, as recorded by Julius Caesar (De Bello Gallico), John Drinkwater noted that the institution of patronage was seen most clearly in time of war. Again, Josephus' record of the events in Galilee at the outbreak of the revolt demonstrate, as we have shown, that this also appears to hold true. War led to the realignment of patron-client networks, brought them into relief against the background of struggles over newly available resources, and made the dynamics of loyalty, client choice, competition among elite patrons and competing factions all the more visible to our alien eyes.
In the introduction I indicated that the issue of Josephus' personality could be approached through a model of one of the primary social scripts of the ancient Mediterranean - patron-client relations (above, p. 2). It was noted that Josephus is often accused of being vain (above, p. 5) and it was suggested that such judgements are a result of cultural transference. Using the analysis of Shaye J.D. Cohen, it was then subsequently shown that the concept of vanity was being used ethnocentrically to explain what was readily apparent in the presence of a patron-client model (above, III.B.3). This is a indication of how historical research rooted in intuitive assumptions, creates ethnocentric "common sense" explanations of behaviour in the absence of social models for antiquity. This study is a small example of the potential that adequate social models have to "make strange" our familiar objects of study and our familiar ways of being. Josephus must be to us a stranger in what to us is a strange land. As it is, our assumption of familiarity has lead to no small amount of contempt in the case of Josephus.
Through the four test cases I have demonstrated to a reasonable degree that patron-client dynamics are a significant factor within V. While in V all the necessary facts are not always equally present, nonetheless, the degree of `fit' between model and text has proven to be significant in all four relational encounters.
Leaving aside within this study the question of historical actuality, the embassy to Rome need no longer be seen as a vain fantasy, but instead, as a realistic portrayal of a relatively common social script within Josephus' time and class. The things that Josephus reported as having occurred are the things that his readers would have reasonably expected to have seen happen. Knowledge of the relevant cultural scripts unlocks the meanings embedded within the text. In Josephus' world we find brokers at the gateway to patrons and resources, bandits in the employ of elites, colonial aristocrats courting the favour of their conquers, elite Jews fighting over the loyalty of peasant Jews, and peasants playing a skilful hand at manipulating patron against patron to place themselves in the most desirable position. We should expect to see nothing less.
But what has the study produced? Has the model proved to be useful and appropriate to the subject matter? The following is a summary of the primary insights into V and Josephus that have been made possible by the model. It is followed by a summary of the intuitive conclusions which are corrected through use of this model of patron-client relations.

I. Culturally Sensitive Insights

(1) The importance of the role of Aliturus as a "friend" (broker) in Josephus' attempt to access the goodwill of the Imperial household has been brought to light by the model (II.A.2). The discussion of Aliturus is normally focused upon his supposed status as an "apostate" but this has little bearing within Josephus' account.
(2) The "why" of Poppea Sabina's favour and gifts has been shown to be less mysterious in light of the roles cast by society for imperial patrons and colonial clients. Likewise, Josephus' motives for publicizing the gifts can now be understood as a function of the cultural script rather than being reduced to a function of supposed vanity. Imperial patrons where an asset, even for Jews. Josephus knew this well and so did his readers (III.B.3).
(3) The significance of controlling peasant surplus can now be seen in relationship to the role of patrons in a redistributive economy. Josephus and John struggled over the supplies of corn and oil because they had a large client base to support in the maintenance of their positions as patrons (III.B.2).
(4) Similarly, the inability of Josephus and John to work together is now comprehensible in light of their positions within competing factions of an uneasy alliance. A full understanding of their actions can only be arrived at with reference to the competing factions of the Jerusalem coalition and the lines of the networks that lead from Jerusalem to Upper and Lower Galilee (III.B.3).
(5) The model adds another dimension to the nature of the Galileans of V. Above all else, they were quite certainly loyal clients of Josephus (II.C.2). Their actions toward other cities and individuals are only fully comprehensible when contrasted to these cities and individuals' actions toward their patron Josephus. It would be a mistake to interpret the nature and motives of the Galileans apart from this intimate social relationship.
(6) The general importance of the role of the Galileans' support as a client base in the context of the rebellion's factional struggle has been demonstrated (III). It is probable that the various factions within the Jerusalem coalition were constantly engaged in attempting to expand their client base throughout Roman Palestine while meanwhile undermining the client base of their rivals. The power of the Jerusalem coalition did not exist in the vacuum of Jerusalem society.
(7) The model demonstrates that Josephus' action towards the bandits are typical of the relationship that is known to exist between elite rulers and bandits (III.C.1). Again, we find that Josephus is describing an altogether believable series of relationships in Galilee.
(8) The basis of Josephus' authority in Galilee now no longer need be seen as a function of the "religious" affiliation that Galilee may have had with Jerusalem. The model allows us to see the elite patron, Josephus, as a desirable "resource" to the Galileans (III.C.3). It was on the basis of his status as an elite patron and a member of the Jerusalem coalition that Josephus was able to take command in Galilee. Here, material, and not religious, concerns may have been foremost in the minds of the local Galilean leaders.
(9) Josephus' claim to the continued beneficia of the emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian reflect the best favours from the most desirable patrons. His claims are not unreasonable and they replicate the values dearest to the elite classes throughout the Roman empire (III.D).

II. Corrected Intuitive Conclusions

(1) Why did Josephus receive gifts from the Imperial household? Contrary to Feldman, an attempt to defuse the revolution by Nero can no longer be seen as "the only answer that makes any sense" to this question (III.A.4). This type of gift giving must be interpreted as a function of a patron-client script being enacted through the social personalities of patrons and clients.
(2) There is no reason to interpret Josephus' status as a client of Poppea Sabina as a source of embarrassment for him (III.A.4).
(3) There is no basis for labelling Josephus as vain because he would not accept John of Gischala as an associate (III.B.3).
(4) There is also no basis for claiming that the bandits of V were "experienced, fulltime fighters" (III.C.1). Neither the text nor the social dynamics of social banditry make this a necessary conclusion.
(5) There is no warrant for claiming that the local Galilean elite would have "resented the intrusion" of Josephus into their "domain" (III.C.1). The domain of Galilee was intimately tied to the domain of the centre of Roman Palestine, Jerusalem.
(6) Josephus was not the only patron in Galilee with Jerusalem connections and John was not merely a "local big man". Both were patrons within a competing Galilee-Jerusalem network (III.C.3).
(7) It can no longer be maintained that Josephus based his power simply "on the old tension between city and country". He based his power on his elite status, his network connections and his potential as a benevolent benefactor within the peripheral society of Galilee.
(8) As it is quite possible to have more than one patron at once, there is thus no warrant for ascribing a switch from Flavian patronage to the patronage of Epaphroditus because of the references to Epaphroditus in V 430 and AJ 1.8-9 (III.D).

The primary result of these conclusions and observations, when seen as a whole, is that we are now in a position to better interpret the personality of Josephus. The above four test cases reveal that the central aspect of Josephus' social personality, from the perspective of his culture, is that of an elite patron. Josephus saw himself as an honourable patron of honourable clients and an honourable client of honourable patrons. I suggest that a fuller study of V would demonstrate that this theme dominates and unites the apparently disparate elements of Josephus' autobiography.
In the article, "The Social Identity of the First Christians: A Question of Method in Religious History" (Journal of Religious History 11, 1980), E.A. Judge argues that it is illegitimate to import social models "that have been defined in term of other cultures" until the "social facts of life characteristic of the world to which the New Testament belongs" have been established through historical "field work". He here argues that the social facts (cultural scripts) of antiquity must first be established by the traditional textual "field work" of the historian before cross-cultural social models can be applied to an ancient text. Yet I have shown that historical "field work" (intuitive historical criticism) is largely unable to penetrate the "social facts of life" in antiquity because our own experience of reality comes between us and the subjects of our field work. Judge appears to suggest that the texts themselves will lead to the social facts. In this article he unwittingly provides us with yet one more example of the pervasive "principle of similarity" when he states that "we deny our forebears the individuality we take as a basic feature of our own humanity. The New Testament is conspicuously modern". But if the individuality of our "own humanity" is altogether unique to the modern world, then it is entirely anachronistic to call the New Testament "conspicuously modern". Consider Malina's largely overlooked point that when we speak of the dyadic personality of the first-century Mediterranean person:
It would make no cultural sense at all to ascribe anything to personal and uniquely individual psychological motives or introspectively generated reasons and motivations.
A model of "individuality", modern and ancient, is needed before we can claim that the New Testament a document of our own time and culture.
Finally, this study corrects the widespread assumption that patronage was only a "Roman" phenomenon and had no place in the Jewish cultures of Roman Palestine (and, by extension, Rabbinic Judaism). The dynamics of patron-client interaction are a vital missing perspective in most past and current attempts to unravel the beginnings of Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism.

Appendix I
The Mediterranean Personality.

The following is a point form summation of Malina's overview of the first century Mediterranean personality. It is included here simply to give the reader who is unfamiliar with cultural anthropology an idea of just how far removed Josephus' social context is from our own (at least according to Malina). Malina arrives at the following definition of the ancient Mediterranean personality:
First century Mediterranean persons were strongly group-embedded persons. Since they were group-oriented, they were socially minded, attuned to the values, attitudes, and beliefs of their ingroup. Due to their ingroup enculteration, they were used to assessing themselves and others in terms of stereotypes often explained as deriving from the geographical location of their group. Furthermore, since these persons were strongly embedded in a group, their behaviour was controlled by strong social inhibitions along with a general lack of personal inhibition. Their prevailing social institution was kinship; familism was foremost in people's minds. And the primary way in which they made sense of the world was in terms of gender, by viewing persons as well as things, time and space in terms of male and female.

A discussion of the limitations of Malina's model remains beyond the scope of this work.
For an introduction to the main issue underlying Malina's personality model - the Mediterranean as a category of regional comparison - see, Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honour, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies," Ethnology 10 (1971) 1-24; J. Davis, People of the Mediterranean: An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977; and Joao de Pina-Cabral, "The Mediterranean as a Category of Regional Comparison: A Critical View," Current Anthropology 30 (1989) 399-406 (with a good bibliography).

The Ancient Mediterranean Personality:

(1) Sees no conflict between individual and group needs. (2) All members of a group share the same perspective (worldview). (3) Ego is embedded in the group. (4) Anti-introspective, not-psychologically minded. (5) Basic personality derives from ethnic characteristics. (6) Assesses other individuals through ethnic stereotypes. (7) Divides world according to ethnic group versus world (e.g., Greek vs. Barbarian; Jew vs. Gentile).
(8) Perceives himself and others as sharing an undifferentiated ego mass, i.e., each person represents their ethnic group completely
(9) Psychological ego reference is primarily to some group.
(10) Suppresses consciousness of individual needs and sees group needs as most important. (11) Immediate group needs are the focus of group interests, not the total ethnic group
needs.
(12) "I" always connotes some "we".
(13) Roles and space are divided according to gender.
(14) Behavioral controls are embedded in (social) custom, not in the individual conscience.
(15) Norms are not internalized.
(16) Norms reside in custom which controls situations which controls individuals. (17) Individuals carry strong social inhibitions and weak or non-existent personal inhibitions.
(18) Virtue is that which strengthens group cohesion, while evil weakens group solidarity. (19) Community controls behaviour, not individual responsibility.
(20) Concern to demonstrate gender specific characteristics and virtues.
(21) Sexual drive is uncontrollable in the absence of social controls.
(22) Males carry an inferiority complex which breeds sadistic and aggressive tendencies, thus
men are willing to inflict pain on everyone except ingroup adult males in order to
realize their goals. (23) Males are ever vigilant and defensive of their male image and have a great fear of
being perceived as feminine.
(24) Males are expected to show emotions.
(25) Three zones of action:
Heart is for thinking and eyes fill the heart with data (emotion filled),
Mouth speaks, ears hear (self-expressive),
Hands and feet act (purposeful action).
(26) Kinship is the central institution.
(27) Kinship group is the primary focus of personal loyalty. (28) Interpersonal behaviour is conducted on the basis of kinship. (29) All foreigners are a threat.
(30) Everyone knows everyone else's business.
(31) Problems are personalized as "who's" not "what's". (32) Mother - son bond is the strongest of Mediterranean affective relations.

Appendix II

Characteristics of Mediterranean Biography

Based upon Malina ("Dealing with Biblical [Mediterranean] Characters"), the following diagram is a comparison of cultural themes found in modern and ancient biography. As has been demonstrated, the application of modern criteria to ancient biography leads to false conclusions about past events and personalities. Many of the ancient biographical themes listed below are seen to operate in V. (Keep in mind that these themes reflect broad tendencies and therefore must not be expected to operate in each and every instance). The list is tentative and not meant to be exhaustive yet it renders comprehensible much of what Josephus describes and justifies the peculiar style of ancient Mediterranean texts (see below, Diagram 8).

Diagram 8

Cross-Cultural Comparison of Story Telling (Biography)

Diagram 8 - Continued

Cross-Cultural Comparison of Story Telling (Biography)

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_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ F U N C T I O N : _ _ M O D E R N : _ _ A N C I E N T : _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ Fulfilment of _ _
_ _ Describes... _ _ Psychological _ _ stereotypical roles according _ _
_ _ _ _ developmental stages _ _ prominence or deviance status _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Individual distinction _ _ _ _ Unusual events a _ _
_ _ demonstrated through... _ _ Skills and achievements _ _ person had to confront _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ How a person felt about _ _
_ _ Tells reader... _ _ What really happened _ _ what happened and how one _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ ought to feel about the events _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Basic personality _ _ Environment of early childhood, _ _ Geographically rooted ethnic _ _
_ _ assumed to be a result of.._ _ education and innate abilities _ _ characteristics (stereotypes) _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Problems in life _ _ Flawed personality _ _ Faulty relationships (bad _ _
_ _ are attributed to... _ _ and poor circumstances _ _ contracts) & personalized forces _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ Story _ _ The idiosyncratic, _ _ Conformity to _ _
_ _ demonstrates... _ _ the psychologically unique _ _ groups' worldview _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ Every individual is embedded _ _
_ _ Details how... _ _ Each person stands alone _ _ in some other individual _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ Honour maintenance, favour of _ _
_ _ Very concerned with... _ _ Specific unique achievements _ _ patrons, noble family lines _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ Exaggerated descriptions _ _
_ _ Tends towards... _ _ Realism _ _ of self and others _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Important events _ _ Impersonal circumstances _ _ _ _
_ _ are caused by... _ _ and resources - "what's" _ _ Person's - "who's" _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Evil _ _ The destruction of the self, _ _ The destruction _ _
_ _ is seen as... _ _ violation of personal integrity _ _ of group solidarity _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
_ _ Virtue is seen as... _ _ Perfection of individual quality _ _ The promotion of group cohesion _ _
_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _ÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑÑ_ _
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Appendix III
Other Clients of Poppaea Sabina

There are two other explicit indications that Poppea had clients other than Josephus in Roman Palestine. The earliest indication occurs during the procuratorship of Judaea by Porcius Festus (6062 C.E.) when a dispute arose between Jerusalem priests and Agrippa II. Agrippa had built a diningroom on to the Hasmonaean royal palace which thus allowed him a view over the inner court of the Temple. This, of course, enraged the priests who responded by building a wall along the west side of the inner court. The new wall effectively blocked not only Agrippa's view but also the view of Roman soldiers who kept watch from the western colonnade during festivals. This in turn angered both Agrippa and Festus who then ordered the priests to tear the wall down. The priests demanded a ruling on the matter from Nero himself as they could not bear to see any part of the Temple demolished. Festus agreed and an embassy of twelve Jews left for Rome which included the High Priest Helcias and the Temple treasurer Ismael. In Rome Nero granted the Jews the right to maintain the new wall. Josephus gives the following explanation for this favour: This was granted them in order to gratify Poppea, Nero's wife, who was a religious woman and had requested these favours of Nero, and who gave order to the ten ambassadors to go their way home; but retained Helcias and Ismael as hostages with herself (AJ 20.8.11).
While we can only guess if Poppea's reason for interceding on behalf of the Jewish deputation was truly religiously motivated, we may be sure that the result was that she gained more clients among the Jewish aristocracy who were now indebted to her for this act of intercession. It must be kept in mind that nothing was done by the elite without the expectation of future reciprocity and there could be no baser action than ingratitude and failure to reciprocate. The High Priest and Temple Treasurer were probably held in Rome by Poppea for a short time to ensure that the priests would not take advantage of their new privacy from the eyes of Roman guards.
The third instance of patronage by Poppea is explicit though lacking in details. Josephus makes a passing reference to Cleopatra who was the wife of Gessius Florus, the last procurator of Judaea (AJ 20.11.1). We are told that Florus obtained his appointment because his wife was a friend of Poppea. There is an abundance of evidence which attests to the granting of offices, honours and verdicts by the wives of Emperors. The granting of such posts is a clear manifestation of patronage. Through such favours Poppaea created a group of clients who were in her debt and from whom she could require service at any point in the future. This was the essential function of patronage in Josephus' world.

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White, Peter. "Positions for Poets in Early Imperial Rome." Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome. Ed., Barbara K. Gold. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1982. 50- 66.

Williams, Gordon. "Phases in Political Patronage of Literature in Rome." Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome. Ed., Barbara K. Gold. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1982. 3-27.

Williamson, G.A. The World of Josephus. London: Secker and Warburg. 1964.

Wolf, Eric R. "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies." Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Eds., Steffen W. Schmidt et al. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977. 167-77.

Zeitlin, Solomon. "A Survey of Jewish Historiography: Josephus Flavius and John of Gischala." Solomon Zeitlin's Studies in the Early History of Judaism. New York:
Ktav. 1973. 375-406.

All references to the text and translation of Josephus are from H.S.T. Thackeray, R. Marcus, A Wikgren, and L.H. Feldman, eds. and trans., Josephus 9 vols., Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926-1965.
H. Moehring, "Joseph b. Matthia and Flavius Josephus," ANRW 2.21.2 (1984) 865.
Shaye J.D. Cohen, Josephus in Galilee and Rome: His Vita and Development as a Historian, Leiden: Brill, 1979, 235. For less contemptuous evaluations of Josephus' credibility, see Tessa Rajak, Josephus: The Historian and His Society, London: Duckworth, 1983; D. M. Rhoads, Israel in Revolution: 6-74 C.E., Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976; and Martin Goodman, The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt Against Rome A.D. 66-70, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 21, who concludes that "In general when his (Josephus') narrative can be checked against other evidence he emerges as sometimes negligent but often remarkably accurate".
See, Appendix I, The Mediterranean Personality, for a brief outline of Bruce J. Malina's model of the ancient Mediterranean personality.
Cohen, Josephus 169. I am inclined to think that the failure to see thematic unity in alien texts is due to the social construction of our perception which fails to penetrate the relevant cultural codes embedded in ancient texts. Consider Cohen's conclusion in the light of the observation that historical criticism "betrays the narrative integrity of the text" (Ched Myers, Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark's Story of Jesus, Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988, 25).
Cohen, Josephus 105 and 127.
The term "cultural script" is used as a synonym of "social institution". "Cultural script" is here preferred because of the connotations of the word "script" which conveys the sense of two or more actors sharing a known "text" that outlines the flow of action in any given situation. For example, in our culture when you invite me over to dinner I will follow an expected pattern of behaviour when I come to your house to dine (introductions, etiquette, type of clothes, body language and so on). We can speak of this encounter in terms of actors who share a known script and thus come to expect certain patterns of behaviour in any given context. The same dynamic of culturally scripted action (a shared body of cultural knowledge) will be seen to govern actors in the context of patron-client relations within V.
T.F. Carney, The Shape of the Past: Models and Antiquity, Lawrence: Coronado Press, 1975, 171. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill also notes that "if we want to understand the structure of social relationship in antiquity, patronage study is an essential tool of analysis" ("Introduction," Patronage in Ancient Society, London: Routledge, 1989, 7).
For example, see, H.W. Attridge, "Josephus and His Works," Compendia 2.II (1984) 192.
Moehring, "Joseph," 866.
Cohen, Josephus 110.
For an introduction to the underlying issue of cultural universals (sameness) verses relativism (difference) see Edwin Ardener, "Social Anthropology, Language and Reality," Semantic Anthropology, London: Academic Press, 1982, 1-14. For an introduction to the anthropological characteristics of ancient Mediterranean biography see, Appendix II Characteristics of Mediterranean Biography.
Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, New York: Dutton, 1922, 25.
David B. Gowler, "Characterization in Luke: A Socio-Narratological Approach," BTB 19 (1989) 54.
Rene Lemarchand notes that the "ultimate test" of a patron-client model rests in its "descriptive and explanatory power", ("Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic," Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Beverly Hills - London: Sage, 1981, 15).
Bruce J. Malina, "The Received View and What It Cannot Do: III John and Hospitality," Semeia 35 (1986) 173-74.
Norman K. Gottwald, The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Introduction, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985, 21. William Farmer also speaks of "the tyranny of outmoded ideas and paradigms" in his overview of source criticism and the continuing influence of nineteenth century liberal German Protestant criticism on contemporary studies, "Source Criticism: Some Comments on the Present Situation," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 42 (1982) 55.
Bruce J. Malina notes that the Received View the dominant academic perspective and methodology(s) claims to be adequate to interpret texts historically but has in fact been unable to do this task. A general ignorance of the importance of social systems, as reflected in texts, has resulted in the received view continuing to produce "some of the best 19th century commentaries ever written" (Bruce J. Malina, "The Received View and What It Cannot Do: III John and Hospitality," Semeia 35 [1986] 17172).
Josephus' readers would have been both Jewish and non-Jewish, (see Cohen, Josephus 147), and most of these would have belonged to the upper classes.
See Carney, Shape, and Wallace-Hadrill, Patronage, for examples of new approaches to the study of antiquity.
E. Troeltsch, †ber historische und dogmatische Method in der Theologie, Tźbingen: Mohr, 1922, 734f, as delineated by Ben F. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus, London: SCM, 1979, 17.
Carney, Shape 5, observes that "The hard fact is that we do not have the choice of whether we will use models or not. Our choice, rather, lies in deciding whether to use them consciously or unconsciously".
Bengt Holmberg, Sociology and the New Testament: An Appraisal, Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990, 2.
Malcom Crick makes a similar observation about methodologies of social sciences which, in the extreme situation, "tell one nothing about the object of investigation but a great deal about the scientist's state of mind" (Malcom Crick "Anthropological Field Research, Meaning Creation and Knowledge Construction," Semantic Anthropology, London: Academic Press, 1982, 24).

James D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980, 296.
Dunn, Christology 296.
Augustine Stock, "The Limits of Historical-Critical Exegesis," BTB XIII (1983) 31.
John H. Elliot, "Social Scientific Criticism of the New Testament and its Social World: More on Method and Models," Semeia 35 (1986) 2.
Mary Douglas, "Do Dogs Laugh? A Cross-Cultural Approach to Body Symbolism," Journal of Psychosomatic Research 15 (1971) 389.
Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey, Calling Jesus Names: The Social Value of Labels in Matthew, Sonoma: Polebridge, 1988, xv. For our purposes here it will not be necessary to go into the very complex issue of what we mean by meaning. A good introduction to the problematics surrounding this far from culturally neutral term is Mark Hobart's essay, "Meaning or Moaning? An Ethnographic Note on a Little-Understood Tribe," (Semantic Anthropology, London: Academic Press, 1982, 39-63) where no less than seven main theories of meaning are identified within the American and British analytical approach alone. Hobart's survey of the bitter disagreements between and within the various schools leads him to conclude that "if hermeneutics can provide a clear statement about meaning it will be over the dead bodies of its own proponents" (Ibid., 47).
Elizabeth Tonkin, "Language Versus the World: Notes on Meaning for Anthropologists," Semantic Anthropology, London: Academic Press, 1982, 114.
Bruce J. Malina, "The Social Sciences and Biblical Interpretation," Interpretation, 36 (1982) 233.
With reference to the New Testament, Robin Scroggs suggests that "most texts are speaking about theological verities, not sociological conditions" (Robin Scroggs, "The Sociological Interpretation of the New Testament: The Present State of Research," New Testament Studies, 26 [1980] 166). Yet it is artificial to divorce the social setting from a text, regardless of its contents. As Malina has demonstrated, even such "theological verities" as grace are deeply embedded in a social context (see below, II.C.3.a fn. 54).
Cf., Ian G. Barbour, who describes a model as "a symbolic representation of selected aspects of the behaviour of a complex system for particular purposes" (Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion, New York: Harper and Row, 1974, 6).
Unlike Malina, I do not presume that the models constructed below will `head off' ethnocentrism from "the very outset", (Bruce J. Malina, Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation, Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1986). There is no pure starting point for perception, even with the best of models.
Trokin, "Language Verses the World," 108.
Carney, Shape 6.
James A. Boon, Other Tribes, Other Scribes: Symbolic Anthropology in the Comparative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions and Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, ix.
Here I am following Resseguie's discussion of the Russian formalist, Victor Shklovsky (James L. Resseguie, "Defamiliarization and the Gospels," BTB 20 [1990] 147).
Ressequie, "Defamiliarization" 147.
Elliot, "Social-Scientific" 5.
Carney, Shape 9-11.
On the limitations of models see also, Richard Rohrbaugh, "Models and Muddles: Discussions of the Social Facets Seminar," Forum (3) 1987, 23-33.
Elliot, "Social-Scientific" 9.
Carney, Shape 9.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 13. It is this factor of conceptual stretching verses conceptual straining which has not yet been reckoned with in the social scientific modelling of Malina et al.
S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 2-3. For a brief survey of the evolution of contemporary work on patron-client relations, see also, Arnold Strickon and Sidney M. Greenfield, "The Analysis of Patron-Client Relationships: An Introduction," Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage and Power Systems, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1972, 1-17.
Carney, Shape 171.
Terry Johnson and Christopher Dandeker, "Patronage: Relation and System," Patronage in Ancient Society, London-New York: Routledge, 1989, 218-242. See also, David D. Gilmore's "Anthropology of the Mediterranean Area," Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982) 175-205, for a brief survey of some approaches to modern patronage in the Mediterranean.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage" 218-242. The approach followed below will be to combine the macro-system analysis of political scientists and sociologists with the micro-system analysis of social anthropologists. This will allow us to fit the actions of Josephus into the immediate context of Galilee and into the broader context of the Roman empire. On the dual, national-regional focus of patronage studies see, Alex Weingrod, "Patronage and Power," Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London: Duckworth, 1977, 41-51.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons 27677. These nine characteristics reflect the authors' criticism of the systemic emphasis found in the models of the functionalist schools.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons 48-49.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 12.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 12.
See, for example, Paul Millet, "Patronage and its Avoidance in Classical Athens," 15-48, and Peter Garnsey and Greg Woolf, "Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World," 153-70, in Patronage in Ancient Society, 1989.
Wallace-Hadrill, Patronage 9-10, I would suggest that such was also the case within Roman Galilee throughout the first century C.E. Likewise, Richard Saller has also shown that any concept of "technical" criteria (strict legal and social definitions) for Roman Patronage are simply modern attributions: "the Romans applied the language of patronage to a range of relationships...usage was more fluid than usually supposed, and the connotations of amicus, cliens and patronus were subtly and variously manipulated in different circumstances ("Patronage and Friendship in Early Imperial Rome: Drawing the Distinction," Patronage in Ancient Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 57). For a brief survey of variations in patron-client systems see, Ernst Gellner, "Patrons and Clients," Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London: Duckworth, 1977, 1-6. On the parallel existence of variations in the forms of patron-client relations between modern and ancient (Roman) societies see, Luis Roniger, "Modern Patron-Client Relations and Historical Clientelism: Some Clues from Ancient Republican Rome," Archives EuropŽennes de Sociologie 24 (1983) 63-95.
Mary Douglas, "Cultural Bias," (Occasional Paper No. 35 of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland), London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1978, 5. On social determinism in the Human Sciences see, Sheldon R. Isenberg, "Some Uses and Limitations of Social Scientific Methodology in the Study of Early Christianity," Society of Biblical Literature 1980 Seminar Papers (19), Chico, California: Scholars Press; and Stanislav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery, Markham, Ontario: Penguin, 1972.
S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange," Comparative Studies in Society and History 22 (1980) 49.
John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," The American Political Science Review LXIV (1970) 413.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Study," 277.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 234-40.
John G. Gager, Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975, 101.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 9. On patronage as both socially functional and dysfunctional in the Roman empire see David Braund, "Function and Dysfunction: Personal Patronage in Roman Imperialism," Patronage in Ancient Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 137-52.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "The Study of Patron-Client Relations and Recent Developments in Sociological Theory," Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Beverly Hills-London: Sage, 1981, 278.
Marshall D. Sahlins, "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange," The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology, London: Tavistock, 1965, 147.
Cf., Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 225.
Julian Pitt-Rivers, The Fate of Shechem (or The Politics of Sex): Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean, London: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 34.
Pitt-Rivers, Fate 34.
Carl H. Lande, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism," Friends, Followers and Factions, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, xv.
Lande, "Dyadic" xv.
See Bruce J. Malina, "Patron and Client: The Analogy Behind Synoptic Theology," Forum (4) 1988, 4, 5-6, for a discussion of how the vocabulary of "grace" (_a____µa_, _____, ____sµa) belongs to the script of patronage.
Malina, Forum 6.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 225.
John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," The American Political Science Review LXIV (1970) 411.
Powell, "Peasant" 411.

J. Davis, People of the Mediterranean: An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, 132.
Davis, People 132. James Scott likewise speaks of "the normative order of the village (which) imposes certain standars of performance on its better-off members" (Scott, "Patronage as Myth," 27).
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 223-24.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage" 231.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Study," 284.
Cf., Patronage in Ancient Society, Ed., Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 232-34. For an opposing view see, P. Flynn, "Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 12 (2) 138-56, were it is suggested that coercion and manipulation are intrinsic to political clientelism.
James Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London: Duckworth, 1977, 34-35.
Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" 35-36.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 10.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 10.
Lemarchand, "Comparative," 10. Sydel Silverman has also observed that in certain instances, when the downward flow of exchange to clients is minimal, then an ideology of patronage can serve to underwrite the status and authority of elite patrons in the absence of equitable exchange, (Sydel Silverman, "Patronage as Myth," Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London: Duckworth, 1977, 7-19).
Malina sees the word µEs_t__ as rooted in the phenomenon of social brokerage and therefore translates 1 Tim 2:5 as "For God is one and the broker between God and men is one, too, the man Jesus Christ ...". He goes on to interpret Jesus as broker and God as patron as portrayed within the Synoptic gospels. See Malina, "Patron and Client," 11-18.
Malina, Forum 2-32.
Jeremy Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, 148.
Boissevain, Friends 146-47.
Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 227.
The following description of power and cultural brokers is based upon Richard N. Adams' "Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of Complex Societies," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 26 (1970) 315-327. In contrast to Adams' definition, William T. Stuart sees little distinction between patrons and brokers (William T. Stuart, "The Explanation of Patron-Client Systems: Some Structural and Ecological Perspectives," Structure and Process in Latin America: Patronage, Clientage and Power Systems, Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 1972, 33-34).
This explains why Jesus was such a threat to them. As a broker of the resources of God he competed with the Pharisees and threatened to undermine their client base (the Jewish peasantry) and this was a direct threat to their strength as a faction among the ruling elite .
Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 172-73.
Martin Goodman, The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt against Rome A.D. 66-70, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 150.

Robert Paine, "A Theory of Patronage and Brokerage," Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic, Toronto, 1971, 18. Failure to adequately define brokers as distinct from patrons or clients due to the type of resources they mediate leads to vague and imprecise usage of the concept. The term `broker' becomes synonymous with `patron' and loses analytical value (as Robert Paine has pointed out). This is seen to occur in Halvor Moxnes' The Economy of the Kingdom: Social Conflict and Economic Relations in Luke's Gospel (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988) where brokers are described simply as mediators or middlemen (44).
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Patron-Client," 49.
Davis, People 134. Johnson and Dandeker likewise note that complex networks of patronage can function as the prime mechanism in the redistribution of scarce resources, "Patronage," 223.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations," 48-49.
See, for example, Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity, New York, 1979, 12, and F.F. Bruce, The Spreading Flame, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958, 139141.
This line of reasoning can be seen in Feldman's analysis: "Jewish missionary activities...were well on their way to converting the Roman Empire to a Jewish or semiJewish state." Luis H. Feldman, "Flavius Josephus Revisited: the Man, His Writings, and His Significance," ANRW Vol. II, New York, 1984, 785.
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," Patronage in Ancient Society, London-New York: Routledge, 1989, 64.
Although there were several embassies from Judaea to Rome prior to the revolt, Josephus' embassy cannot be identified with any of the events reported in AJ or BJ (Tessa Rajak, Josephus: The Historian and His Society, London: Duckworth, 1983, 39).
Martin Goodman, The Ruling Class of Judaea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 139. On embassies to the emperor, see Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World, London: Duckworth, 1977, 375-385.
Goodman, Ruling 139. Cohen, Josephus 61-62, unnecessarily maintains that the priests were sent to Rome on charges of anti-Roman activity. In doing so he fails take into account the obvious possibility that they were sent to Rome purely as a result of factional fighting within the largely pro-Roman (collaborative) ruling class.
Carney, Shape 62.
PittRivers, Fate 34. As with many aspects of patronclient dynamics, this is true both of GraecoRoman society and the modern Mediterranean. Compare PittRivers, Fate 34, with Richard Saller, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 1314.
For the importance of amicus and amicitia (friends and friendship), see Saller, Personal 1115. Saller notes that among Romans, friendship was fundamentally instrumental in nature because of the "underdevelopment of rational, impersonal institutions for the provision of services" Personal 14-15. As both the material environment and the social script of patron-client relations were largely uniform throughout the early empire, it is thus highly likely that the utilitarian nature of friendship and its role in patron-client relations were comparable phenomena between the elite classes of Rome and the elite members of her colonies. At the centres of power and resources everyone played the same game.

David Braund, "Function and Dysfunction: Personal Patronage in Roman Imperialism," Patronage in Ancient Society, London-New York: Routledge, 1989, 151. The provincial elite as brokers of Imperial resources and control became increasingly significant as the political expansion of the early empire outran the organizational capacity of the emperor's household (Johnson and Dandeker, "Patronage," 238).
Patronage appears to have been exercised by Imperial women under Nero, Vespasian, Domitian, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius and Caracalla, (see Saller, Personal 65). Poppea systematically removed every obstacle that prevented her rise to power beside Nero - including Nero's own mother, Agrippina, and wife, Octavia. It is not unreasonable to speculate that she subsequently used her considerable wealth to strengthen her position in Rome and increase her supporters throughout the empire. On the life of Poppea see, Miriam T. Griffin, Nero: The End of a Dynasty, London: Batsford, 1984.
Saller, Personal 6566.
Generosity is one of the characteristics of a good benefactor; Frederick W. Danker, Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a GraecoRoman and New Testament Semantic Field, Missouri: Clayton, 1982, 323336.
Saller, Personal 126. The lack of direct empirical evidence that there was in fact a reciprocal (and generalized) exchange between Josephus and Poppea is mirrored in a wider lack of empirical evidence of reciprocal exchange relations between patrons and clients in Rome. Johnson and Dandeker note that the lack of direct evidence is overcome once the focus moves from a relational to a system level of analysis: "At the system level the empirical issue is not the existence of one-to-one exchanges over the short term but the existence and operation of a complex network of vertical and cross-cutting ties which have wider integrative and social control functions than those identified through the discrete reciprocations of single patrons and clients" ("Patronage," 225).
Saller, Personal 127.
E. Mary Smallwood, "The Alleged Jewish Tendencies of Poppaea Sabina," The Journal of Theological Studies, 10 (1959) 329335. Smallwood's explanation is really no different from G.A. Williamson's which has Poppea being "impressed" by Josephus' appeals (G.A. Williamson, The World of Josephus, London, 1964, 141). Both explanations ignore the factors of interpersonal contact that made the Graeco-Roman world quite unlike ours.
Saller, Personal 14. Malina, "Patron and Client" 5, also notes that "all gifts implied obligations and were made with strings attached".
Feldman, "Flavius," 782. It is difficult to see why Feldman attributes the gifts to Nero and not, as Josephus relates, to Poppea. Perhaps this is because he did not understand how Poppea herself mediated Imperial resources.
Josephus' embassy to Rome took place in 64 C.E., but the outbreak of the revolt was not until mid 66, (Rajak, Josephus, 39 and BJ 2.315).
Richard A. Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine, San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987, 9. See also David M. Rhoads, Israel in Revolution: 6-74 C.E., A Political History Based on the Writings of Josephus, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979.

It is surprising that Harold W. Attridge could find reason to claim that Josephus does not record the outcome of his embassy. The context of patronage certainly serves to indicate that "this favour" of Poppea's is in fact the liberation of the priests (V 16), see Attridge, "Josephus," 186.
For an analysis of the strategic role of favours and gifts granted by members of imperial households to their clients, see "Reciprocity and Social Cohesion," in Saller, Personal 6978.
P.A. Brunt, "The Romanization of the Local Ruling Classes in the Roman Empire," Assimilation et rŽsistance la culture grŽco-romaine dans le monde ancien, Paris: SociŽtŽ d'dition "Les Belles Lettres", 1976, 169.
On the career of Agrippa I, see Daniel R. Schwartz, Agrippa I: The Last King of Judaea, Tźbingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990.
Goodman, Ruling 148.
Cohen, Josephus 61, casts doubt upon the probability of the embassy because Josephus was only a "young man". Yet Josephus' social status as a member of the Jewish aristocracy would have been a far more compelling reason for his selection for such an embassy than his age would have been an impedance. Indeed, how "young" is 26 in antiquity for members of the elite classes (consider that public careers of the Roman aristocracy began in their late teens, cf., Lily Ross Taylor, "Nobles, Clients, and Personal Armies," Friends, Followers and Factions, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 179-192)?
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," Patronage in Ancient Society, London-New York: Routledge, 1989, 78.
It is significant that Josephus was in fact able to operate at the highest level of Roman culture, the imperial household, with relative ease. That Josephus knew how to penetrate the centre of the Roman empire suggests that elite Jews shared in patron-client relations a common cultural script with elite Romans. I would suggest that it was almost entirely within the context of this shared cultural script that the two societies are seen to interact with each other. Here they share, if not the same language, then a similar dialect (cf., John Rich, "Patronage and Interstate Relations in the Roman Republic," Patronage in Ancient Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 117-135; and Braund, ["Function and Dysfunction," 137-52], who notes that "Patronage was a principle channel by means of which foreign and provincial administration were conducted" [139]). For an introduction to client relationships in Roman foreign policy and the role of the Roman aristocracy, see, E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae: 264-70 B.C. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.
Goodman, Ruling 156.
The following overview of the Jerusalem-Galilee network is based upon Martin Goodman's analysis in Ruling.
Ananias' alliance contained his own long term supporters, the factions of Eleazar and Jesus, as well as other factions (Goodman, Ruling 183). Solomon Zeitlin overlooks the faction of Jesus b. Gamalas and therefore identifies only two factions in the provisional government ("A Survey of Jewish Historiography: Josephus Flavius and John of Gischala," Solomon Zeitlin's Studies in the Early History of Judaism, New York: Ktav, 1973, 45). Here we are concerned only with those who had a direct impact on the action portrayed in V between Josephus and John.
Goodman, Ruling 184. (V 197 with BJ 2.628).
Goodman, Ruling 183.
Goodman, Ruling 183.
There can be no questioning that V and BJ portray John as a member of the ruling class. On this see Goodman, Ruling 201-2 and Cohen, Josephus 221-7.
Both Josephus and John initially react in the same manner to the peasant revolt, they both try defuse the situation and restore loyalty to Rome. This is an indication of their status as members of the ruling class and a further confirmation of the position of the Jewish elite as collaborators with Rome.
The inter-city and inter-ethnic fighting that Josephus describes throughout the V as erupting during the rebellion reflects known sociological dynamics of an imperial-colonial context. Once the immediate threat of Roman punishment for disorder was removed, long standing rivalries were unleased. On Jewish-pagan relations, see Uriel Rappaport, "Jewish-Pagan Relations and the Revolt against Rome in 66-70 C.E.," The Jerusalem Cathedra I, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981, 81-95; Douglas R. Edwards, "First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring the Archaeological and Literary Evidence," SBL 1988 Seminar Papers 169-182; P.A. Brunt, "Josephus on Social Conflict in Roman Judaea," Klio 59 (1977) 149-53; and E. Schurer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, G. Vermes et. al., 3 Vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1973-87, I, 336-513. In light of the intense, local hostility that the Jews faced it is not improbable that Josephus' fortifying activities were not primarily a defensive measure against the Romans but an interim measure against their Greek neighbours. Rappaport likewise suggests that John fortified Gischala not necessarily from anti-Roman motives but as a defensive measure against non-Jewish neighbours, (see, "John of Gischala in Galilee," The Jerusalem Catherdra I, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1981, 52).
Goodman associates Joazar and Judas' support of John's control over the imperial corn as "a transfer of power in the north of Galilee to John" (Goodman, Ruling 201), but he fails to connect the control of resources to the social structure of patron-client relations as the mediator of major resources.
Goodman, Ruling 184.
Cohen, Josephus 210, misses John's connection to Eleazar's faction and therefore finds it "strange" that Josephus should refer to Upper Galilee as "his (John's) province" (V 73) but this must have been obvious to Josephus, who would have know full well that Eleazar was intent on maintaining John in Upper Galilee and therefore sent Joazar and Judas with Josephus to represent his faction's interests in Galilee and support John over the issue of the imperial corn. V indicates that Josephus was very astute politically about both Jerusalem and Rome. As a member of the ruling aristocracy he had to be just to survive among his peers.
This is a good example of how social status serves in the redistribution of wealth in an embedded economy. In antiquity social status and the political power that was embedded in status lead to the control and distribution of peasant surplus (Anthony J. Saldarini, Pharisees, Scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian Society: A Sociological Approach, Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1988, 23).
Cohen, Josephus 222.
Goodman, Ruling 183-84. The process of power sharing was probably one of negotiating and manoeuvring rather than "delegating". The is no evidence to suggest that Josephus was in a position to delegate anything in Upper Galilee after John gained control of the imperial corn stores.
Cohen, Josephus 223.
Cohen, Josephus 222.
One of the few explicit indications of the cooperation that existed between the two rival leaders is also an indication of their intense rivalry. This is seen when Josephus permits John to travel to the hot baths of Tiberias on the excuse of poor health (V 84-93). On his arrival John immediately attempts to undermine Josephus' leadership of that city (see below).
Patronage of communities, towns and even cities was common throughout the Roman world. It "was treated as analogous to personal patronage: it was described in similar vocabulary, was equally heritable, and also involved reciprocal services", Garnsey and Woolf, "Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World," 161.
Braund, "Function and Dysfunction," 140.
Sean Freyne, Galilee 211, refers to John as "commercially entrepreneurial," but his actions of manoeuvring for control of corn and selling the oil cannot be interpreted with reference to the modern economic concept of commercial entrepreneurialism as if John was a private individual in a capitalist market system. Commercial entrepreneurialism largely arises out of private monetary incentives and rewards and reflects a highly individualistic society. Yet John's actions were probably not motivated primarily out of the desire for private profit but reflected his role, as an elite patron, within a redistributive economy. He actions are best described as an elite patron who reinforced his ability to redistribute material goods to a growing base of local clients (on the lack of an entrepreneurial ethic in antiquity, see T.F. Carney, The Economy of Antiquity: Controls, Gifts and Trade, Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado, 1973).
Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society," 73-75.
Richard A. Horsley and John S. Hanson, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus, Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985, 48-87.
Cohen, Josephus 211.
Keith Hopwood, "Bandits, Elites and Rural Order," Patronage in Ancient Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 175-76. On social banditry see, Henk Driessen, "The `Noble Bandit'and the Bandits of the Nobles: Brigandage and Local Community in Nineteenth-Century Andalusia," Archives EuropŽennes de Sociologie 24 (1983); Goodman, Ruling 60-64; E.J. Hobsbawm, Bandits, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969; Horsley and Hanson, Bandits; and Richard W. Slatta, ed., Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry, New York: Greenwood, 1987.
"(l)ocal representatives of state authority and bandits were often hand in glove" (103), Driessen, "The `Noble Bandit'. B.J. 2.253 speaks of bandits with close links to villages.
Driessen, "The `Noble Bandit'" 184.
Pace Cohen, Josephus 211.
Goodman, Ruling 224-26.
Cohen, Josephus 212.
Cohen, Josephus 214.
Among agarian peasants, patrons are particularly valued as mediators of disputes and perservers of local order (Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" 23-24).
Cohen is uncertain whose loyalty the Galilean leaders were guaranteeing, "of themselves and the others of their class, or of the Galileans?" (Cohen, Josephus 208). Yet the context of V 77-84 is clearly patron-client relations: Josephus describing his clients and how he engaged them (V 77-79); his character as an ideal patron (V 80-83); and his clients' loyalty to him (V 84). Therefore it is certain that the phrase "the loyalty of the district" meant both the loyalty of the local leaders and the Galilean peasantry in light of the wider context of V and with regard to the general dynamics of a patron-client network.
Cohen, Josephus 206-209.
Sydel Silverman's study of the Colleverdesi reveals a parallel phenomenon that saw the patronage system serving as a means to draw high-status outsiders into local commitments ("Patronage as Myth" 17). The same dynamic appears to have occurred between the Galilean aristocracy and Josephus.
On the sexual behaviour of women being the crucial link in the structure of a family's honour see, Wolf "Kinship" 171 and Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honour, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies," Ethnology 10 (1971) 3.
It is hopelessly ethnocentric to claim that in V 84 Josephus is boasting of his popularity in his "normal vainglorious manner" (Cohen, Josephus 125). Josephus' frequent claims of popularity among the Galileans is a function of his claim to have been an honourable patron. In this context, claims to popularity cannot be interpreted as a function of vanity.
Zeitlin attributes the change in the provisional governments' attitude of Josephus' command to Josephus own actions and not to factional manoeuvring by John. Yet there is no compelling reason to doubt that the deputation was sent as a result of bribery within the coalition ("A Survey of Jewish Historiography," 45).
Cohen attributes the failure of the deputation to their supposed origin in a Pharisaic faction - they failed because the Pharisaic movement was not influential in Galilee "until after the Bar Kokhba revolt" (Josephus 226). But Pharisaism was neither the issue with Josephus or with the Galileans. To the contrary, the issues that are clearest in V are the loyalty of the Galileans to Josephus, the Galileans' opposition to the rival patron, John and the honour and good conduct of their own patron Josephus. It is patron-client dynamics, and not the lack of popularity for the Pharisaic movement, that best explains the deputation's failure.
Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation?" 22. Scott makes the important point that the question "is not whether the exchange is lopsided, but rather how lopsided it is (sic)" ("Patronage" 25).
Inter-patron conflict and the role of client choice increased as the social systems of Roman Palestine decayed in the course of the revolt. In a similar fashion, these two factors came to dominate patron-client relations throughout the late empire (see, Garnsey and Woolf, "Patronage of the Rural Poor in the Roman World").
Sean Freyne, Galilee, Jesus and the Gospels: Literary Approaches and Historical Investigations, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988, 150-51.
Freyne makes a similar error when he writes that the Galilean peasants "remained innately suspicious of the locals made good (locals like Jesus of Nazareth or John of Gischala)", Galilee 267. To the contrary, our analysis shows no such suspicion of John on the bases of his local origin. The suspicion that does exist arises out of either his stance as a revolutionary or from his position as a rival patron to Josephus. John and his interaction with the Galileans cannot be analyzed simply through intuitive concepts of a "big man" or a "local-made-good" without misinterpreting both John and the Galileans.
There is a mention of a Galilean named Jesus who was staying in Jerusalem with six hundred armed men (V 200) but there is no connection between Jesus and the group Josephus refers to as "the Galileans" other than geographical.
This analysis confirms Freyne's observation that within V the term "__ Ga___a___" has a distinctive meaning as indicating the loyal supporters of Josephus, (Sean Freyne, "The Galileans in the Light of Josephus' Vita," New Testament Studies 26 [1980] 397-413).
Cohen once again reduces his analysis of V to a personalistic level when he states that, "Personal rivalry between the two leaders is a sufficient explanation for this ploy (of sending for the Jerusalem deputation) and recourse to political differences is not necessary" (Josephus 224). Contrary to Cohen, we have shown that John acted against Josephus because he was a member of a rival faction. Cohen tends to see Josephus and John as largely independent of the Jerusalem coalition, but this was most certainly not the case.
Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society," 77. He also notes that the existence of such a network is hard to document "without numerous collections of letters" (77), but V with BJ stands out as a unique document in antiquity that describes with unusual detail the networks of relationships and the resources involved between the centre and the periphery of society. It is striking that, as far as I have been able to ascertain, there exists no study of patronage within Josephus' work besides my own. In this regard, V has thus far been overlooked.
Sean Freyne, "Galilee-Jerusalem Relations According to Josephus' Life," New Testament Studies 33 (1987) 602.
Freyne, "Galilee-Jerusalem" 607.
Tacitus also claims to have enjoyed the benefactions of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian: "My official career owed its beginning to Vespasian, its progress to Titus and its further advancement to Domitian" (Histories 1.1.5). For a survey of the role of imperial patronage from the beginning of Roman literary activity in the mid third century B.C.E. down to the Flavians, see Gordon Williams, "Phases in Political Patronage of Literature in Rome," Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 3-27.
In 62 C.E. Cicero defended a Greek poet from a charge of having made a false claim to Roman citizenship (Arch. 5).
Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World, London: Duckworth, 1977, 493.
Millar, Emperor 506.
Millar, Emperor 493.
Peter White, "Positions for Poets in Early Imperial Rome," Literary and Artistic Patronage in Ancient Rome, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 64.
Eisenstadt and Roniger, "Patron-Client Relations," 62.
John Drinkwater, "Patronage in Roman Gaul and the Problem of the Bagaudae," Patronage in Ancient Society, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 190.
Cohen, Josephus 207. The model of cultural antagonism between city and village in Galilee does not adequately take into account the symbiotic economic, social and political relationships that existed between villages and urban areas throughout the Roman empire (see, Edwards, "First Century Urban/Rural Relations").
Judge, "Social" 210.
Judge, "Social" 216.
Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology, Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981, 52.
Martin Goodman's excellent analysis of the origins of the Jewish revolt misses much as a result of wrongly maintaining that the "relationship between patron and client which was fundamental in, for instance, Roman culture was not found among Jews" (Ruling 67). His argument is based upon a brief analysis of economic production and overlooks the bulk of the literature on patron-client relations.
Bruce J Malina, "Dealing with Biblical (Mediterranean) Characters: A Guide for U.S. Consumers," BTB 19 (1989) 127-141.
Malina, "Dealing" 139.
For critiques of Malina's modelling theory, see Susan R. Garrett, (Review) Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation, by Bruce J. Malina, Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1986, in the Journal of Biblical Literature 107 (1988) 532-534; Jerome H. Neyrey, "Social Science Modelling and the New Testament," BTB 16 (1986) 107-110; and Leland J. White, "The Bible, Theology and Cultural Pluralism," BTB 16 (1986) 111-115.
AJ 20. 18996.

See, Saller, Personal 6566.
Note that Poppaea had clients among both ruling groups within Palestine, the Romans and the Jewish aristocracy.

Patron-Client Dynamics in the VITA

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